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Abstract 
latrogenic injury has been found to occur in around 10% of UK hospital admissions, equating to the 
harm of approximately 850,000 patients each year. The Department of Health has made repeated 
calls for NHS research to learn from proactive error management techniques (EMTs) employed 
within other 'safety-critical' organisations (DOH 2000,2001). The aim of this research was to 
develop a valid and reliable proactive measure of latent organisational failures (EMT) for use in 
secondary care using a psychological theory of organisational accidents (Reason, 1990,1997). This 
theory purports that errors occur as a result of a complex interaction between unsafe acts and 
systemic organisational weaknesses known as latent failures. This tool will be used to measure and 
monitor organisational safety in health care and predict the likelihood of medication administration 
errors (MAEs). 
Twenty semi-structured interviews were conducted in study I with qualified nurses from several 
general medical wards and senior managers from Bradford Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation 
Trust. Using error vignettes, participants were asked to discuss their perceptions of error causation. 
Additional qualitative data was collected using clinical observations and incident report review. 
Using thematic content analysis, ten latent workplace and organisational causes of MAEs were 
identified, consistent with psychological error theory and error causes evidenced within other 
safety-critical industries (Reason, 1997; Groeneweg, 1992; Helmreich, 2000; Colla et al., 2005), 
including team functioning, human resources, culture and training. In ternis of Reason's 
organisational accident model, combining three pools of independent qualitative data afforded an 
in-depth exploration of latent error causes at an individual (e. g. unsafe practices), workplace (e. g. 
team functioning) and organisational level (e. g. use of policies and protocols). 
Study 2 was conducted to conceptualize identified latent preconditions of MAE within a proactive 
questionnaire measure; the Organisational Safety Questionnaire (OSQ). Revisiting qualitative data 
collected in Study 1, this study explored the ways in which each latent organisational failure would 
manifest at a hospital ward level. One hundred and forty-five safety indicators were generated 
based on these manifestations of poor safety. Pilot studies to test the face validity of indicators and 
content analysis to remove less commonly endorsed items led to refinement of the tool to 82 items. 
Given several notable drawbacks to using NHS formal incident reporting systems as an outcome 
measure, study 3 was conducted to develop an independent measure of MAEs against which to test 
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the predictive validity of the OSQ (the Drug Round Behaviour questionnaire; DRBQ). This study 
explored the types of MAEs which can arise in secondary care as a direct or indirect result of the 
ten latent preconditions. Using the qualitative data obtained in study 1, a 27-item measure of 10 
types of MAE (NCC MERP, 1995) was developed which was not reliant upon adverse patient 
outcomes and intended to also capture near misses. After a pilot study was conducted to improve 
the construct and face validity of the tool, 13 items which reflected 7 types of MAE had good face 
validity and were retained for study 4. 
The final study was conducted to measure the validity and reliability of the OSQ. The 82-item OSQ 
was administered to qualified and unqualified nurses working in 54 clinical areas across 2 two 
Bradford hospitals. Analysis revealed that the OSQ was relevant for all qualified nurses working in 
34 of these clinical areas. Although developed as 10 subscales representing 10 latent preconditions 
of MAE, factor analysis yielded only one overall construct from 28 items named 'organisational 
safety'. However, these items reflected 8 of the 10 proposed predictors of MAE which supports 
their role in the occurrence of MAE. The 28-item OSQ had good internal consistency and 
concurrent validity (with an independent 9-item measure of local safety culture; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 
2007). While the OSQ was significantly predictive of MAEs measured by the DRBQ, it did not 
significantly predict formally reported incidents. However, this may have been an artefact of low 
stati fe n istical power which may have been improved with a larger sample. Finally, high sa ty isk 
wards said they were less likely toformally report their errors than lower risk wards, yet all wards 
reported a similar number of incidents. It is proposed that high risk wards report a comparatively 
smaller percentage of the errors which actually occur compared to lower risk wards due to poorer 
safety cultures. Interestingly, high safety risk wards admitted making significantly more MAEs on 
the DRBQ than 'safer' wards suggesting the DRBQ was a more sensitive measure of the actual 
number of drug administration errors occurring on wards. The Organisational Safety Questionnaire 
represents a novel, valid and reliable proactive measure of safety which is not currently available in 
health care which would be useful in measuring the effects on systems interventions and other 
organisational changes. 
This thesis has explored and identified latent organisational causes of medication administration 
errors in secondary care and used methodological techniques used in other safety-critical industries 
to develop a valid and reliable measure of organisational safety which was successful in predicting 
medication administration errors. Findings are discussed in terms of the benefit of rigorous 
qualitative methods in this type of research and the direction of future research which could 
examine the generaliseability of the tool to other health care professionals or fields of medicine. 
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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
................. . ........ t..... . ....... .. "ý-. IAA"-. .. .1 -- ý.. Aj A. . ................ ...... I 
1.1. Introduction 
Errors are to be expected, even in the best organisations. When errors occur, 
the question should not be "who is at fault? " but "why did our defences fail? " 
Focussing exclusively on individuals misses an essential part of the error story 
and blocks the path to effective remediation. We cannot change the human 
condition, but we can change the conditions under which humans work. 
(Reason, 2000, pp. 769) 
Human error is routinely blamed for accidents in many high risk industries, particularly in health 
care. The public are often faced with newspaper headlines such as 'Negligent doctor orders killer 
jab! ' (Daily Mail, July 2003), or 'Nurses hygiene to blame for superbug' (Evening Times, April 
2004). To believe such headlines would be to assume that when health care professionals enter the 
hospital grounds they become impervious to the cognitive constraints particular to all human beings 
and in some ways are 'superhuman'. 
Over the last decade, research and national policies have highlighted that the investigation of only 
the immediate causes of error has had a minimal effect on error management strategies in health 
care. Many researchers have indicated and driven government policy towards more detailed 
exploration of medical error causation which may present as an early warning sign much earlier in 
the chain of events preceding human error (Coxon et al., 2003). This thesis will present evidence 
towards a clearer understanding of such 'early warning signs' in the field of secondary health care. 
This chapter outlines the overall research aims and objectives of the thesis and briefly outlines each 
of the four studies undertaken. This chapter also includes a summary of the most current 
international and national statistics on medical error and a brief overview of a key UK government 
report, An Organisation with a memory (Department of Health; DoH, 2000) to give context to the 
ongins of this research. 
1.2. Research sponsorship 
This study was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), Bradford Teaching 
Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust (as part of an ESRC-CASE collaboration) and the University of 
Leeds. The overall aim of the research was to employ a mixed methods approach to explore 
organisational factors and other local working conditions which contribute to medication errors in 
secondary care. While it was the initial intention of the research to study all types of medical errors 
it quickly became evident after reviewing a number of clinical incident reports that this would be 
considerably beyond the scope of the project. After liaising With the collaborating institution and 
reviewing the evidence on the prevalence of different types of error, the decision was made to focus 
on medication errors, in particular those involving the administration of drugs in view of their 
importance in health care. Being the collaborating industrial sponsor, all field work was conducted 
in two of Bradford NHS Trust secondary care hospitals; Bradford Royal Infinnary and St Luke's 
Hospital. 
1.3. Medical error statistics 
In the UK, adverse incidents leading to patient harin (latrogenic injury) have been found to occur in 
around 10 per cent of hospital admissions, equating to the injury of an estimated 850,000 patients 
per year. More than 6,600 adverse incidents involving medical devices were reported to the Medical 
Devices Agency in 1999; 87 of which resulted in death and 345 serious injuries (DoH, 2000). Of 
particular relevance to this thesis which focuses on errors made in the administration of medication, 
is the finding that approximately 10,000 patients in the UK each year are involved in some forin of 
adverse drug reaction'. Apart from the obvious costs to the health of patients, there are also 
financial implications. The NHS spends around MO million each year in settlement of clinical 
negligence claims and in 1998/99, had a potential liability of approximately E2.4 billion for 
' An adverse drug reaction refers to the 'unwelcome, negative consequences associated with the use of 
administered medications' (Nebeker et al., 2004). 
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expected and existing claims, many of which litigation analysis found to be avoidable. Additionally 
around Q billion every year is spent in prolonged hospital stays and additional treatment costs 
associated with iatrogenic injury (DoH, 2000). Comparable statistics can be found internationally. 
USA 
The US publication To Err is human. - Building a safer health system (Institute of Medicine; IoM, 
1999), reported that between 44,000 to 98,000 hospitalised patients die each year as a result of 
iatrogenic injury. Even using the lowest of these figures means medical error related deaths are the 
eighth leading cause of mortality in the USA, higher than the number of deaths attributable to 
AIDS, breast cancer or car accidents (McFadden et al., 2004). The IoM report estimated that 
medical errors cost the US around $37.6 billion each year. The Harvard Medical Practice Study 
(Brennan et al., 1991; Leape et al., 1991) constituted landmark researcb in this field, reviewing 
patient records of 30,121 hospitalizations from 51 acute care hospitals In New York State in 1984. 
Results revealed that Adverse Events (AE) occurred in almost 4 per cent of hospitalizations; the 
most common AEs were medication-related (19 per cent) and approximately 70 per cent of these 
events were preventable. 
Australia 
In the Quality of Australian Health Care Study in 1995,14,179 hospital admission records from 
1992 from 28 hospitals were reviewed to identify adverse events and adverse drug events which had 
resulted in 'unintended injury to patients caused by health care management" (Wilson et al., 1995). 
Results revealed almost 17 per cent of reviewed admissions were associated with adverse events 
and 1.6 per cent of these were associated with adverse drug events (ADEs); almost half of which 
were deemed preventable. Unfortunately, this study (and many others conducted in Australia - 
Lannour et al., 1991; Easton et al., 1998; Runciman et al., 2002,2003) focused predomInantly on 
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the number of adverse events which have resulted in admission to hospital' but made little 
distinction between these and the number of hospital admissions which had resulted in adverse 
events or drug events as is the case for most research in this area. 
New Zealand 
In the New Zealand Adverse Events Study, Davis et aL reported that 'of the top 20 risk factors that 
account for nearly three quarters of all [New Zealand] deaths annually, adverse in-hospital e\, ents 
come in at number II above air pollution, alcohol and drugs, violence and road traffic injury' 
(Davis et al., 2002,2003). 
Canada 
The Canadian Adverse Events study (Baker et al., 2004) estimated the incidence of Adverse Events 
(AEs) in 2000 ('... unintended injuries or complications resulting in death, disability or prolonged 
hospital stay that arise from health care management... ') by reviewing patient records from five 
Canadian acute care hospitals. AEs were identified in 255 of the charts, equating to 7.5 per cent of 
hospital admissions in 2000; approximately 37 per cent of which were deemed by physician 
reviewers as preventable. It was calculated that patients spent an additional 1521 days in hospital as 
a result of these 255 AEs alone. Baker et al. extrapolate these findings to suggest that of the 2.5 
million hospital admissions in Canada each year, around 185,000 are associated with an AE and 
approximately 70,000 of these are potentially preventable. 
Iran 
In a study of 370 patient records in a hospital at the Tehran Medical Sciences University, GholarM 
and Shalvin (1999, as cited in Kanjanarat et al., 2003) found approximately 17 per cent of these 
patients had at least one Adverse Drug Reaction (ADR) during their hospital stay. Gholami and 
I Wilson et al., estimate that 49 per cent of detected adverse events were the reason for hospital admission. 
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Shalviri classified 10 per cent of the ADRs as mild, 86 per cent as moderate, 1 per cent as severe, 
and 3 per cent as lethal. Of these ADRs, approximately 60 per cent were identified as preventable 
and 96 per cent as predictable reactions. 
1.4. An organisation with a memory 
In 2000, an expert group on learning from adverse events in the NHS published the government 
report: An Organization with a Memory, which drew attention to the scale of medical error and 
proposed ways in which future patient safety research should be directed to effect positive changes. 
One particular research objective included gaining a clearer understanding of the root causes of 
adverse incidents in NHS care (DoH, 2000). The report acknowledged that in order to reduce the 
number of adverse events to patients, healthcare orgamsations must learn the lessons about the 
underlying causes of these events. The report further acknowledged that current incident analysis 
systems in the NHS focused largely upon 'localised causes' of adverse incidents, often blaming 
human actions which immediately precede events. Recommendations emphasized the need for a 
new strategy of incident analysis which recognizes the presence of both activefailures (unsafe acts) 
and latent conditions (Reason, 1990) in most adverse events. Latent (dormant) conditions are 
organisational or other systems weaknesses (e. g. training issues, lack of resources etc. ) which 
develop over time but which can go unnoticed or disregarded until they result in an unsafe act or 
combine with other latent conditions to compromise patient safety. The distinction between latent 
conditions and active failures will be discussed in more detail in chapters 2 and 6. 
Of particular interest to this thesis, the DoH report emphasizes that future patient safety researchers 
should focus on ways to proactively identify these latent systemic causes of poor patient safety 
which are entrenched within the organisational culture to enable more effective error management. 
The report further cautions that; 
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'Any attempt at risk management that focuses primarily upon the supposed mental 
processes underlying error (forgetfulness, inattention, carelessness, negligence, and the 
like) and does not seek out and remove these situational 'error-traps' is sure to fail. 
The local human errors are the last and probably the least manageable part of the 
causal sequence leading up to some adverse event. ' (DoH, 2000, pp. 2 1) 
The research presented in this thesis aimed to explore one of the recommendations of An 
Organization with a Memory; learning safety management lessons ftom other non-health care high 
risk industries such as aviation and nuclear power generation. The report makes particular reference 
to James Reason's Swiss cheese model of accident causation and the ways in which this model has 
been used as a proactive method of error management in other safety-critical industries. Although 
this model will be described in more detail in the following chapter, in short the model proposes 
that 'holes' in consecutive layers of organisational defence (e. g. barriers and safeguards) created by 
active failures and latent conditions, can line up and create 'windows of opportunity' for accidents 
and errors (Reason, 1997, pp. 11). In Reason's later framework of organisational accidents he 
proposes that once latent conditions have been identified within an organisation, proactive measures 
can be taken to reduce the likelihood of errors and accidents before they arise. The DoH report 
acknowledges that while such models have been developed with other more technologically-driven 
industries in mind, much can and should be learned Erom these safety management techniques. 
Although some research has been conducted using Reason's framework of organisational accidents 
to retrospectively investigate the latent causes of adverse drug events (e. g. Vincent, Taylor-Adams 
& Stanhope, 1998), there has been little, if any, conducted with a proactive approach to error 
management. 
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1.5. Rationale and research objectives 
The research conducted here is well-timed in that it responds to a call from various research 
councils (e. g. MRC3 , ESRC4 and EPSRC5) to increase the numbers of skilled researchers in the area 
of patient safety working in the UK. As already mentioned, the Department of Health has 
repeatedly called for NHS research to learn from error management techniques employed in 
industries which have attempted to proactively identify latent conditions before they have the 
opportunity to result in error. Reason (1997) describes such proactive methods of error management 
in detail within a range of organisations including Shell Expro and British Airways in his book 
Managing the Risks q Organisational Accidents. However, despite the obvious appeal and face )f 
validity of these methods there is little empirical evidence available to support their adoption 
beyond the field in which they were developed. The aim of this research was to employ a range of 
qualitative methods to explore the latent conditions which predict medication administration errors 
in secondary care. Medication administration errors are defined as errors committed by nurses in the 
preparation and/or administration of medication to patients (e. g. incorrect drug/dosage/patient). As 
such these errors are distinguishable from errors made during any other part of the medication 
process such as prescribing, transcribing or dispensing. The second aim of the project was to 
conceptualize this knowledge within an instrument which could effectively measure the presence 
(and hence absence) of safety in a secondary care environment. In order to be useful, the instrument 
was developed with the following criteria in mind; 
I Objectivity. Achieved by making items tangible and reducing subjective responding. 
2. Predictive validity. Ability to proactively predict future medication errors. 
3. Generaliseability. Ability to monitor the safety of multiple secondary care environments. 
4. Analysis at ward / unit level. As with several industrial instruments of this nature, this tool 
should generate data at the team/ward/unit level rather than at an individual level. 
3 Medical Research Council 
4 Economic and Social Research Council 
5 Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council 
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It was intended that the tool would take the form of a type of safety audit which could be 
administered at regular intervals (e. g. once every 6-12 months) and ideally to any qualified nurse on 
any ward within secondary care. In this way, ongoing organisational safety could be effectively 
monitored over time. Although similar instruments are available within other high-risk industries 
(e. g. Tripod Delta; Hudson et aL, 1994), there is to date no evidence that such instruments are 
generalisable beyond the industrial environments in which they were developed, to the management 
of safety in health care. Furthermore, there is little empirical evidence supporting their ability to 
predict future errors. For the proposed health care safety management tool to be considered a 
proactivc method of predicting future medication administration errors, it should show predictive 
(criterion) validity with an objective measure of errors. However, due to problems associated with 
the current NHS incident reporting system (e. g. underreporting and reporting bias; Henriksen & 
Kaplan, 2003; Lifford, Mohammed, Braunholtz & Hofer, 2003), a third aim of this research was to 
develop an independent measure of drug administration error With which to validate the 
organisational safety tool. In consultation with the Director of Research at the collaborating 
institute (Bradford Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust), it was agreed the research should be 
conducted within general medicine to keep the research as generic as possible with the potential for 
the tool to be used in multiple clinical fields. It was hypothesized that conducting the research in a 
more specialised area of health care (e. g. obstetrics/paediatrics) may have resulted in the 
development of a tool which was not as generalisable to other areas of hospital care. 
1.6. Thesis plan 
This thesis will address four main research questions; 
I. What are the latent causes of drug administration errors in secondary care? (study 1) 
2. How do these latent causes manifest themselves on a day-to-day basis in the workplace? (study 
2) 
3. What types of drug administration errors occur in secondary care? (study 3) 
4. Can the latent causes identified be empirically shown to predict drug administration errors'! 
(study 4) 
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The thesis is arranged as follows; 
Chapter 2- Review: Organisational perspectives of error: The systems approach 
This chapter discusses organisational error theory; in particular Reason's Swiss cheese model and 
framework of understanding organisational accidents (Reason, 1990,1997) with a view to exploring 
identified latent causes of human error. Research conducted in a variety of research fields is also 
presented to lend support to Reason's framework. 
Chapter 3- Review: Organisational and workplace interventions to reduce medication error 
This chapter presents a systematic review of research which has implemented systems interventions 
in secondary care to reduce medication errors in an attempt to explore the role of these latent 
variables In the occurrence of error. Findings are discussed in terms of theoretical approach, 
methodological designs, interventions and outcome measures. 
Chapter 4- Study 1: An exploratory study to identify latent causes of drug administration errors 
This chapter describes study I which comprised interviews, observations and a retrospective review 
of clinical incidents to explore the latent causes of medication administration errors (MAEs). 
Methodological disparities and concems of each of the three comparative sources of data are 
discussed with a view to combining the data in a meaningful way. Findings are presented and one 
of the ten extracted causal 'themes' is discussed in full to give a general idea of how all themes 
were identified as latent preconditions of MAEs. Finally, findings from a test of the inter-rater 
reliability of the ten themes are also presented in this chapter. 
Chapter 5- Study 2: Development of the Organisational Safety Questionnaire (OSQ) 
Using the qualitative data obtained in study 1, this study explored the ways in which each of the ten 
latent failures manifest on a ward level. For example, how do poor communication or training 
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issues look like on a particularly 'bad' working day. This chapter describes thematic content 
analysis of qualitative data collected in study I to generate 'safety indicators' based on these 
manifestations of poor safety. Findings from a pilot study to test the face validity of these 
indicators are also presented. 
Chqpter 6- Study 3: Development of the Drug Round Behaviour Questionnaire (DRBQ) 
This chapter describes several disadvantages to using NHS formally reported incidents as an 
outcome measure against which to test the predictive validity of the OSQ, followed by a discussion 
of other ways in which medical errors have been categorized or classified into comprehensive 
taxonomies. Study 3 is then described in which an independent measure of medication 
administration errors was developed (DRBQ). Using the qualitative data obtained in study 1, this 
study explored the types of MAEs occurring in secondary care using a well-known taxonomy of 
medication errors as a template for analysis. Finally, this chapter will describe a pilot study 
conducted to improve the structure and face validity of the tool. 
Chapter 7- Study 4: Validation of the QSQ 
This chapter presents the final research study which involved hospital-wide administration of the 
OSQ, along with the DRBQ and an independent behavioural measure of safety climate at the ward 
level (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007) against which to test the internal consistency, predictive and 
concurrent validity of the tool. 
Chapter 8- Conclusions 
The final chapter of this thesis draws research findings together in order to discuss overall findings, 
methodological limitations of this type of applied research, practical recommendations for future 
research and overall conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ORGANISATIONAL PERSPECTIVES OF ERROR: 
THE SYSTEMS APPROACH 
"I .................... . ........ . .. 16.41 A-A 11-11-9.11 ................................... A ............ I 
2.1. Introduction 
Large scale accidents have often involved investigation into the causes of human error. However, 
over the last 50 years research - particularly in the field of cognitive psychology, has attempted to 
study error in less catastrophic events with the aim of differentiating 'correct performance' from 
'human fallibility' (Reason, 1990). The result has been a broad spectrum of error explanations from 
individual perspectives which account for cognitive and personality characteristics leading people 
to commit errors (Croskerry, 2002) to engineering perspectives which recommend humans should 
be 'engineered out' of a system by increasing automation (Vincent, 2006). Psychological theories of 
human error in particular have evolved over time from traditional cognitive approaches (Bartlett, 
1932; Knowles, 1963) to more recent organisational models of explanation (Reason, 1997). This 
chapter will focus predominantly on one particular error causation framework; the Swiss cheese 
model, proposed by James Reason (Reason, 1990,1997). This conceptual model is one of the most 
widely accepted explanations and taxonomies of human error and Reason's research on 
organisational accidents provides the main foundation of the current research. Reason's earlier 
psychological error taxonomy; Generic Error Modelling System (GEMS; Reason, 1990) will be 
discussed in chapter 6 with a view to informing the development of a second tool to measure drug 
administration errors. 
2.2. The 'Swiss cheese' model 
Reason hypothesized that errors are best understood as an interaction between unsafe acts known as 
acth, e errors (e. g. slips/lapses, mistakes and violations) and systemic organisational weaknesses 
known as lalent. fýilures (Reason, 1990). Reason argues that the majority of adverse events in 
safety critical industries will involve a combination of these two sets of variables. Using Swiss 
cheese as a useful metaphor, Reason argues that all organisations have layers of defensive barriers 
and safeguards (in the forrn of alarrns, physical barriers, people or rules and procedures) which 
protect it from hazards. Within each defensive layer are 'holes' (similar to those found in Swiss 
cheese) which are continuously opening, closing and moving location. Figure 2.2 illustrates this 
accident trajectory. 
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Figure 2.2: Reason's Swiss cheese model of accidents 
Reason argues that holes in defensive layers can occur as a result of active errors and others as a 
result of latent conditions. Opportunities for adverse events arise when holes in multiple layers of 
defence line up and create an accident trajectory. 
2.2.1. Active errors and error management 
Reason proposes that active errors occur at the 'sharp-end' of the workforce and often temporally or 
proximally precede a negative outcome. These errors would involve individuals in direct contact 
with the system such as nurses, pilots, engineers and police officers for example (Reason, 1997). 
I -) 
For example, a nurse who administers the wrong medication to a patient or a train driver who 
mistakenly drives through a stop signal would be considered to have committed active errors at the 
sharp-end of the organisation. 
In terms of error management, organisations that focus on specific unsafe acts often look no further 
for potential causes of an adverse event once they have identified those individuals closest (in time 
or space) to the outcome. Corresponding error management countermeasures, particularly in health 
care tend to focus on blame, retraining, discipline or other responses targeted at specific individuals 
('blame-and-retrain-cycle' - Reason, 1997; Walton, 2004; Battles, 2006). Such solutions are often 
employed in the hope this will lead to improved vigilance in the person deemed 'responsible' for 
the error and act as an error deterrent to others. This indiVidualistic approach to error management 
has long since been the predominating stance taken in health care and is likely to be driven in part 
by a psychological phenomenon known as Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE; Fiske & Taylor, 
1978). This theory asserts that individuals commonly attribute internal personality factors to the 
actions of others yet offer external situation factors to explain their own behaviour. In this way, 
individuals are more likely to explain errors they make as being due to situational variables (e. g. 
being placed under extreme pressure) and errors made by someone else as being due to negative 
aspects of their personality (e. g. recklessness) or cognitive ability (e. g. lack of vigilance). This 
attribution tendency is frequent in the media which often implies that patients have been harmed by 
carelessness or intent (Wieman & Wieman, 2004). Headlines such as '[k]Illed by doctors' 
blunder... ', (The Sun, Friday 20th April, 2000); '[d]eath jab doc behind bars... ' (The Sun, Tuesday 
23 rd September, 2003) are relatively commonplace within the tabloid press. 
2.2.2. Latent conditions and error management 
Reason suggests that '[a]ctive failures are like mosquitoes. They can be swatted one by one, but 
they will still keep coming. The best remedies are to create more effective defences and to drain the 
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swamps in which they breed. The swamps, in this case, are the ever present latent conditions 
(Reason, 2000, pp. 769). These latent conditions are defined as inevitable 'resident pathogens 
within an organisational system which arise from decisions made by top-level management, 
designers and procedure wnters. Such failures include poor management or supenision, lack of 
adequate job training or poorly designed tools and equipment for example. These latent failures lay 
dormant as 'gaps' in the organisation's defences and promote local error-producing conditions due 
to the system's weakened state. When these latent failures combine with inevitable hurnan 
tendencies to make active errors at the sharp-end of the system, the end result is often an adverse 
event. This process is referred to as the accident trajectoty (Reason, 1997, pp. 12). 
In tenns of error management, Reason argues that whilst active errors are inevitable and 
unpredictable, latent conditions on the other hand can be identified before an adverse event occurs. 
If holes due to latent failures can be proactively identified and effectively remedied or alternatively 
systems defence layers can be added, the problem could be averted before a negative outcome 
ensues. Figure 2.2.2 illustrates this concept. Reason argues that when errors occur * ... the question 
should not be "who is at fault? " but "why did our defences fail? "" 
HAZAROB 
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Figure 2.2.2: Identifying latent conditions and averting adverse consequences 
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2.3. The 'Organisational Accident' 
As an extension of his Swiss cheese model, Reason formulated a framework of understanding the 
relative contribution of various latent failures in the occurrence of accidents in high-risk 
organisations (Reason, 1997). This organisational accident theoi-y attempts to explain the 
development of accidents from unsafe acts, through local workplace factors to organisational 
factors at the 'blunt-end' of the system. For instance, after incidents or accidents have occurred, 
retrospective incident investigation can be conducted in a bottom-up approach from unsafe acts 
upwards through error-provoking local working conditions and on to the organisational 
determinants of the accident, thus establishing top-down causation of future accidents. 
It is important to emphasise that Reason's organisational accident model was formulated within his 
extensive experience of industry and was developed particularly from the examination of three case 
studies to identify common features. These case studies were the Barings Bank Collapse (the loss of 
E869 million due to rogue trader Nick Leeson between 1992 & 1995); the Nakina Derailment 
(1992 train crash in Ontario, Canada) and finally the analysis of a near-miss crash of a Boeing 737 
in 1995. These in-depth analyses of large-scale industrial accidents (and one potentially fatal near- 
miss) lead to the development of general principles of accident trajectories from latent conditions to 
active failures common to each accident. Figure 2.3 summarises and illustrates Reason's theory. 
Green arrows indicate the direction of error causality and the blue and red arrows indicate potential 
investigative steps. 
Reason suggests that latent conditions can be considered along a causal sequence starting with 
organisational processes such as forecasting, budgeting, allocation of resources and managing 
which operate at the blunt-end of the system. The effects of these decisions are filtered down 
throughout the organisation to individual workplaces (e. g. hospital wards, flight decks, control 
rooms etc. ) where they manifest as defective local working conditions. Inadequate or faulty 
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equipment, poor work er-supervi s or relationships, insufficient training, excessive NA, orkloads and 
poor team communication are some of the local working conditions resulting from defective 
organisational processes. These variables combine with inevitable human tendencies to commit 
active errors at the sharp-end of the system and increase the potential for adverse events. 
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Figure 2.3: Reason's Organisational accident model 
2.4. Support for the framework 
Reason's framework has been utilised to some degree in a wide array of safety-critical industries 
including aviation, railways and nuclear energy. However, empirical evidence to measure the 
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validity or reliability of the framework (i. e. whether latent failures consistently prcdict future 
safety) is distinctly lacking. Nevertheless, in view of the three main aims of this research, exploring 
latent failures specific to health care, developing ways to measure these failures and developing a 
tool to measure error behaviour with which to validate these failures, particularly relevant research 
will be outlined here. 
2.4.1. Oil and Gas production 
Of particular importance to the current research was a study of latent failures specific to the oil 
industry conducted by a team of researchers from yniversities in Manchester and Leiden (Reason et 
al., 1988; Groeneweg, 1992; Hudson et al., 1994). The study was commissioned by the Royal 
Dutch/Shell Group to provide them with a 'global indication' of their company's 'safety health' 
since millions of dollars were being invested in behaviour modification techniques with little effect 
on the rate of accidents (Hudson et al., 1994). Since earlier error management attempts in the Shell 
group had consisted largely of training and disciplinary measures aimed at unsafe acts, the aim of 
this research was to examine another dimension - latent conditions. To this end, the research group 
developed the Tripod model; derived from the relationship between the three components of 
accident causation identified by Reason; latent conditions, unsafe acts (active errors) and accidents, 
illustrated in Figure 2.4. l. a. To measure and control latent failures, the team developed two error 
management tools; one to proactively identify latent failures in the organisation (Tnpod-DELTA) 
and the other (Tripod-BETA) to retrospectively investigate accidents. This section will focus on the 
tool most relevant to the research proposed - Tripod-DELTA. 
6 Diagnostic EvaLuation Tool for Accident Prevention 
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Figure 2.4.1. a: The three 'feet' of Tripod Delta: General failure types, unsafe acts and 
accidents 
Eleven distinct latent failures were identified from extensive analysis of accident scenarios, audit 
reports and one study conducted on several offshore oil rig platforins, as reflecting high-level 
underlYing organisational failures which would lead to an infinite number of unsafe acts 
(Groeneweg, 1992)'. These failures were ten-ned General Fcidure Tipes ' (GFTs; Reason et al., 
1989; Hudson et al., 1994) and are outlined overleaf (adapted from Reason, 1997, pp. 134-135 & 
Gordon ef al., 2000). The research group proposed that the greater extent to which one or more 
7 Research later showed these constructs to be generalisable to a wide range of oil exploration-related fields, 
including seismic activity, offshore drilling and maintenance and gas production (Groeneweg, 1992). 111 4-- - 
GFT's are now referred to by the Tripod Group as Basic Risk Factors (BRF's) due to crossover with the 
abbreviation of GFT in Holland which refers to biologically degradable waste disposal. 
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GFTs are present in any industrial organisation, the less stable their corresponding safety will be 
and the more likely accidents will occur (Groeneweg, 1992; Hudson et al., 1994). 
1. Hardware - Failures due to the inadequate quality of materials, tools or equipment, non- 
availability of hardware and failures due to ageing. This also includes policies and 
responsibilities for hardware purchase, quality of stock system, quality of supply, theft or loss 
of equipment, short-term renting, compliance to spec and non-standard use of equipment. 
2. Design - Deficiencies in the layout or design of facilities, equipment or tools that leads to 
misuse or unsafe acts, increasing the likelihood of particular types of errors and violations. For 
example, the failure of designers to provide external guidance (knowledge gulf), objects 
designed as opaque in their inner workings or range of safe actions (execution gulf) and a 
failure of items to provide feedback to user (evaluation gulf). 
3. Maintenance management - Failures in the systems for ensuring technical integrity of 
facilities, plant equipment and tools. This GFT relates to the management of maintenance NOT 
the execution of maintenance activities. For example, was required maintenance work carried 
out in timely fashion? 
4. Procedures - Failures related to the quality, accuracy, relevance, availability and workability 
of procedures. 
5. Error enforcing conditions - Factors such as time pressures, changes in work patterns, 
physical working conditions which act on the individual or in the workplace and encourage the 
performance of unsafe acts. Either 'error-producing conditions' or 'violation-promoting 
conditions'. 
6. Housekeeping - Organisational tolerance of deficiencies in conditions of untidiness and 
cleanliness of facilities and work spaces or in the provision of adequate resources for cleaning 
and waste removal which increase the chances of unsafe acts. 
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7. Incompatible goals - Failure to manage conflict: between organisational goals (safety and 
production); between fon-nal rules (company written procedures and the rules generated 
informally by a work group); between the demands of individuals, tasks and their personal 
preoccupation or distractions. 
8. Organisation - Deficiencies in either the structure of a company or the way It conducts Its 
business that allow safety responsibilities to become ill-defined and warning signs to be 
overlooked. 
9. Communication - Failures in transmitting information that is necessary for the safe and 
effective functioning of the organisation to the appropriate recipients in a clear and 
unambiguous or intelligible form. Transmission failures indicate that the necessary 
communication channels do not exist (system failures), the necessary infon-nation is not 
transmitted (message failures) or the necessary information is misinterpreted or delayed 
(reception failures). 
10. Training - Deficiencies in the system for providing the necessary awareness (of the hazardous 
conditions of the workplace), knowledge or skill to an individual or individuals in the 
organisation. This GIFT includes provision of on-the-job coaching mentors and supervisors as 
well as forinal courses, provision of training relative to operations and appropriate task 
analyses. 
11. Defences - Failures in the systems, facilities and equipment 
for control or containment of 
hazards or for the mitigation of the consequences of either human or component failures. These 
failures comprise: detection/alarm; control and interim recovery; personnel 
protection/containment, escape and rescue. 
Of particular relevance to the current research aims; researchers developed a comprehensive 
checklist of safety indicators which could proactively measure both the presence of each GIFT and 
the cumulative holistic safety of the localised workplaces and the organisation as a whole. 
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Indicators were generated during several studies which included detailed observations of employees 
during high-risk activities followed by focus group sessions to discuss observed practices (for full 
description of these studies see Groeneweg, 1992, pp. 147-205). Safety indicators were developed 
for each GFT to represent objective (not subject to interpretation) directly observable (tangible) 
indicators of failure to which the answer would be 'yes' or 'no'. Pools of indicators for each GFT 
was then compiled and subject to various face validity tests with senior and second-in-command 
managers (Groeneweg, 1992). Table 2.4.1 provides examples of generated indicators. 
Table 2.4.1: Examples of safety indicators used in Tripod-DELTA proactive tool 
General Failure Type Item 
Training Are there any requests for training been made the last month that have not been granted? 
Hardware Is a high pressure water cleaning system available? 
Is the evacuation time to a hospital in cases of serious injury Defences 
shorter than 2 hours? 
Have people who were involved in making one of the last three Procedures 
procedures you received visited your rig? 
Have you been invited to the Coast in the last two months to give Communication 
an update of the situation on the rig? 
The safety indicators (usually 20 for each GFT) deemed to be the best representations of each GFT 
were then used to compile a final safety management checklist, and administered to relevant 
employees (those responsible for execution of that activity). A GIFT safeo, profile was generated by 
summing responses within each GIFT and developing an appropriate action plan for remediation of 
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the three most problematic GFTs. Figure 2.4. Lb depicts a systems safety profile companng the 
safety of two organisations on the same activity. 
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Figure 2.4.1. b: An example of the system safety profile comparing two companies 
As this figure illustrates, the II GFTs appear along the horizontal axis, whilst the safety score for 
each GFT is plotted against the vertical; highest scores indicating those GFTs most in need of 
remediation (since the safety score is the total number of indicators scored in the *concern' 
direction). In company A the scores for GFTs overall are generally higher and more erratic 
compared with the safety levels of company B which are reasonably constant across all II GFTs. A 
clear pattern emerges from company As data which shows the three GFTs with the poorest safety 
levels and thus the most cause for concern are housekeeping, communication and error enforcing 
conditions. By comparison, scores for each GFT within company B are more consistent. The three 
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GFTs with the highest scores for company B are housekeeping, training and hardware. However, 
these scores are not significantly higher than scores for other 8 GFTs measured, nor are they higher 
than GFT scores measured in company A. For this reason, the Tripod project has since developed 
benchmarking tools which aim to measure safety thresholds for particular industries in order to 
provide individual companies with a benchmark profile with which to make industry comparisons 
(see www. tripodsolutions. net for further details). 
In terms of the concurrent validity of the Tripod-DELTA tool, the Tripod research team 
administered an independent questionnaire which asked employees (who had not previously 
completed the checklist but were involved in the same task) to rate on a five point scale from very 
poor to very good to what extent each GFT had an impact upon their work (Groeneweg, 1992). For 
instance, one question asked employees to rate the quality of the design of the platform they were 
working on. Statistical analysis revealed very high significant correlations between scores on the 
safety checklist and the validation questionnaires. In a study of the predictive validity of the II 
GFTs, two researchers blind to checklist items or the outcomes of the validating questionnaire 
reviewed 10 reported incidents for the presence of each GFT in their causation. Their results 
revealed high and significant correlations between the researchers recorded GIFT frequencies in 
reported incidents and both the safety checklist and validating questionnaire. 
Since its conception, the Tripod-DELTA safety management tool has been employed in a number 
of similar industrial settings as a proactive identification of systems failings likely to result in future 
errors, including chemical engineering (AKZO Nobel, DSM and Shell Chemicals), the Nuclear 
Energy Authority in the U. K. and oil and gas production on the North Sea (Groeneweg & 
Roggeveen, 1998). However, it is worth mentioning that Tripod Delta is rarely (if ever) 
administered with outcome measures such as error frequency or other quality measures against 
which to test its predictive value as a safety management tool. One possible explanation for this is 
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the extremely low occurrence of errors in these industries making predictive validity difficult. 
Companies such as Motorola and General Electric have popularized the concept of achieving a Six 
Sigma level of safety which equates to only 3 errors occurring in every one million activities 
(Spencer, 2000). Perrow argues that the reason such industries report such low rates of error is due 
to the existence of 'correctional defences' built into the system over a number of years which avert 
the consequences of unsafe acts (Perrow, 1984). Without the existence of reported errors therefore, 
it is difficult to state with any confidence that Tripod-DELTA tool and the GFTs subsumed within it 
predicts errors. However, the absence of rising numbers of adverse incidents goes a little way 
towards promoting the tools efficacy. 
2.4.2. Railways 
On October 5 th 1999, two trains collided on a main line near Ladbroke grove in the vicinity of 
London Paddington Station. This collision provoked an extensive multi-disciplinary investigation 
to identify the contributory factors leading up to the fatal accident, conducted by the UK Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE, 2002), public enquiries (Cullen, 2000a, 2000b) and human factors experts 
(Lawton & Ward, 2004). Focussing on the latter investigation, Lawton and Ward were invited to 
retrospectively review witness interviews and transcripts with a view to conducting systemic crash 
analysis to identify active errors, local working conditions, situational and task factors, inadequate 
defences and latent organisational failures. Using the organisational, accident model proposed by 
Reason as a basis for understanding the interplay between these variables, the authors identified 
multiple contributory factors, surnmarised in Figure 2.4.2. 
The main intention of acknowledging Lawton and Ward's study is to emphasise the usefulness of 
Reason's model as a framework for understanding this relationship between active errors, local and 
latent conditions operating beyond the industry in which the model was originally developed. This 
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human factors approach to retrospective accident investigation heralded a move away frorn the 
more traditional view of individual responsibility (i. e. that of the train driver alone). LaAqon and 
Ward acknowledge that error management strategies focussing on the role of one individual act of 
passing a stop signal at danger would represent an ignorance of 'system pathogens' which would 
likely result in future catastrophes. In terms of remediation, authors note in this article that at the 
time of Wilting a significant number of recommendations made by this analysis, the public inquiry 
and a previous crash analysis of the Southall crash in 1997 had been implemented. 
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Figure 2.4.2: A summary of organisational, local and individual failures in Ladbroke 
Grove accident (adapted from Lawton & Ward, 2004) 
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Although Lawton and Ward's analysis applied Reason's organisational accident framework to the 
retrospective analysis of a railway incident, the latent failures they proposed had preceded the 
accident were not those identified as most likely causes (e. g. their 11 GFTS) by the Tripod research 
group. Nevertheless, more than 20 years after its conception, the Tripod group still maintain that 
the II GFTs they specify as the most likely to result in human error can be found in any type of 
organisation (www. tripodsolutions. net). The Tripod Group are now an international risk 
management company which offer worldwide consultancy services and products which include 
their proactive (Tripod-DELTA) and reactive (Tnpod-BETA) instruments. They advocate on their 
website that the II GFTs which were originally found in the 1992 Shell study, are the 'chief [latent] 
causes leading to all preconditions which generate unsafe acts ... in a variety of industries including 
the health sector, transport services, IT and banking services'9. 
This is particularly pertinent for the current research project which aims to identify latent failures 
specific to secondary health care. Groeneweg (2002) suggests that in order to proactively measure 
the presence of each GFT, an organisation needs only to generate the safety indicators relevant for 
that particular field or activity. However, research would suggest that the latent failures which are 
associated with errors in the oil industry may not be as prevalent (or present at all) in other high-risk 
industries which may rely less on highly automated systems of work and more on hands-on person- 
to-person work (IoM, 2004). This all depends on whether health care can be considered directly 
comparable with other high-risk industries. Vincent (2006) suggests that while lessons can be 
learned from other types of organisation on the causes of human error, research should exercise 
caution before drawing too many parallels between these environments and health care. Reason 
concurs and suggests that within non-health care industries there is a large emphasis on highly 
routine tasks and monitoring automated activities (Reason, 1997). By comparison, the field of 
health care is considerably less technologically driven and involves a workforce who are 
9 This author could find no published evidence that the Tripod-DELTA tool had been tested in the health 
sector or any other sector outside the oil and gas production industry. 
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predominantly involved with 'abnormal person-specific situations' whicli are inherently more 
'error-provocative' and 'nsk-laden' (IoM, 2004, pp. 61). Reason also refers to the uncertainty of 
knowledge faced by health care staff, methods of incident investigation (often very public in health 
care leading to less opportunities for organisational learning), and the mode of delivering service 
('few-to-many' vs. 'few-to-one') as major discrepancies between non health care and health care 
environments (Reason, 2003, as cited in IOM, 2004, pp. 61-63). 
To account for this environmental disparity, Reason has developed two further instruments which 
proactively measure both local and latent failures in railway (Review; Reason, 1993) and airline 
organisations (MESYO; Reason, 1995). Although based on the same framework of organisational 
accidents (Reason, 1997), these tools measure qualitatively different failures relevant to their 
respective organisations, such as planning, staffing and rostering (ReWew), organisational structure, 
people management and commercial pressures (MESH). Although the premise of accident 
causation is the same (e. g. the presence of latent organisational failures predict the likelihood of 
future errors), the failures themselves are specific to that particular environment. Therefore, for the 
purposes of the current research, it is important to establish which latent failures are the most 
prevalent and necessarily predictive of errors in the field of medicine. 
2.4.3. Medicine 
While several proactive and reactive safety measures exist in other high-risk industries (e. g. Tripod- 
DELTA and Tripod-BETA in oil production, Review in railway operations and MESH and MEDA'' 
used in aircraft maintenance); there is currently no comparable measure (proactive or reactive) of 
latent failures available in health care. The majority of what little medical literature there is which 
has applied Reason's organisational accident model has largely involved retrospective analysis of 
clinical incidents (Vincent et al., 2000; Vincent, 2004; Meurier, 2000; Molloy & 0' Boyle, 2005). 
10 Managing Engineering Safety Health 
11 Maintenance Error Decision Aid 
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One particularly prominent example of this research is the collaborative work of Charles Vincent 
and colleagues at the Imperial College, London. This collaborative research group compnses 
members of the Clinical Risk Unit (UCL, London) and members of the Association of Litigation 
and Risk Management (ALARM). As an extension of Reason's organisational accident model. the 
group proposed an adapted conceptual framework for the retrospective investigation and analysis of 
clinical incidents in health care (Vincent, Taylor-Adams & Stanhope, 1998). A summary of this 
framework is presented in Table 2.4.3. 
Table 2.4.3: Summary of Vincent's seven-level framework 
Factor types Contributory influencing factors 
Condition (complexity and seriousness) 
Patient factors 
_Language 
and communication 
Personality and social factors 
Task design and clarity of structure 
Task and technology Availability and use of protocols 
factors Availability and accuracy of test results 
I Decision-making aids 
l ff Knowledge and skills Individua (sta ) 
f t 
_ Competence 
ac ors _ Physical and mental health 
Verbal communication 
T f Written communication eam actors Supervision and seeking help 
Team leadership 
Staffing levels and skill mix 
Workload and shift patterns Work environment 
f Design, availability and maintenance of equipment actors Administrative and managerial support 
Physical environment 
Financial resources and constraints 
Organisational and Organisational structure 
management factors Policy, standards and goals 
_ Safety culture and priorities 
Economic and regulatory context Institutional context National health service executive factors 
Links with external organisations 
Sharp-end 
Blunt-end 
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This hierarchical framework comprises levels of safety operating across seven levels of the 
organisation from 'sharp-end' patient variables, through task and other workplace variables to 
'blunt-end' management and regulatory body factors. These variables were identified using a 
combination of patient record review, staff interviews and a review of human factors variables 
(psychological and organisational) identified by other major frameworks outside health care (e. g. 
socio-technical pyramid; Hurst & Radcliffe, 1994). Vincent suggests that in any given clinical 
situation, the condition of the patient will have the most significant influence on outcome; a feature 
of health care which distinguishes it from other high-risk industries (Vincent, 2006). 
Although Vincent's framework constitutes a broad and comprehensive conceptual taxonomy for 
investigating potential contributory factors implicated in medical errors, current government 
recommendations (e. g. DoH, 2001; IoM, 2004) advise that health care organisations should not rely 
solely on retrospective analysis. The Institute of Medicine in particular suggest 'reactive 
investigations must be supplemented by proactive error reduction activities'. Indeed, Reason 
suggests latent holes in each defensive layer are in 'continual flux' (Reason, 1998). Therefore, 
while reactive investigation can provide useful information on how specific errors have occurred it 
cannot mitigate against all possible future unsafe acts. Proactively identifying latent failures which 
consistently predict multiple unsafe acts or at least promote local triggering conditions would be a 
useful addition to an organisational error management toolkit. 
2.5. Summary 
The need for safety in high-risk industries is well established. In installations such as nuclear 
power, chemical engineering or aviation, what could be deemed a relatively small unsafe act could 
potentially cost thousands of lives and have dire financial consequences (e. g. Chernobyl reactor 
disaster, 1987; Three Mile Island nuclear plant disaster, 1979; Clapham junction railway accident, 
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1988; see Reason, 1997, pp. 86-90 for detailed case histories). By comparison, the level of error 
occurring on a daily basis within health care far exceeds that observed in other high-risk industries. 
Leape, Bates and Cullen (1995) estimate that patients in intensive care units could each experience 
up to 2 errors every day that they are hospitalized and 20 per cent of these errors could be of a 
potentially serious nature or even result in fatality. In terms of medication errors, Leape suggests 
that these may occur in as few as 1 in 1,000 to I in 10,000 patient admissions in the United States, 
but adds that even a 0.01 per cent failure rate would not be tolerated in other hIgh-rIsk Industries 
such as aviation or engineering (Leape et aL, 1995). Research suggests that human error is both 
inevitable and resistant to change and acknowledges that as a result individualistic error 
management strategies have been and will continue to be largely ineffective (Temple, 2004). 
Reason maintains that this 'person-approach' is still the dominant tradition in health care and 
suggests that 'continued adherence to this approach is likely to thwart the development of safer 
healthcare institutions' (Reason, 2000, pp. 769). He suggests that by considering only factors at the 
level of the individual as likely causes of error, opportunities for organisational learning are being 
lost and subsequent remediation attempts to reduce errors will continue to be unsuccessfal. 
While there has been some application of Reason's organi§ational accident framework in several 
high-risk industries to retrospectively identify latent failures, there has been no published evidence 
to support their association with future errors. In order to test the relationship between latent 
failures and active errors and therefore validate Reason's framework, it is vital that latent failures 
can be measured as proactively predicting future errors. There is to date no empirical evidence that 
any identified latent failure predicts errors or any other outcome measure in health care or any other 
high-risk industry. Chapter 3 will present health care research which has employed latent systems 
interventions to reduce medication errors. It is anticipated that this review will go some way 
towards testing the applicability of Reason's framework in health care research. 
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2.6. Research plan 
This thesis will present findings from a systematic review of interventions which have been 
implemented within secondary care to target systems (e. g, organisational and workplace) variables 
to reduce medication errors. It is anticipated that this review will go some way towards informing 
subsequent exploratory studies to investigate the latent causes of medication errors. Using Reason's 
organisational accident model as a framework the research aims to explore the latent failures which 
exist in secondary care from a 'bottom-up' perspective in a similar way to the Ladbroke grove 
analysis (Lawton & Ward, 2004). Using similar methodologies as those employed in the Tripod 
research project, interviews with both senior management at the 'blunt-end' of the NHS 
organisation and also 'sharp-end' health care professionals will be conducted alongside incident 
report reviews and clinical observations. The research will then investigate whether tangible safety 
indicators can be generated for each identified latent failure. Since research has emphasised the 
lack of empirical evidence showing latent failures cause subsequent errors (due to low error rates in 
industry and no suitable proactive measure in health care), the final aim of this research will be to 
measure the predictive validity of latent failure safety indicators. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SYSTEMS INTERVENTIONS TO REDUCE MEDICATION ERRORS: 
A SYSTEMATIC RIEVIEW 
.................... .......... a ........... 1.4 .... ... b ............... st. 6 ................ .................. I .............................. 
3.1. Introduction 
Research suggests that medication errors represent at least 20 per cent of all adverse events 
involving hospitalised patients, many of which are often considered preventable (Leape et al, 1991; 
Bates et al., 1995; O'Hara & Carson, 1995). It has also been suggested that these figures may 
underestimate the scale of the problem, relying predominantly upon formal incident reporting 
systems which tend to underestimate the actual number of errors occurring (Wakefield et al., 1999; 
Brown et al., 2008). In terms of how these statistics relate to patient admissions, Leape reports that 
medication errors may only occur in as few as 1 in 1,000 to 1 in 10,000 admissions in the United 
States, but adds that even a 0.01 per cent failure rate would not be tolerated in other safety-critical 
industries such as aviation or engineering (Leape et al., 1995). 
Whilst organisational and other aspects of the working environment are frequently cited latent 
variables associated with human error in many other high-risk industries (see chapter 2), this 
chapter explores evidence for the role of latent organisational variables in the occurrence of 
medication errors in secondary health care. This chapter presents a systematic review of the 
literature which has implemented systems interventions in secondary care to reduce medication 
errors. It is proposed that if systems variables cause medication errors then interventions which 
target these variables should in turn reduce error occurrence. The terms 'system', 'organisational' 
and 'workplace' factors are used interchangeably throughout this chapter. The term sYstems 
variab1c is intended to encapsulate organisational variables which operate at the 'blunt-end' of the 
organisational system (e. g. policy development), and workplace variables which operate at the 
-sharp-end' (e. g. teamwork) (Reason, 1997). 
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3.2. Literature search and data extraction 
Hoff et aL (2004) conducted a similar review to investigate the linkages between organisational 
factors, medical errors and patient safety. Their search strategy generated a list of 16 organ'satIonal 
terms highlighted within the United States health care quality improvement literature (e. g. 
communication, training, feedback, education, culture etc. ). The reviewers then combined each 
organisational. term with the term 'patient safety' and then with the term 'medical error" (32 
electronic searches in total). This extracted a total of 2445 articles which, when subject to several 
selection filters was reduced to 42 empirical articles. Although a rigorous search strategy, one 
potential disadvantage of this method is that it assumes a top-down approach to searching. 
Generally, employing this method will only extract those articles in which the authors knew they 
had studied a known organisational factor and reflected this in their tenninology. Hoff et al 
acknowledge that their method of searching for articles was developed to reduce the chance that 
searching would be biased by the reviewers own opinion on what organisational factors are 
important in medical error. They further acknowledge that wide variability in the use of 
organisational terminology in the medical literature may have restricted the number of articles 
extracted. It is possible therefore that Hoff s list of 16 organisational factors used to search for 
articles generated by the quality improvement literature remains biased by the terminology used to 
search for articles. This is in part supported by the fact that the current review found several articles 
which had implemented organisational or systems interventions which were not extracted by Hoff 
et al. 
While the current review shared similar broad objectives to the review conducted by Hoff et al., it 
also differed in three ways. Firstly, the search strategy (bottom-up vs. top-down; as described 
above) was broadened to search a wider range of databases and used a more exploratory method of 
searching for organisational or systems terminology. Secondly, Hoff et al. included studies which 
had utilized quality improvement measures as outcome variables (such as litigation costs, job 
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dissatisfaction, self-reported quality of care), which were not included in the current review. Since 
the main aim of this research was to explore the role of organisational and workplace factors in 
medication errors and not quality of care, only those studies which had employed suitable error 
measures were included. Finally, this review will focus upon errors committed during the 
administration of medication while Hoff s review explored the causes of medical errors in general 
(e. g. diagnostic, prescribing, administration etc. ). 
3.2.1. Search strategy 
3.2.1.1. Aims 
The aim of this search strategy was to identify studies published from 1990 onwards (when patient 
safety research started to gain momentum; Vincent, 2006) which had employed any organisational 
and/or workplace intervention to reduce medication administration errors (MAEs). A broad 
approach to searching the literature was employed using systematic review principles recommended 
by the Centre for Reviews and Dissemination" (CRD, 2001) to extract any studies which were 
potentially relevant. These guidelines recommend that reviews are undertaken and reported in an 
unbiased way with specific and explicitly stated search strategies and selection (inclusion and 
exclusion) criteria (CRD, 2001, pp. 8). Although there is a considerable literature base which has 
theorised organisational and workplace causes of MAE, this review focussed upon studies which 
had designed and implemented organisational or workplace interventions to reduce medication 
errors. These studies were considered to be those which, through intervention had empirically 
tested the role of these variables in error causation and so would be of the most relevance to this 
research. 
12 The Centre for Reviews and Dissemination (CRD) is part of the National Institute for Health Research 
(NIHR) and is a department of the University of York. CRD, established in 1994, is one of the largest groups 
in the world engaged exclusively in evidence synthesis in the health field, undertaking systematic reviews to 
evaluate the research evidence on health and public health questions of national and international importance. 
CRD produces guidelines for researcher conducting systematic reviews in health care research 
(http: //www. york. ac. uk/inst/crd/index. htm). 
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3.2.1.2. Review question 
CRD guidelines recommend developing an explicit review question before starting the reviex 
process. The review question for this review is as follows; 
Which organisational and workplace factors have been targeted for intervention to 
reduce MAEs in secondary care hospitals since 1990? 
3.2.1.3. Method 
Multiple methods were employed to achieve a 'comprehensive' and 'unbiased' search of the 
literature (CRD, 2001, Stage 11, Phase 3, pp. 4). 
i. Electronic searches - MEDLINE (1950-2008); British Nursing Index (1985-2008); 
Cumulative Index to Nursing & Allied Health Literature (1982 -2008); EMBASE (1980 - 
2008); Health Management Information Consortium (1983 - 2008) and PsychINFO (1985 - 
2008). All databases recommended by the CRD, were accessed via the search engine Ovid. 
ii. Individual journal search -The journals Quality and Safety in Health Care, Health Services 
Research, Joumal of the American Medical Association and the British Medical Journal were 
hand searched between 1998 and 2008 for any articles not retrieved by electronic searches. 
Due to time and journal issue availability constraints, only the last 10 years were searched by 
hand. 
iii. Review articles - Review articles and government reports were extracted both by electronic 
and hand searches which highlighted important intervention studies. These review articles 
were subsequently searched for any studies which might be relevant to the current review. 
The following reviews were particularly useful; Hoff et al., (2004); loannidis and Lau (2001); 
35 
'Building a safer NHSfor patients' (DoH, 2001); 'To err is human: building ýi saIcIr health 
system'(IoM, 1999). 
iv. References - All relevant articles retrieved and subject to appropriate selection criteria were 
hand searched for any additional citations to other articles which previous search techniques 
had not already retrieved. 
v. Unpublished studies - The CRD systematic review guidelines recommend the Inclusion of 
unpublished studies but suggest this search step should be omitted if the length of time 
allocated for the review does not permit this. 
3.2.1.4. Search terms 
CRD guidelines recommend that search terms should be sensitive enough to identify all available 
relevant articles yet specific enough to exclude irrelevant articles which can hinder the search 
process. This process should be iterative and guidelines suggest several attempts should be made to 
develop an adequate strategy. Using a structured approach, the review topic was broken down into 
four 'facets', which included study population (area of care), interventions (systems variable 
targeted), outcomes (type of error) and study designs. Search terms representing each facet were 
then generated between the principal researcher, academic supervisors and other collaborating 
13 
partners 
In order to access electronic databases, the following search terms were used for each of the four 
facets; 
I. Type of error - these terms were considered to incorporate multiple variations of medication 
error. It was anticipated that whilst this would also access studies which had not necessarily 
13 As part of this research the principal investigator was invited to join the hospital's patient safety steering 
group which provided valuable input throughout the duration of the project. 
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measured MAEs (e. g. many had measured transcribing errors), trial attempts at running the 
search using ternis only related to MAEs was too stringent and yielded few relevant studies. 
Medication, medication error, drug error, drug administration error, drug event, adverse drug 
event, ADE, near miss: 8 exploded terms (to include any related terms) combined using OR; 
yielded 8,044 results 
Area of care - these items were considered to reflect the area of care most relevant for this 
research. Several search attempts revealed these tenns were specific enough to exclude any 
studies conducted outside of secondary care (i. e. primary care, ambulatory care). 
Secondary care, secondary, tertiary, tertiary care, hospital, in-patient, medicine, ward, 
hospitalised: 9 exploded terms combined using OR; yielded 5,138 results 
3. Systems variable targeted - although Hoff s review employed a top-down strategy to search 
16 key organisational variables, a key objective of this review was to explore the literature 
and identify studies which may not have necessarily used well-known terminology. One way 
of achieving this was to impose less stringent criteria on this aspect of the search. CRD 
recommendations suggest researchers should find the middle-ground between developing 
broad search terms which will successfully retrieve a comprehensive selection of relevant 
articles (and ultimate several irrelevant ones), and developing overly-specific terms which 
may bias the retrieval (and retrieve too few relevant articles). Preliminary searches revealed 
that as predicted there was a general inconsistency in the tenninology used to describe 
organisational and workplace vanables (see section 3.4 for discussion of findings). In order 
to retrieve articles which had possibly measured the same variable as other articles but used 
different terminology, a broad approach to search terms was taken. Government documents 
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(DoH, 2000,2001; IoM, 1999) were reviewed for appropriate search tenris which would 
encapsulate the nature of systems variables (i. e. organisational, workplace, systems etc. ) if 
not the variable itself 
Organisation, organisational, system, systems, systemic, environment, environmental, workplace, 
working condition, local conditions, ergonomic, ergonomics, ergonomic factors, human factor, 
human factors; 15 exploded terms combined using OR; yielded 80,822 results 
4. Study design - terms commonly used to describe various empirical research designs were 
developed. 
Intervene, intervention, randomised controlled trial, RCT, controlled trial, trial, case study, time 
series, cohort, control group, non-randomised, beforelafter study: 12 exploded terms combined 
using OR; yielded 3,930,246 results 
All four search results were combined using AND; yielding 1223 results. CRD guidelines 
recommend applying a number of filters to ensure all abstracts to be reviewed in the first instance 
are relevant. Filter I removed all duplicate articles (since multiple databases had been searched), 
leaving 912 results. Filters 2 and 3 removed any articles not published in the English language and 
those published before 1990 (since several of the databases did not allow for this specification 
beforehand). A total of 714 articles remained. 
3.2.2. Inclusion/Exclusion criteria 
As recommended by CRD guidelines, article titles and abstracts were screened in the first instance 
for relevance, followed by a full review of the article if the following criterion was met; 
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i. Intervention - As discussed previously, only those studies which had proposed potential 
systems (organisational and/or workplace) causes of medication errors and implemented 
some form of systems intervention to reduce these errors were included. There was no 
inclusion restrictions on the type of intervention carried out. Studies which provided 
insufficient explicit detail to determine the intervention employed to reduce errors with 
enough detail to be replicable were excluded. 
ii. Field of health care - Studies conducted within any in-patient secondary or tertiary care 
setting were included, provided that the intervention or systems problem descnbed was not so 
specific that it would not be generalisable to other fields of health care. For each article 
extracted, a judgement was made by the reviewer on whether the systems variable identified 
and intervention employed was generalisable beyond the clinical specialty in which it was 
conducted. Since this research focussed upon errors made in secondary care, it was decided 
that studies conducted in residential care facilities, primary care or any other outpatient or 
community setting would be less useful for the development of the safety tool and so these 
studies were excluded. For example, Eccles et aL (2002) measured the effects of 
implementing computerized evidence-based guidelines on the prevalence of medication errors 
in the management of asthma and angina in pnmary care. Although employing a systems 
intervention, this study was excluded since it was not conducted in secondary care and 
referred to processes specific to primary care which were not considered transferable to 
secondary care settings. There was no selection criteria imposed on the types of health care 
staff members participating in the studies. 
iii. Outcome measure - it was originally hoped that only studies which had employed a measure 
of MAEs would be included since this was the main focus of this research. However, during 
preliminary screening of extracted articles it became apparent that very few studies had 
measured errors at the administration process of medication delivery. The decision was 
therefore made to expand the search and include studies which had measured errors at ani, of 
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the stages of medication delivery including prescribing and transcription. Although the focus 
of this research was on errors occurring in the administration of medication, it ", as 
acknowledged that this process relies upon the combined success of preceding stages. It was 
anticipated that studies which had explored other aspects of this process would shed light on 
downstream causes of error at the administration stage (e. g. prescribing practices). 
Most of these outcome measures were in the form of self-reported errors (either via survey or 
those formally reported in hospital reporting systems) since there are few other error 
measures available to health care researchers. Other studies employed the use of medical 
chart reviews or observational methods. All methods were considered eligible outcome 
measures. Several studies reported interventions to reduce the incidence of Adverse Drug 
Events (ADEs) but had not specified whether these 'events" were the outcome of error or 
were non-preventable unexpected events (e. g. giving penicillin to a patient without knowing 
they were allergic). Only studies which explicitly attributed ADEs to some type of error in 
prescribing, dispensing or administration of the drug were the focus of this review. 
Studies which had used onI quality improvement measures as their outcome variable (such Y 
as those included in Hoff s review) were excluded since the focus of this research was on the 
improvement of patient safety, in the form of medication error reduction rather than quality of 
care. For example, some studies extracted had investigated reductions in litigation expenses, 
length and costs of patient stay, patient or health professional ratings of quality of care or 
nurse stress and burnout levels. 
Studies which provided insufficient detail of pre- and/or post-intervention comparisons on 
outcome measures were also excluded. For example, some studies simply stated that 
interventions had been 'successful' in reducing errors (Leape, 2000). Only studies which 
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stated explicitly the number (or percentage) of medication errors made before and after 
intervention were included in the full review. 
3.3. Results and analyses 
After initial filtering processes, 788 articles were subject to the selection criterion after which a total 
of 769 were excluded due to a lack of empirical reporting of improvements post-intervention, 
insufficient detail regarding the type of intervention, the methodology and /or intervention success 
and poor or non-existent definitions of the types of medication errors (MEs) measured. The final 
review consisted of 19 articles which had identified potential systems causes of medication errors 
and employed systems interventions to reduce them. All articles were analysed in terms of several 
salient categories such as the areas of hospital care they were conducted in, their methodological 
design, the systems variables targeted, any theoretical framework or approach used for intervention 
design and finally the types of outcome variables (types of medication error) measured. Although 
each of these general areas of research interest will be discussed briefly under their corresponding 
subheadings, this review will focus predominantly on the systems interventions employed in order 
to assist in the development of the error management tool. Each article was assigned an 
identification number from 1-19. These numbers are used in tables and discussion to improve 
synthesis and discussion of articles. Summary tables of articles reviewed (including identification 
numbers and references), comparison of key findings, and specific intervention details of each study 
are available in appendices 1,11 and III respectively. 
3.3.1. Area of hospital care 
Studies were conducted in a broad range of clinical areas. Table 3.3.1 presents a summary of these 
areas. More than a third of the studies reviewed were conducted in paediatrics or neonatal care 
settings. This is unsurprising since there is an abundance of evidence highlighting the significantly 
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higher risks of MEs occurring within this patient population compared to adult patients (Wong et 
al., 2004; Gon-nan et al., 2003; Manna et al., 2000) and research has estimated the likelihood of 
these errors resulting in patient injury to be three times higher in paediatric patients (Fortescue ct 
al., 2003). Davey et al. (11) note that these increased risks are largely due to the need for more 
individualized calculations of drug doses based on patient weight and report previous findings that 
estimate there are potentially 50,000 paediatric dosing errors per year in England (Wong ct al., 
2004; Costello et aL, 2007). 
Table 3.3.1: Clinical specialties of reviewed studies 
Area of medical care Articles Percentage of total 
Paediatrics / Neonatal 3,11,13,15,16,17,18 37% 
General Medicine 1,2,7,10 21% 
Critical / Intensive Care 1,2,5,19 21% 
Unspecified Secondary Care 8,12,14 16% 
Coronary care 5,19 11% 
Surgery 7,9 11% 
Emergency Care 6 5% 
Anaesthesia 4 5% 
* Studies 1,2,5,7 and 19 were conducted in multiple areas of hospital care 
One particularly important aim of this review was to explore areas of care which had implemented 
systems interventions to reduce medication errors, whose findings were generalisable to other 
clinical specialities. Only studies which reported findings not limited to a highly specialised field of 
patient care were included in the review. For example, several studies were identified which 
reported the effects of interventions on errors of one particular chemotherapy drug (Schiff, 
Aggarwal, Kumar & McNutt, 2000) whose intervention related to a highly specialised process of 
cancer therapy and were subsequently excluded. By comparison, although the risks of dosage 
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errors in pediatric settings are elevated, general dosage errors per se are not limited to that field of 
health care. Similarly, a study by Landrigan et al. (5) reported that many serious MEs were being 
made by medical interns (e. g. trainee doctors) on coronary care and intensive care wards, whose 
shift patterns meant they could potentially be expected to work up to 70-80 hours per week. The 
effects of sleep deprivation as a result of long working hours and / or shift patterns is not specIfic to 
coronary care and systems interventions to reduce errors are unlikely to be beneficial only in this 
area of care. For this reason such studies were retained. 
3.3.2. Methodological design 
Table 3.3.2 below details the methodological designs employed in the 19 studies reviewed. 
Table 3.3.2: Methodological design of reviewed studies 
Methodological design 
I 
Articles Percentage of total 
Before/After quasi -experimental study 
(no control group) 
1,2,4,5,6,9,10,11,12,14, 
15,16,17,18 73% 
Randomised Controlled Trial 7,19 11% 
Non-Randomised Controlled Trial 8,13 11% 
Cohort Study 3 5% 
Almost three quarters of the studies extracted employed before/after study designs without control 
group comparisons. These studies involved comparing the number of MEs occurring pre- 
intervention with those occurring post-intervention. Interestingly, there was a large degree of 
variation in the length of post intervention follow-up, ranging from only one week (11) to four year 
follow-ups (2). For example, Bates et al. (2) examined the impact of a computerized physician 
order entry (CPOE) system upon MEs over a period of four years. This study recorded a baseline 
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measurement of the number of reported MEs made pre-intervention in 1992, followed by three 
follow-up measurements of errors in 1993,1995 and 1997. This level of follow-up Is rare wi 
heath care research due to time, financial resources and recruitment constraints common to the field. 
In this instance, it allowed the researchers to make additional changes to the computerized system to 
reduce errors further such as the addition of allergy warnings and drug-drug interaction warnings 
(referred to as decision support). By comparison, Davey et aL (11) measured the impact of a 
prescribing tutorial and introduction of decision support for junior doctors on the number of 
prescnibing errors executed only one week after each change had been implemented. Although they 
report that the number of prescribing errors significantly decreased after the interventions, one 
might argue that a follow-up occurring after only one week is not long enough to detect the 
durability of that intervention. Without control group comparisons it is possible that significant 
effects may have occurred as a result of the Hawthorne effect (Landsberger, 1958). This effect has 
been described as a short-lived reactivity to quasi-experimental conditions which results in 
improved performance which does not occur as a result of the condition being tested but simply 
because participants are being observed and as such are being paid more attention. Studies have 
shown participants will respond positively to any novel change in work environinent (Mayo, 1949; 
Gillespie, 1991). Parsons (1974) furthers this argument to suggest that if the nature of the 
experiment involves participant feedback (as it did in the case of Davey et al. ) this effect will be 
more profound. Without extended follow-up periods, it is difficult to determine whether significant 
reductions in MEs observed after intervention have occurred as a result of the intervention itself. 
One way of controlling for this confounding variable is to use an appropriate control group. 
Interestingly, only two of the studies employed randomised controlled designs (RCTs). These 
studies (7 & 19) involved comparisons of MEs between wards implementing systems interventions 
and control wards that had not. These interventions are described below under human resources 
and decision support subheadings respectively. Neither study found a significant effect of their 
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respective interventions on the number of MEs (7 & 19). ADEs, potential ADEs or 'serious' 
medication errors (19). 
The fact that only two studies had attempted RCTs is unsurprising for several reasons. Firstly, they 
are notoriously costly and often require long-term funding for external positions and/or the 
employment of the most experienced members of staff to carry out the research (Pringle & 
Churchill, 1995). Bottomley (1997) suggests that appropriate recruitment and randomisation of 
participants to groups requires significant effort which means these studies are largely conducted 
only within 'centres of excellence'. Even when well designed, RCTs suffer problems with 
participant recruitment, attrition and 'opposition to randomisation' which Fallowfield (1995) argues 
can all lead to results which are difficult to interpret at best. Bottomley proposes that while RCTs 
are undoubtedly rigorous, their implementation may be at the cost of 'methodological problems 
which may limit general i seabil ity of findings' (Bottomley, 1997, pp. 228) which could explain why 
so few attempts to implement RCTs was observed in this review. 
One particularly noteworthy article implemented multiple systems interventions and has been 
categorised as a before/after study since it provided baseline and post-intervention ME data for 
eight hospitals. Silver and Antonow (14) reported the results of a multi-hospital systems 
intervention scheme involving large scale recruitment of thirteen hospitals across Utah (although 
data was only reported for eight of these). These hospitals adopted a variety of interventions to 
reduce MEs and whilst data are presented before and after interventions, it is an aggregate of all 
eight hospitals. One criticism of the paper is that because not all hospitals employed the same type 
or number of interventions, the authors do not report which interventions Yielded the most 
significant benefits in terms of error reduction, a finding which would be useful for those 
organisations hoping to utilize some of the changes in their own institutions. However, the absence 
of such methodological detail does not represent a failing because the objective of the article is to 
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present a quality improvement initiative to reduce MEs and is reported as such. Unfortunately, in 
terms of organisational learning, such a study may be dismissed by organisations seeking more 
rigorous methods of 'gold standard' research on which to base their own interventions. 
3.3.3. Theoretical framework 
As discussed previously, there has been a large body of published research on the potential systems 
causes of high-risk industrial error (see chapter 2); a large proportion of which has focussed on 
Reason's organisational accident framework (Reason, 1990,1997) or other human factors 
approaches to understanding error causation (Perrow, 1984; Rasmussen, 1983). Extracted articles 
were reviewed for any evidence that identification of organisational/systems causes of medication 
error or the implementation of systems interventions had been driven by known theories of human 
error. 
Almost all articles reviewed (18 out of 19) provided no indication that their designed intervention(s) 
were based around any theoretical framework or human error prmciples. Only one article (14) 
intimated that their interventions had involved redesign of their systems based on the Institute of 
Healthcare Improvement's Breakthrough Series model (Langley, Nolan & Nolan, 1992) which had 
evolved from human factors principles of task and process design identified by human factors 
engineers in industrial research 14 . However, the authors of this paper 
do not elaborate exactly how 
their interventions had been developed with this theory in mind; only that staff were 'encouraged to 
select strategies on the basis of the literature on human factors in non-medical settings' (pp. 333). 
In a similar article by Leape et al. (2000), which was extracted but not included in the review 
because it did not meet inclusion criteria, 739 individual systems changes were presented such as 
14 In 1996,38 US hospitals and other health care organisations formed a collaborative under the leadership of 
the Institute for Healthcare Improvement to reduce medication errors. Teams from multiple hospitals were 
recruited to develop 'best practices' to improve the quality of health care. 
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improvements in error reporting, increased standardization of procedures, checklist development 
and implementation of protocols, based on the 11-11's Breakthrough Series model, conducted in fort,,, 
hospitals over a fifteen month period. They report an overall 'successful reduction' of medication- 
related errors of 20 per cent but like Silver and Antonow (14), do not describe in any detail which 
particular interventions were most beneficial in reducing which types of errors in which areas of 
patient care. Without this transferable information, the data simply presents a showcase of how 
successful one organisation has been and offers little opportunity for patient safety learning. The 
IHI model of improvement itself however, does not offer guidance on the types of organisational or 
systems interventions which are most likely to be effective under certain circumstances or for 
particular environments. For example, adopting one of the model's 'best practices' seen to 
effectively reduce prescribing errors in paediatric care may be less effective in emergency or elderly 
care settings. The only way in which staff in a specific environment would know whether one 
particular type of intervention is warranted or will be effective in their field would be through 
reporting of empirical evidence or information on interventions which are generally effective. 
3.3.4. Systems variables addressed 
Extracted articles were reviewed to determine from the interventions implemented, which systems 
failures had been addressed. Of the 19 articles reviewed, there was very little use of common 
systems terminology in descriptions of interventions. Those studies which had attempted to classify 
their type of intervention showed little consistency in the terminology used. Additionally, the 
terinmology used in each article did not always provide the most accurate reflection of the variable 
the authors had actually addressed. Therefore, the variables presented in Table 3.3.4 are a 
culmination of terms described within the reviewed articles (if presented), General Failure Types 
(GFTs, Groeneweg, 1992; see also chapter 2 of this thesis, section 2.3.1.1) in cases where these 
terms were a better reflection of the variable than the term used within the article, and the reviewers 
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own judgement. An independent reviewer was then given a list of systems terminology which 
included any terms used in the review articles, II GFTs (with definitions) and others which the 
primary reviewer had generated in the course of the review. The second reviewer was giý, en each 
article's methods section and asked to categorise the systems variable(s) measured using one of the 
terms provided in the list. Agreement was reached on the variable being measured for all but 2 of 
the 19 studies. After discussion, agreement was reached on all 19 studies. 
Each variable will be discussed individually under corresponding subheadings followed by a more 
detailed discussion of salient points and data synthesis in section 3.4. Specific details regarding 
each intervention are listed in Appendix 111. 
Table 3.3.4: Systems interventions employed by reviewed studies 
System variable Articles 
_I 
Percentage of totalý] 
Standard operating procedures (G) 
1,2,6,9,10,12,13,14,15, 
16,17,18 63% 
Decision support 1,2,8,11,16,17,18,19 42% 
Education / training (G) 4,8,11,14 21% 
D G uipment 4,14,16 
16% 
esign ( ) 
Zrkplace 
3,14 11% 
Human resources 7 5% 
Local working conditions 5 5% 
Team Communication (G) 1 5% 
* Some studies identified more than one variable 
(G) Systems variables which are specified as a General Failure Type (Groeneweg, 1992) and proposed to be the 
most likely error antecedents 
3.3.4.1. Standard Operating Procedures 
By far the most frequently implemented systems intervention involved making changes to standard 
operating procedures (SOPs). All of these articles (n=12) involved changes made to prescribing 
practices. This is not surprising since there is considerable evidence that approximately 50 per cent 
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of MEs occur at the stage of drug ordering (Bates et al., 1995; Kaushal et al., 2001). Notably, all 
SOP studies except three involved the implementation of Computerised Physician Order Entry 
(CPOE) systems (1,2,6,9,10,13,15,17 & 18). CPOE is an electronic method of prescribing 
medication and aims to improve poor prescribing practices related to inappropriate drug chart 
design, illegible handwriting, delays in the medication delivery process (from ordering to 
administration) and difficulty keeping track of paper drug charts among others. Interestingly, few 
of the articles reviewed described any of the above benefits of CPOE as a rationale for its 
implementation or identified that these aspects of prescribi ice were a particular problem in ng pract 
their hospital. In general, these articles referred to government directives to integrate this 
technology into secondary care (DoH, 2000; IoM, 1999). It should be emphasised that standard 
CPOE systems can simply involve a change in prescribing practices from paper-based to electronic 
ordering of medication. More sophisticated systems can also 'add-on' decision support options 
including drug libraries and error-prompts. Since not all studies review had installed such 
advanced systems, studies which had measured the impact of decision support add-ons to standard 
CPOE systems are discussed separately under the decision support subheading. 
All nine SOP studies which measured the effects of CPOE implementation on some form of ME 
used various definitions of this type of error and employed a variety of methods to measure them 
making it difficult to draw overall conclusions as to whether this type of intervention was 
successful. For example, Spencer et aL, (10) measured the effects of CPOE implementation on 
self-reported ordering/dispensing and administration errors. Franklin et aL, (9) however, measured 
the effects of CPOE on prescribing and administration errors as observed by independent 
pharmacists. It is unlikely that these two methods of measuring errors are comparable, largely due 
to reporting bias and other factors which may influence whether individuals are willing to report 
their own behaviour (see chapter 6, section 6.2). 
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Putting this variability in defining and measuring MEs to one side, CPOE successftilly and 
significantly (statistically) reduced someforms of medication error in seven of the nine studies 
which had implemented the system. The remaining two studies reported that they had observed 
decreases in medication errors post-intervention (dosage errors of Gentamicin and general 
prescribing errors respectively) but did not report whether these reductions were statistically 
significant (6 & 17). 
The three studies which had not implemented CPOE systems but have been classified here as 
employing changes to SOPs, employed the use of a standardised protocol of prescribing insulin 
(12), standardised medication ordering procedures for high-risk medications (14) and standardising 
drug concentrations (16). Two of these studies reported statistically significant reductions in 
prescribing errors (12), ten-fold dosage errors and medication-infusion errors (16). Although Silver 
and Antonow (14) report a statistically significant overall decrease in medication errors after 
standardising ordering procedures, the article combines data for multiple hospitals employing a 
variety of interventions so individual intervention success cannot be ascertained. 
3.3.4.2. Decision Support 
Eight studies measured the effects of providing decision support on MEs. Four of these studies 
ith additional decision support options (1,2,17 & 18). involved implementation of CPOE systems wi II 
CPOE systems are usually commercially manufactured electronic prescribing aids tailored 
according to the needs of individual health care organisation and most importantly designed 
according to budget. Of the nine studies which implemented CPOE systems, five did not 
incorporate additional inforination which could be defined as decision support or did not specify 
whether they had or not (6,9,10,13, & 15). For example, the electronic prescribing system 
implemented by Bizovi et al. (6) comprised a 'low-spec' computer system of medication selection 
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allowing prescribers to choose medications, dosage, quantity and frequency from a drug 'pick-lisf. 
This system alleviated some but not all problems associated with prescribing practice. Similarly, 
Franklin et al. (9) measured the effects of a computensed prescribing, dispensing and 
administration system which employed the use of hand-held prescribing computers, synchronised 
with other computers across the hospital. Although this computer system comprised pull down lists 
of available drugs, no actual decision support was incorporated into the system. 
By comparison, all four of the studies identified here as decision support interventions which had 
employed CPOE had significantly more sophisticated versions of the system. For example, Potts et 
al. (18) describe their CPOE system as including several decision support ftinctions such as drug 
allergy checking, contraindication and incorrect dosage warnings. Similarly, Bates et al. (1) 
describe their CPOE system as incorporating 'consequent order prompts' (e. g. orders that should 
follow from other orders according to the patient's previous clinical history) allergy checking and 
electronic presentation of patient test results which might affect the medication selection. In this 
way, doctors are presented with more sophisticated information than standard CPOE. It is 
acknowledged that although some CPOE 'add-ons' described involved providing physicians with 
decision 9upport (e. g. drug libraries, dosage options etc. ) other aspects of these decision support 
options might also have been categorised as the GIFT defences (e. g. drug allergy warnings; see 
chapter 2, section 2.3.1.1). Since these elements provide the user with support in making the 
correct decision it was decided that decision support was a more apt classification of these elements. 
It is difficult to determine whether the addition of decision support to CPOE systems Is more, less 
or equally effective in reducing medication errors overall due to the considerable variability in 
outcome measures reported. Only one study specifically compared the cumulative effects of adding 
decision support to basic CPOE systems (2). In a before/after study, Bates et al. measured the 
effects of implementing a basic CPOE system on three 
hospital wards in intensive care and general 
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medicine, followed by two attempts to gradually increase decision support aid over the following 
three years. Their results revealed that the introduction of a basic CPOE system significantly 
reduced some types of medication errors (e. g. non-missed dose errors, serious medication errors, 
non-intercepted potential ADEs) by 64 per cent overall compared to baseline measures. The 
addition of decision support functions (e. g. an allergy warning system in phase 2 and forced 
ordering of potassium chloride in phase 3) significantly decreased more types of error (e. g. all of the 
above plus preventable ADEs and intercepted potential ADEs) by a further 64 per cent compared to 
standard CPOE. 
Two of the remaining four decision support studies measured the effects of implementing 'smart' 
infusion pumps on medication infusion errors (16 & 19). Smart pumps address the increased nsk of 
error posed by individualized medication infusion concentrations by calculating standardized rates 
of fluid administration and alerting users to incorrect dosage or flow rates, with maximum dosage 
ranges to eliminate ten-fold dosage errors. Larsen et al. (16) investigated the effects of combining 
smart pumps with the provision of standardised drug concentrations (based on 32 common 
intravenous medications calculated by patients weight) and 'human engineered' medication labels 
to facilitate the correct transfer of information to the pump. Although a 73 per cent decrease in 
medication infusion errors was observed, the independent effects of each intervention were not 
measured so it is difficult to determine which particular effort was the most effective in reducing 
errors. It is possible that the combination of standardised drug concentrations and medication labels 
designed according to human factor prmciples was both cheaper and a more effective strategy of 
error reduction than the implementation of smart pump technology. This idea is strengthened in a 
similar study by Rothschild et al. (19). This study investigated the effects of using smart pump 
decision support technology in cardiac surgery. Results revealed no significant impact on serious 
medication errors or Adverse Drug Events (ADEs) after implementation of only smart pump 
technology. Authors attribute this non-significant result in part to the observation that although the 
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technology offered some support in decision making, it was still possible to over-rule the guidance 
given and over-rides were frequently observed. 
These findings do however raise the question of whether simpler, less costly methods of 
intervention based on human engineering principles would be both easier and more likely to be 
implemented and ultimately more effective in error prevention long-term. With this in mind, the 
final two decision support studies (8 & 11) measure the effects of much simpler, less technology 
based interventions on prescribing errors. Shaw et al. (8) tested the effects of 'academic detailing' 
on prescribing errors in drugs of addiction (DoA). Part of their intervention comprised one-to-one 
interviews with junior doctors to discuss and troubleshoot problems with prescribing DoA in terms 
of the legal requirements according to state law. This element of their intervention will be discussed 
under the subheading education and training. The other component of their intervention involved 
provision of a bookmark to all junior doctors with a ten-point summary of legal prescribing 
requirements for DoA on one side and a sample prescription on the other. Although they described 
their intervention as 'educational', they did not acknowledge that they had also tested the added 
effects of decision support in the forrn of a bookmark prompt. Findings revealed that there was a 
significant decrease in the rate of prescribing errors (from 41 to 24 per cent of the total written over 
a 4-week period) compared to a control group. However, authors report only the overall 
effectiveness of their educational and decision support interventions but do not report the respective 
effects of the additional decision support aid. This information would have undoubtedly been 
useful since decision support prompts are cost effective and require fewer man hours to produce 
compared with education interventions which require significantly more effort. It is possible that 
the prompt alone was a sufficient memory aid to reduce prescribing errors in this study. 
Comparatively, Davey et al. (11) measured the respective effects of education and decision support 
for junior doctors on paediatric prescribing errors. Their intervention involved an interactive 
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pharmacist-led tutorial for junior doctors on appropriate prescribing practices which included 
legibility of handwriting, placement of decimal places and zeros, units of administration and dosage 
calculations (not currently taught on UK undergraduate medical training). This tutorial was 
followed by the formulation of standardised bedside guidelines for calculating 22 common drugs 
utilised on paediatric wards according to patient age and body weight. Results revealed a significant 
reduction in prescribing errors after the educational tutorial but no further reduction in errors was 
seen from introduction of the decision support fool. These findings would appear to suggest that 
while educational interventions alone can be successful in reducing MEs, the addition of decision 
support aids offers no further benefit to error reduction. However, post-intervention follow up data 
for both studies was just one week (11) and two months (8) so it is possible that clinicians had little 
need to rely upon the decision support aid since their knowledge had only recently been refreshed. 
In order to determine whether such simple and cost effective decision support aids could be 
independently useful in reducing error likelihood (or that the findings were not due to the 
Hawthorne effect), a longer follow-up would be required or a separate test of the effects of only 
decision support. 
While Shaw et aL did not measure the cumulative effects of adding decision support to formal 
education and Davey et al. did, neither study referred to this aspect of their intervention as decision 
support, which is crucial to patient safety learning. If an organisation has identified a problem With 
prescribing practices and is looking for an inexpensive method of reducing errors as an alternative 
to the very expensive implementation of CPOE, it would be useful if this could be readily identified 
from the patient safety literature. By making little effort to label interventions appropriately, 
opportunities for leaming will be lost. 
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3.3.4.3. Education and training 
Four of the nineteen articles reviewed investigated the effects of education/training on medication 
errors. Two of these studies measured the direel effects of specific educational interventions. As 
already discussed previously, Shaw et al. (8) and Davey et al. (11) describe interventions which 
aimed to measure the impact of educational programs in the form of one-to-one troubleshooting 
interviews and prescribing practice tutorials respectively on prescribing errors. Both studies report 
statistically significant reductions in prescribing errors made by junior doctors. However, both 
studies combined their primary educational intervention with additional decision support aids. By 
comparison, Fasting and Gisvold (4) measured the indirect effects of combining 'medication safety 
education' as a secondary intervention with an intervention primarily focussed on the design of 
equipment. In this study, only the combined effects of the two interventions were reported. 
Authors provide only a cursory mention of their educational intervention, reporting that 
'educational department meetings' were held to discuss medication errors and the mechanisms 
behind them. No further details were provided. Similarly, Silver and Antonow (14) report an 
educational intervention carried out by five of their recruited eight hospitals which had 
implemented 'comprehensive educational programs' aimed at identifying drug knowledge 
deficiencies in nursing staff to increase their 'awareness for error potential'. As with Fasting and 
Gisvold, Silver and Antonow provide no detail on exactly what form this comprehensive 
educational intervention took or how it was developed or implemented. 
Providing this level of detail is especially important in educational interventions which can be both 
costly and time-consuming (Berkson, 1993) since research has shown there to be a vast range of 
educational approaches available to teaching skills and knowledge to health care professionals. For 
example, small group problem based learning (PBL) strategies in particular have been shown to be 
significantly more successful than more traditional educational methods in liealth care settings 
(Walton & Matthews, 1989; Vernon & Blake, 1993). However, Savin-Baden (2000) found there to 
55 
be five different types of PBL strategies alone currently being employed in UK medical institutions 
and Newman (2003) points out that established guidelines on the implementation of PBL strategies 
(Barrows, 2000) are not widely used. It is vital therefore that research which has involved 
educational interventions report explicitly the types of methods employed for the benefit of 
replication and as a guide to 'what works'. 
3.3.4.4. Design 
Four of the nineteen studies reviewed measured the effects of design interventions on medication 
errors. These studies have been subcategorised according to the nature of their design changes. 
Two articles measure the impact of changes to the design of the workplace (3 & 14). Walsh-Sukys 
et al. (3) measured the effects of ergonomically reducing sound and light levels on medication 
errors in a neonatal intensive care unit. They hypothesise that excessive light and sound levels may 
contribute to increased levels of stress in both patients and nurses, which may increased the risk of 
making errors. However, confusingly they also argue that reducing light and sound levels may also 
cause errors. Whilst a well controlled study, the authors do not report the success of the 
intervention in terms of the reduction of errors on the experimental ward; only the difference in 
error rate between the experimental and control wards which was non-significant. In a 
comparatively larger study involving seven of their eight recruited hospitals (although the exact 
number of participating wards or individuals is not reported), Silver and Antonow (14) describe two 
distinct strategies to reduce medication administration errors by making changes to workplace 
design. One intervention involved 'restriction of physical access to potentially lethal drugs' and the 
other involved separating look-a-like drugs in clinical storage cupboards. As has been mentioned 
previously, Silver and Antonow do not report data for each intervention, only the combined success 
of all interventions across all eight recruited hospitals. 
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Three studies describe ME reduction strategies based on the design of eguipment (4,14 & 16). 
Fasting and Gisvold (4) measured the impact of colour-coding syringe labels in an attempt to reduce 
medication administration errors in anaesthesia. Their findings showed no significant decrease in 
errors after the intervention, though this intervention was combined with an educational program 
which may have had an impact on the number of errors reported (see section 3.4. for more detailed 
discussion). In a similar study, Larsen et aL (16) measured the impact of designing intravenous 
fluid labels based on 'human engineering principles* to facilitate the transfer of correct information 
into IV pumps. This intervention was a tertiary strategy to reduce medication infusion errors and 
was combined with the primary and secondary decision support strategies of smart pump 
technology implementation and provision of standardised drug concentrations. Although an overall 
significant reduction in medication infusion errors was observed, as discussed previously the 
respective effect of this design change was not measured. The final study to test the impact of 
equipment design changes on MEs was reported by Silver and Antonow (14). In their collaborative 
report, the authors report an intervention to improve the 'design of medication administration 
records' to improve clarity for nursing staff. However, the authors do not report exactly how this 
was perforined or whether this particular design strategy was independently successful in reducing 
errors. 
3.3.4.5. Human Resources 
Only one of the nineteen studies measured the impact of employing changes in human resources on 
MEs. Greengold et al. (7) measured the effects of changing the job role of nursing staff to yield 
reductions in MEs. This study hypothesised that MEs would decrease by having dedicated 
4 medication nurses' who could focus entirely on administering drugs to overcome problems 
associated with ftequent prescription changes and an abundance of new drug products. This 
strategy did not significantly reduce MEs overall. However, this result may have been a knock-on 
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effect of combining a secondary educational intervention with the primary changes in human 
resources. This argument will be discussed in more detail in section 3.4. 
3.3.4.6. Local working conditions 
Only one study had attempted to measure the effects of what could be classified as a local working 
conditions intervention. The Harvard Work Hours, Health and Safety Group (5) measured the 
effects of reducing the number of hours worked consecutively in one shift and per week by doctors 
(intems). The intervention compared the number of 'serious' MEs (among others) dunng a 
traditional intem work schedule of 77-81 hours per week with the possibility of 34 continuous 
working hours with an intervention schedule comprising a maximum of 63 hours per week and no 
more than 16 hours of continuous work per shift. Results revealed that interns made significantly 
fewer serious MEs during the intervention period. 
3.3.4.7. Team Communication 
Again, there was only one study which claimed to have measured the effects of a team intervention 
on subsequent MEs. Bates et al. (1) investigated the combined effects of a primary CPOE 
intervention with a secondary team intervention developed to improve team communication. The 
authors provide sparse detail on this secondary aspect of their intervention (one small paragraph) 
and the information they do provide appears to describe multiple decision support additions such as 
standardised dilutions charts, a drip-rate calculation program and standardised labelling of IV bags, 
tubes and pumps. The only aspect of their intervention which seems to directly address the way in 
which a multi -professional team might function or communicate is in the form of a nurse to 
phan-nacy communication log book to improve inter-disciplinary communication. Nevertheless, the 
authors did attempt to measure the independent effects of their 'team intervention. The authors 
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report no incremental effect of the team intervention over the benefit of CPOE implementation 
compared to wards who had received CPOE alone. 
3.3.5. Outcome measures employed 
Each of the articles was reviewed in terms of their employed outcome measures. Table 3.3.5 
summarises these findings which are discussed in more detail below in terms of the provision of 
error definitions, the utilisation of known error classifications and the methodologies used to 
measure these outcome variables. 
Table 3.3.5: Outcome measures employed by reviewed articles 
Error type Articles Percentage of total* 
Medication Errors - All 2,3,10,13,14,15,19 37% 
Prescribing Errors 6,81,9,11,12,17ý, 18 37% 
Medication Administration Errors 4,7,9,16 21% 
Serious Medication Errors 1,5 11% 
Adverse Drug Events 2,19 11% 
Potential Adverse Drug Events 2,19 11% 
* Some studies employed more than one dependent variable 
3.3.5.1. Definitions and classifications 
Studies were reviewed in terrns of their definition of medication error and their use of known 
classification systems. Sixteen of the nineteen studies reviewed reported measuring only one type 
of medication error, while the remaining three studies reported measuring two (9) and three (2 & 
19) types of medication error. Eight studies reported additional outcome measures including 
procedural and diagnostic errors (5), physician confidence in prescription writing (8), time taken to 
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conduct the drug administration round (9) and pharmacy turn-around times (17). Of the seven 
studies purporting to measure 'all' medication errors, five used the NCC MERP" definition (or 
variations of) which denotes; * ... any error in prescribing, dispensing, administering and monitoring 
medications regardless of outcome... ' (2,10,13,15 & 19). The remaining two studies did not 
provide a definition of all medication errors (3 & 14). 
Seven studies measured errors associated with prescribing medication. Two of these articles 
presented no definition of prescribing errors (8 & 12). Another study did provide a definition of 
prescription error; although the authors measured only dosage errors of one high-risk drug 
(Gentamicin) given on admission to a Neonatal Intensive Care Unit. This error type was so specific 
it required little defining (17). An additional two studies stated they had used established 
definitions of prescribing error and prescribing classification systems (Dean, Barber & Schacter, 
2000; AAP, 1998), though they did not provide these definitions within the article (9 & 11). 
Finally, the remaining two studies measuring prescribing errors presented detailed definitions of 
prescribing errors and the ways in which these errors had been taxonomised (6 & 18). For example, 
Potts et al. (18) give a clear definition of the types of prescribing errors they measured and 
classified them as either potential adverse drug events (ADEs), medication prescribing errors 
(MPEs) or rule violations (RVs). The authors provide clear definitions and examples for each 
category such as providing incorrect or inappropriate information on ordering medication, failing to 
account for patient-specific information such as allergies, problems with interpretation of 
handwritten orders and non-compliance with standard hospital policies. Similarly, Bizovi et aL (6) 
present a detailed description of their outcome measure which comprised medication orders which 
required 'pharmacist clarification'. Authors also provide examples of several clarifications such as 
missing or incorrect information, legibility problems, incorrect dose or drug selection. 
15 The National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention (NCC MERP) is an independent 
body comprised of 23 national organizations spearheaded by the United States Pharmacopoeia. 
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Four studies measured the effects of intervention on medication administration errors (MAEs). One 
of these studies provided no definition of what constituted an MAE (16), while another provided a 
vague reference to 'intra-operative problernsý in the form of MAEs but little else (4). Greengold et 
al. (7) describe their outcome measure as discrepancies between physician's medication orders with 
independent observations of drug administration rounds which included documenting 'variations 
from safe medication practices'. The authors do note that observers were given the NCC MERP 
definition of medication administration error (see footnote 15) but this definition was not provided 
in the article. Finally, Franklin et al. (9) describe medication administration errors as; '... any dose 
of medication which deviated from the patient's current medication orders... ' However, no further 
elaboration was provided and the authors do not cite the use of any system of error classification. 
Two of the nineteen studies described their outcome measures as 'serious' MEs (1 & 5). In their 
study measuring the effects of reducing work hours on MEs, Landrigan et al. (5) present cursory 
definitions of ten outcome measures; describing serious MEs as those which '... related to the 
ordering or administration of pharmaceutical agents, blood products, or intravenous fluid.. ', but do 
elaborate on the word 'serious' to differentiate between these and 'non-serious' errors. The authors 
do not provide a definition of error at all and present no examples of serious errors in lieu of a 
definition. Similarly, Bates et al. (1) provide some details on their definition of serious MEs, 
making the distinction between those which are preventable and those which are not, however, as 
with Landrigan et al. (5), they make no reference to the way in which an error is classified as 
6 serious'. 
The final two studies measured the impact of their interventions on Adverse Drug Events (ADEs) or 
Potential Adverse Drug Events (PADEs) (2 & 19). As their secondary outcome variable, Bates et 
al. (2) measured the effects of CPOE on ADEs and PADEs. Authors provide detailed, though 
convoluted definitions of both measures. Additionally, authors present a highly complicated system 
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of classifying these errors in ternis of their preventability, potential for harm and whether they were 
intercepted before reachi 111 ing the patient which makes it difficult to ascertain exactly what has been 
measured, By comparison, Rothschild et al. (19) present a detailed yet clear description of both 
ADEs and PADEs, elaborating on when an error becomes an ADE. Neither study alludes to any 
known system of error taxonomy. 
3.3.5.2. Methodologies 
As the secondary aim of this research was to record medication error prevalence (in order to 
improve the predictive validity of the error management tool), articles were reviewed for their 
methods of error data collection. Table 3.3.5.2 summarises these findings. 
3.3.5.2: Methods of data collection for reviewed studies 
Method of data collection T Articles rPercentage of total* 
Drug chart/patient record review 1,2,5,7,11,12,17,18,19 47% 
Self report (survey) 1,4,5,14,19 26% 
Spontaneous reporting system 3,10,13,16,19 26% 
Independent observation 5,7,9 16% 
Pharmacist report 2,6,9 16% 
Not stated 8,15 11% 
* Some studies used more than one method 
It was the general aim of this particular phase of the review to determine which methodology 
provided the most accurate measure of ME prevalence. Cullen et al., (1995) suggest that 
spontaneous formal incident reporting (non-anonymous) ordinarily captures less than five per cent 
of the errors which actually occur. Research also suggests that significantly more medication errors 
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are identified when an anonymous system of error reporting is implemented (Harris et al., 2007). 
Similarly, Barker et al., (1984) estimate that when observational techniques of identifying errors are 
employed the prevalence of errors could be as high as one error per hospitalised patient per day; 
significantly greater than those reported 'officially' through more fon-nal channels. In a recent 
comparison of methods across thirty-six hospitals, Flynn et aL (2002) found the number of errors 
identified using independent observation was significantly higher (and identified the highest 
number of events compared to all methods of data collection) than traditional incident reporting 
systems by a factor of 457: 1! 
The original aim for this part of the review was to combine these findings in a meaningful way to 
compare the prevalence of MEs detected by each method and the validity and reliability of different 
methods; the method detecting the highest number of errors presumably reflecting the most 
thorough methodology and therefore providing the best reflection of true error rate. Unfortunately, 
due to the wide variability in the types of medication errors measured by each study it was not 
possible to synthesise these studies in this way. For example, eleven studies employed only one 
method of data collection. However, four studies used two methods (1,2,7 & 9), two studies 
combined three methods (5 & 19) and two studies did not specify their methods (8 & 15). By 
combining data in this way, studies have not measured respective error rates detected by each 
method in the same way as Flynn et aL (2002) (see above). 
Of particular interest to this thesis was the method of self-reporting errors via survey methods. It 
was detennined early in the current research that since the author was not a trained health 
professional, chart review or clinical observations would not be appropriate methods of measuring 
error frequency. Therefore methods which did not require clinical expertise (or recruitment of such 
a professional) would be the most likely method employed in this research. Of the studies reviewed 
which had used survey methods to identify medication error prevalence, two measured 'serious" 
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MEs (I & 5), one measured only MAEs (4) and two studies measured 'all' medication errors but 
provided conflicting definitions (14 & 19). It was subsequently not possible to compare the number 
of errors each respective method had identified because of the huge variability in these studies. 
3.4. Discussion 
This discussion will focus on several key issues which have arisen from the review followed by 
overall conclusions. 
Lack of theory, intervention choice and use of organisational terminology 
Recognising the value of human error theory and developing systems changes which reflect these 
theories (leaming from other high-risk industries) are recommendations made by UK and US 
governments. A strong theoretical foundation is also fundamental in the design of complex safety 
improvement interventions (Eccles et al., 2003). However, all but one of the nineteen studies 
reviewed gave no indication that Reason's Swiss cheese model, organisational accident framework 
(Reason, 1997) or any other 'systems' theory (Perrow, 1984; Rasmussen, 1983) had been utilised as 
a theoretical basis for their intervention. In the only study that did suggest Reasons model had been 
employed as a means of developing their intervention, the way in which the theory was used or to 
what level was not described. This could be in part attributed to the finding that although many 
health care organisations are aware of the model, considerable overlap in interpretation of Reason's 
theory has resulted in a lack of confidence in apprOPnately applying it (Perneger, 2005). The only 
attempts to employ Reasons' organisational accident framework was observed earlier in the review 
process in studies which had used the framework to propose systems causes of errors during 
retrospective incident analysis (Dean et al., 2002; Vincent et al., 1998; Meurier, 2000). However, 
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since these studies had not employed interventions to test their hypotheses, they did not meet 
inclusion criteria. 
As well as being predominantly atheoretical, very few of the articles reviewed here referred to key 
terms such as systems, organisational, human factors, teams, decision support or standard operating 
procedures which are prevalent in other industrial error research (Reason, 1997). None of the 
studies acknowledged that their interventions had involved organisational or sYstenis changes, 
despite having little to do with changes at an individual level (e. g. cognitive strategies, work 
shadowing or vigilance training). Furthermore, most of the reviewed articles provided very little 
empirical evidence to support their chosen interventions. Rationales were largely driven by a 
limited range of government objectives such as the introduction or modification of high-spec 
technology such as computerised physician ordering systems (DoH, 2000; IoM, 1999). These 
studies provided little or no explanation as to why employing these particular interventions was 
necessary or might be successful in reducing errors in their particular organisation. 
Employing interventions to reduce errors in clinical settings is undoubtedly costly and time- 
consuming. However, if attempts are not first made to measure the systems variables which 
actually require intervention, changes may be inappropriate or unnecessary (Wensing & Grol, 
1994). Additionally, if a variable targeted for intervention is problematic within a particular 
environment, the intervention may even lead to dynamic changes to other systems variables. Almost 
half of the studies reviewed here reported that at least one of their interventions was not effective in 
reducing medication errors. In terms of planning appropriate interventions, a theory driven tool 
which can proactively identify multiple systems weaknesses at a local level would unquestionably 
be useful for health care organisations. 
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Single vs. multiple interventions 
More than half of the studies reviewed examined the combined effects of two or more 
interventions 16 . For example, Shaw et al. (8) and 
Larsen et al., (16) describe only the combined 
benefit of implementing multiple interventions. However, it is possible that individual components 
of their interventions alone could have been responsible for the successful reductions in medication 
errors observed. These studies by inference suggest that only when all their interventions are 
combined will successful results be observed. It is possible that the respective contributions of eacli 
component of multiple interventions could be incremental or synergistic. For example, when 
Davey et al. (11) measured the respective effects of a two-stage intervention, results revealed that 
while the initial educational component was successful in reducing prescribing errors, the 
subsequent decision support phase generated no further benefit in error reduction. Similarly, Bates 
et al. (1) measured the respective effects of implementing a basic CPOE system, followed by two 
further interventions to gradually increase decision support. While the implementation of basic 
CPOE (phase 1) significantly reduced MEs compared to baseline measures, the occurrence of MEs 
increased significantly during their phase 2 intervention before finally decreasing once more after 
phase 3. 
It should be taken into consideration that there are significant constraints in this particular field of 
applied research such as access to participants, ethical constraints and the availability of financial 
resources. As a result, by assessing and reporting only the combined results of multiple 
interventions, smaller organisations constrained by significantly lower financial budgets may 
struggle to implement all changes implemented in larger institutions. Fundamentals of research 
design dictate that research should be well described and reproducible. Health care organisations 
which implement interventions to change clinical practice are responsible for reporting explicit 
16 It should be noted that not all of these studies acknowledged they had measured multiple interventions. 
Descriptions of interventions were disentangled where this author considered more than one intervention 
had 
been employed. 
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replicable methodologies for interventions. Where multiple interventions have been employed, 
individual components of those interventions should also be described, including the respectix, e 
effects of each intervention. 
Almost half of the studies reviewed investigated the effects of only one intervention on the 
reduction of MEs. This approach to error management may be viewed as over-simplistic, serving 
only to slow research progress. However, there is considerable industrial evidence to suggest errors 
are likely to occur as a result of a complex interaction between multiple workplace and 
organisational variables (Reason, 1990; Hudson el al., 1994; Wieman & Wieman, 2004; Vincent, 
2006). It would be helpful therefore for health care researchers to consider this complex 
relationship when designing interventions. Without first understanding the multifaceted interplay 
between organisational variables, many combined forms of intervention may not reach their optimal 
potential for reducing errors nor will it be known which aspects are successful or unsuccessful in 
reducing errors. 
CPOE: Panacea or quick fix? 
Kremsdorf (2005) proposes that in the US in particular, IoM recommendations to utilise 
technological systems in health care to improve medication safety have led to an 'industry rush' to 
implement CPOE systems. Implementation of these systems is internationally regarded as the 
technical 'panacea' to medication ordering errors. Almost half of the studies reviewed measured the 
effects of implementing CPOE systems on medication error prevalence. Notably, of the nine 
studies which implemented CPOE systems, four reported that their systems included decision 
support components such as drug libraries or drug-allergy warnings. Three of these studies report 
significantly larger decreases in medication error prevalence post-intervention than studies which 
did not integrate additional decision support features into their CPOE systems (see appendix III for 
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comparison on intervention success). These findings suggest that basic CPOE systems are less 
effective without the addition of decision support features. However, this may be an over- 
generalisation of the effectiveness of additional, costly upgrades to standard CPOE systems. As 
previously discussed, Bates et aL (2) showed that while some decision support options significantly 
reduced MEs compared to baseline measures and standard CPOE implementation alone, other 
decision support options actually increased the rate of errors. In support of this, Koppel et al., 
(2005) observed that implementation of some CPOE systems actually facilitated ME prevalence due 
to poor user-interface design. 
These findings raise several important issues. Firstly, basic CPOE systems and decision support 
features of CPOE do not target the same aspects of human behaviour within an organisation. For 
example, CPOE alleviates problems associated with handwriting prescriptions such as specification 
errors (trailing and leading zeros), transcription errors and problems with the design and tracking of 
paper-based drug charts. Conversely, decision support features are more specifically designed to 
reduce medication errors by providing interactive advice and assistance during the decision making 
process. These features consist of constraining or forcing functions such as incorrect 
drug/dosage/route/frequency prompts and selection of drugs with contraindications or to which 
patients are allergic (Koppel, et aL, 2005). Without first identifying where the problem in any given 
organisation lies, more sophisticated versions of CPOE systems which incorporate decision support 
options may represent a needless and costly purchase. By measuring the respective effects of 
standard CPOE system implementation, followed by incremental introduction of decision support 
options Bates et al. were able to tailor their intervention to some extent to meet the specific needs of 
the clinical setting. Institutions which have implemented CPOE systems should make the 
distinction between the efficacy of standard CPOE systems and the addition of extra decision 
support features clearer and should attempt to measure their respective effects. 
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The total costs of implementing CPOE with additional decision support features at a 500-bed 
hospital have been estimated to be in the region of $8 million, with continuing maintenance costs of 
$1.35 million per year (Kuperman & Gibson, 2003). On the other hand, research has shown that 
implementation of CPOE can significantly reduce the costs of patient care associated with 
iatrogenic injury in the long tenn (Tiemey, Miller, Overhage, & McDonald, 1993; Evans et al., 
1998). However, not all health care organisations will be in a financial situation to afford such an 
expensive 'up-front investment' (AHRQ, 2001). Although more recent data has not yet been 
published, a survey conducted in 2002 at the Health Information Management and Systems Society 
(HIMSS) Annual Conference in the US revealed that while 67 per cent of respondents reported that 
their organisations were planning to implement CPOE, only 21 per cent said that they were 
currently implementing it17. Survey results ftirther indicated a direct relationship between 
organisation size and implementation of CPOE systems with individuals working at larger 
organisations (with budgets over $500 million) more likely to report that they were implementing 
CPOE software compared with individuals working for organisations with annual budgets of less 
than $100 million. Kremsdorf (2005) argues that implementing CPOE systems has prevented some 
health care organizations from funding other interventions that may yield more significant benefits 
and that this in turn has bypassed the core of the patient safety problem and has become a 
'distraction from solving the real systemic issues'. 
The absence of team interventions 
Despite a proliferation of evidence in health care and other high-risk industries implicating the 
influences of team factors on human error, particularly those involving communication, only one 
study in this review claimed to implement a team intervention (1). Although authors described what 
17 The HIMSS 2002 'Hot Topics Survey' addressed key topics influencing the healthcare IT industry, 
including disaster preparedness, HIPAA, and patient safety conducted at the Annual HIMSS Conference and 
Exhibition in Atlanta, Georgia, January 2002. 
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they deemed to be a team intervention, they did not report that their current team functioning or 
communication was substandard or the ways in which the intervention was expected to improve 
these deficiencies. Furthermore, most of the components of this intervention could be more 
appropriately labelled as decision support improvements (e. g. increasing pharmacist's availability 
on the ward, standardising medication dilution charts, computerised drip-rate calculations etc. ) 
rather than improvements of team communication. 
This finding raises two important questions. Firstly, why was there only one published team 
intervention to reduce MEs when team communi III iterature ication is commonly cited in the medical Ii 
as an important precursor of error (IoM, 1999; Helmreich & Schaefer, 1994; Lingard et al., 2005; 
Sutcliffe, Lewton & Rosenthal, 2004)? Secondly, given the considerable degree of evidence which 
has attempted to define and categorise team communication (Reason, 1990; Sasou & Reason, 1999; 
Lingard et al., 2004), reported ways to measure team functioning (Sexton & HeIrnreich, 2004; 
Helmreich & Schaefer, 1994; Healey, Undre & Vincent, 2004) and proposed methods of team 
intervention (Risser et al., 1999; Moray et al., 2002; Lingard et al., 2005; Awad et al., 2005) why 
was this sole 'team' intervention not really a team intervention? 
It could be argued that team interventions are simply too difficult to design and implement. In such 
an applied field of research, getting teams within and between disciplines together is notoriously 
difficult due to time and staffing constraints. However, as described above, there is an abundance 
of research which has developed tools to measure team factors. Altematively, it might be the case 
that any intervention will have an indirect impact on the way a team functions and so specific team 
interventions may not be warranted. For example, increasing the availability of a pharmacist on the 
ward will not improve the knowledge or skills of any other member of the health professional team 
but will provided valuable decision support for the team as a whole. In this way, the burden of 
knowledge for the rest of the team will be attenuated which may in turn indirectly improve intra- 
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discipline relations. Such an intervention could improve team communication by providing a 
communication channel that did not previously exist. However, it does not necessarily follow that 
mere addition of another health professional will improve team functioning if that communication 
channel is ineffective. In fact psychological research has indicated that inappropriately increasing 
team size can lead to coordination problems due to loss of motivation due to 'dispersion of 
responsibility' and problems with performance (Latane, Williams & Harkins, 1979; Sheppard, 
1993). 
Research has suggested that team effectiveness can be affected by multiple inherent design factors 
such as team size (Guzzo & Dickson, 1996; Temple, 2004), group cohesion (Gully, Devine & 
Whitney, 1995), organisational context and a match between material resources and task demands 
(Hackman, 1983). Perhaps it is this plethora of evidence emphasising the highly complex nature of 
teams and communication strategies which has deterred researchers from implementing such 
interventions. Knowing there are so many factors which will determine whether a team 
intervention is warranted and will ultimately be effective could be a deterrent to health service 
researchers, particularly when the alternative could be as comparatively simple as installing a 
computer system. 
Inconsistent error definitions, detection methods and taxonomies 
Classen and Metzger (2003) argue that assessing the effects of any intervention relies heavily upon 
the use of well defined, standardised and reliable medication safety outcome measures. This review 
revealed considerable disparity in the measurement of medication error. Of the 19 studies 
reviewed, only 5 used a standard published definition of medication errors or variations of this 
definition (NCC MERP). Additionally, all studies measured different aspects of medication errors 
from prescribing to administration and all nature of medication error types from 'serious' errors and 
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Adverse Drug Events to dosage errors of Gentamicin. For this reason it is not possible to provide a 
cohesive synthesis of the material (also noted in the Hoff et al. review). In fact, the majority of the 
studies reviewed provided scant definitions of their outcome measures. 
This finding is also consistent with a recent review conducted by Yu et al., (2005) who attempted to 
identify terms and definitions used by organisations associated with medication safety. From 160 
websites searched, only 33 had provided one or more definitions for medication safety terms. 
Using error scenarios to categorise definitions according to similarity, 25 different terms With 119 
different definitions were found. There were eight different definitions of the term adi, crse ev('17t, 
nine versions of the term error and twelve definitions of the ten-n near-miss. Yu et al. concludes 
that there is an 'imperative need for consensus' on the standardised terminology used to describe 
medication safety. This nomenclature will in turn enable more meaningful synthesis of medication 
incident data and assist in the development of improvement strategies. Classen and Metzger (2003) 
argue that it is this current lack of 'meaningful synthesis' which will continue to hamper strategies 
aimed at medication safety. 
3.5. Conclusions 
Apart from one study, there was a distinct lack of any theoretical basis for the implementation of 
medication error management interventions. Because of this there was very little consistency in the 
tenninology used to describe these interventions. Furthennore, the majority of research reviewed 
here provided very little empirical evidence to support the need or use of their respective 
interventions. There is evidently a tendency within health care to perceive technological 
interventions as the panacea to medication safety and many studies used 'evidence-light' 
government recommendations to justify their implementation. This reported wave of technological 
interventions significantly outweighed the use of more psychological improvements involving 
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teamwork or Communication for example. It is argued here that the over-use of technological 
intervention and under-use of more psychological strategies is due to two reasons. Firstly, 
Government directives have recommended the increased use of technology in health care to reduce 
prescribing errors. However, this is often an over-cited recommendation used in lieu of other 
empirical evidence to support its widespread implementation. Both US and UK government 
directives (IoM, 1999; DoH, 2000) recommended multiple strategies to mitigate medication errors, 
many of which related to organisational learning from other high-risk industries in terms of 
primarily identifying organisational weaknesses. This is a directive which is rarely undertaken. 
Secondly, there is to date no comprehensive or reliable tool available to measure organisation or 
systems problems in the workplace. As a result organisations are not aware of exactly which 
interventions are necessary in their institutions and so cannot appropriately design or target required 
improvements. Organisations have 'panic-purchased' technological systems in order to effect 
changes to medication safety practices that may or may not have been warranted in their institution. 
The dearth of psychological interventions such as those which target team functioning for example, 
may have led to the mistaken belief that such interventions are not beneficial in reducing human 
error prevalence. Comparatively, the plethora of technological interventions may have led to the 
over-inflated belief that such interventions are the 'magic-bullet' which will repres'ent the most 
effectual improvements. 
A more 'grass-roots' approach to the identification of organisational and workplace causes of 
medication error involving workers at the 'sharp-end' of medication practices is clearly necessary. 
In this way, efforts can be directed towards the development of a diagnostic measure which can 
proactively identify organisational weaknesses, and target improvement resources before errors can 
occur. Without a valid and reliable diagnostic tool, it is likely that medication error management 
strategies will continue to be inappropriately applied and will therefore not achieve their optimum 
potential. 
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CHAPTER 4 
LATENT CAUSES OF MEDICATION ADMINISTRATION ERROR: 
AN EXPLORATORY STUDY 
...... . ........... .. I..., k.. iAl. ll ........ . ..... Ul .................... al -.,. ...., --.. 4#"dd ............. 
4.1. Introduction 
The main aim of this research was to respond to a call from numerous research and government 
agencies (see chapter 1, section 1.4) for NHS research to learn from error management techniques 
and theory employed in industries which have attempted to proactively identify organisational and 
workplace failures before they result in error. This research is intended to complement existing 
retrospective incident analysis systems and approach error management from the opposing direction 
(see chapter 2, Figure 2.3). A systematic research review was conducted in chapter 3 to identify 
patient safety research which had employed organisational or workplace interventions to reduce 
medication errors. This review revealed a research base which was largely atheoretical and 
unsystematic. Furthermore, this evidence base provided generally inconsistent use of terminology 
to describe interventions, outcome measures and subsequent findings. It is hypothesised that a more 
'grass-roots' approach involving health care professionals at the 'sharp-end' of clinical practice will 
establish a clearer understanding of these latent failures and the ways in which these problems 
manifest in a clinical setting. 
Using Reason's organisational accident model (Reason, 1997) as a framework for understanding 
the interplay between organisation factors, workplace conditions and unsafe acts, this stage of the 
research employed several qualitative methods to explore the latent predictors of medication 
administration errors in secondary care. Research has suggested that qualitative methods are useful 
for capturing the factors behind human error and system failure, particularly in health care research 
(Runciman, 1993). Armitage (2004) argues that such methods are especially useful in the 
exploration of phenomena which is often 'complex, contextual, and of both a physical and psycho- 
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social nature' as is the case in drug administration errors. This qualitative study was conducted in 
three phases. Since the aim of this study was to explore the causes of errors committed by nurses 
during the administration of medication, the first study phase was to conduct observations of 
nursing activities, with particular emphasis on medication rounds (where nurses take a trolley 
stocked with medication around the ward to give patients their prescribed medication). Phase two 
involved reviewing forinally reported drug errors to identify potential error causes and familianse 
the author with the types of error which occur in the process of medication administration. The 
third phase of this study was to explore the perceptions of error causation of health care 
professionals at the 'sharp-end' of clinical practice and senior management at the 'blunt-end' 18 of 
one NHS Trust. 
To meet the research needs of the collaborating hospital (Bradford Teaching Hospitals NHS 
Foundation Trust), the decision was made to focus on medication administration errors (made by 
nurses) as opposed to all medical errors which was the original intention.,, There is substantial 
international evidence in support of this decision indicating adverse events resulting from 
medication errors to be a leading cause of iatrogenic injury (Malpass, Helps & Runciman, 1999; 
Vincent, Neale & Woloshynowych, 2001; Leape, Bates & Cullen, 1995). Furthermore, a recent 
study of the medication delivery process fTom transcription to administration has revealed errors in 
the administration of medication to be the most frequent (Marshman et al., 2006). 
4.2. Method 
Observations of nursing activities (study la), semi-structured interviews (study lb) and a review of 
formally reported incidents (study Ic) were conducted in this study. The main aim of conducting 
multiple qualitative methods in this way was to provide a multi -dimensional perspective on the 
organisational and workplace causes of medication administration errors (MAEs). Wilson and 
18 See chapter 2- Reason's organisational accident model for ftill explanation of these terms 
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Hutchinson (1991) argue that combining two or more qualitative methods provides important 
breadth and depth required in applied research and decreases potential biases or disadvantages of 
independent methods (see section 4.3.2 for discussion of such disadvantages). 
It was agreed between the researcher and the collaborating institute that qualitative data collection 
would be conducted within general medicine. General medicine provides acute medical services for 
adults across a wide range of specialties. This clinical area represented a non-specialised clinical 
environment with a wider variety of patient complaints, medical staff and involved a broader range 
of clinical procedures than more specialised clinical areas (e. g. neonatal care, obstetrics etc. ). It was 
anticipated that findings from research in this environment would be more generalisable to other 
clinical areas. Carrying out the exploratory stage of the research in a more specialised field of 
medicine may have lead to the development of an error management tool which was limited to that 
field. Ethics approval was obtained from NRES'9 (formerly COREC20) and research /governance 
approval was obtained from the Bradford Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust's R&D 
department before conducting any of this research. 
Each of the three phases of study 1 will be detailed under respective subheadings in the order they 
were conducted and the combined results and discussion of all three stages will be discussed in 
section 4.4. 
4.2.1. Study la: Ward observations 
Aims 
Research has highlighted that an ethnographic approach to the observation of clinical practice can 
be most effective (Taxis & Barber, 2000; Dixon-Woods, 2003; Armitage, 2004), particularly when 
19 National Research Ethics Service 
20Central Office for Research Ethics Committees 
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the phenomena of interest is particularly sensitive as was the case in this study (Savage, 2000). 
Observations were conducted by shadowing nursing activity using an ethnographic approach for the 
following reasons; 
To acquaint the novice observer with the research environment and occurrences and patterns 
of nursing behaviour thus enabling the development of a more 'environmental ly-a ware' 
interview schedule. 
As a complementary methodology to assist in the interpretation of medical and nursing 
terminology used in subsequent interviews. 
0 As a potential source of data exploring the workplace 21 causes of error. 
0 To facilitate an open, honest and trusting relationship between the researcher and nursing 
personnel which would be vital in later interviews when staff would be asked to share 
potentially sensitive infon-nation. 
Participants 
Using purposive sampling, matrons responsible for three general medical wards in two different 
hospitals were recruited and agreed for their wards to be observed intennittently over a period of 
three months. Random sampling of wards was not possible since there were only three general 
medical wards in the collaborating hospitals and all three were recruited. It was agreed between 
senior nursing staff and the researcher that any nurse could potentially be observed perfon-ning any 
nursing activity provided that observation did not encroach upon patient rights to privacy. This 
decision was at the nurses' discretion. The nursing team were instructed by the observer 
beforehand that if they felt uncomfortable being observed they were free to question the purpose of 
the observation and could ask not to be observed if they felt uncomfortable. It was emphasised that 
the observer was not watching for mistakes, but the ways in which their local working conditions 
21 It was considered unlikely that organisational causes of error would be directly observed since these are 
more likely to operate at a much higher level of the health care system, not at the ward-level. 
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affected their ability to carry out certain tasks, particularly with respect to the administration of 
medication. 
Design 
Delamont (2002, pp. 130-131) recommends that during ethnographical observations 'an initial 
period of relatively unfocused watching is essential' which will enable the observer to 'tune in' to 
cultural behaviour. This is commonly referred to in qualitative research as the 'descriptive phase' 
(Werner & Schoepfle, 1987, pp. 262-264). Assuming the role of 'complete observer' (e. g. 
remaining unobtrusive in the background throughout the observation in an entirely non- 
participatory role; Creswell, 1994), all three general medical wards were 'Informally' observed over 
a period of three hours each (nine hours in total) to meet this objective. Field notes were taken for 
the duration of these observations before more focussed observations were carried out. 
Nine semi-structured observations were then conducted to explore several facets of nursing care and 
the clinical environment under the following categories. Werner and Schoepfle (1987) refer to this 
as the 'focussing phase'. These categories were derived from the first round of 'unfocussed' 
observations and also health care research which has found similar observational categories useful 
in obtaining a well-rounded perspective of nursing behaviour (Wolf et al., 2006). 
1. Medication administration behaviour. This included any nursing activity, disparate from 
other patient care activities, which involved the preparation or administration of medication. 
Any actual or potential drug errors observed during the shift were also recorded with 
pen-nission from the nurse involved (although in reality this rarely happened during 
observations). This information was often in the form of volunteered information. 
2. Local working conditions. Any immediately obvious aspects of the environment which had 
the potential to increase the occurrence of drug errors (e. g. noise levels, design of equipment or 
patient documentation, interruptions or distractions during complex tasks etc. ) 
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3. Team functioning. Any particularly salient or noteworthy aspects of team behaviours which 
were judged particularly effective or defective. This included communication within nursing 
teams, with other health professionals and with patients. 
4. Administrative tasks. Tasks which required nurses to complete paperwork. 
5. Comments. Any unsolicited comments made by nursing staff to the observer regarding patient 
safety, their experiences of making errors, and their perceptions on error causation reduction 
and/or prevention. Although the researcher did not instigate these conversations, nurses often 
approached with information they thought was important to providing safe patient care. 
Perinission was gained from staff before documenting any of these comments. 
Each ward was observed once a month over a three month period (not including the initial 
4unfocussed' observation), once on a morning shift (7.30am-1.30pm), once on an afternoon shift 
(1.30pm-7.30pm) and again for a period which straddled both morning and afternoon shifts 
(10.30am - 4.30pm) so that a comprehensive overview of that wards daily 'activities could be 
obtained. In this way it was possible to observe three of the four medication rounds conducted daily. 
Nursing staff felt that it was not appropriate to observe night shifts since there was very little ward 
activity, there were fewer staff to observe and patients should not be disturbed while sleeping. Each 
period of observation was approximately 6 hours, therefore each ward was observed for 18 hours in 
total (54 observation hours in total across all 3 wards). All wards observed were traditional 
Nightingale wards on which between 8 and 13 patient beds were positioned against both the left and 
right hand walls in a large rectangular open-plan room (as opposed to more modem wards which 
are divided into several smaller bays and private rooms). All observational data was recorded in the 
form of handv; ntten field notes. 
Procedure 
For initial unfocussed observations, the observer reassured nursing staff on arrival on each ward 
that the observations were simply for the benefit of the researcher to familiarise themselves with the 
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ward environment and nursing activities. During focussed observations, nurses were also informed 
of the categories of behaviour which were being observed. Participants were advised that 
observational field notes would also be taken. Particular emphasis was placed on assuring staff that 
the researcher was independent from the hospital, did not represent the hospital management and 
was not auditing or assessing their perfon-nance. This was felt necessary to ensure staff felt at ease 
and were more likely to behave in a way they normally would, rather than be on their 'best 
behaviour', a common problem in observational methodologies. It was also emphasised that all 
data obtained (either directly observed or disclosed by staff members) would be treated 
confidentially and any personal details which could make any individuals identifiable would not be 
recorded on any field notes which would not be made available beyond the observer. Nurses were 
advised of their right to refuse to be observed without giving reason for doing so. However no staff 
member on any of the three wards reftised to be observed. It was considered extremely important 
for the observer to avoid becoming a potential causc of errors and so the observations were 
designed to be unobtrusive as possible. Observations were generally conducted (approximately 70 
per cent of the time) from a central nursing station in the middle of each ward. Field notes and 
reflections of observations were transcribed after each observation and were entered into the 
qualitative analysis package NVivo for the purposes of organising and reorganising the data in 
subsequent analysis. These notes were analysed for potential workplace causes of drug errors using 
thematic content analysis. 
4.2.2. Study lb: Semi-structured interviews 
Participants and recruitment strategy 
To obtain a broad perspective of the latent causes of MAEs, interviews were conducted with both 
sharp-end nursing staff and senior managers at the blunt-end of the health care organisation. In 
doing this it was anticipated that factors across the whole organisation from management decisions 
80 
and organisational processes at the blunt-end to local working conditions and the nature and 
occurrence of unsafe acts at the sharp-end of the organisational would be explored (see chapter 2 for 
Reasons organisational accident model). 
Twelve senior NHS managers from the collaborating NHS Trust were approached and invited to 
participate in interviews. Managers were sent invitation letters and participant information sheets 
describing the purpose of the research and interviews (appendices IV and V). Eight managers 
agreed to be interviewed. Participants were the Director of Clinical Governance, Head of Nursing 
Practice Development, Chief Nurse, Head of Risk, Clinical Director, Clinical Risk Manager and 
two Patient Services Managers. It was anticipated that senior NHS managers would be in a 
significantly better position than nursing staff to comment on latent causes of errors at the 
uppermost end of the organisational system due to the nature of their responsibilities. 
The two matrons in charge of the three general medical wards previously recruited for observations 
were revisited and asked if their wards would like to participate in interviews. The matrons agreed 
that two of the wards could potentially be recruited but the third ward was due to close in the 
coming months and so was not approached. A recruitment strategy was agreed between the 
researcher and the matrons that only qualified nurses who could discuss the potential causes of drug 
administration errors would be invited to participate. Matrons preferred to nominate those nurses 
they felt were the most experienced, knowledgeable and articulate. Letters inviting nurses to 
participate in the research explaining the purpose of the study and the ways in which interviews 
would be conducted were sent to 25 nurses from the two recruited wards (appendix VI). Since it 
was agreed that interviews would be conducted during nurses' lunch breaks, lunch was provided as 
an incentive for interviewees. Furthermore, matrons, senior managers and the ethics committee 
agreed that f 50 could also be offered as a prize draw incentive which is common practice to 
increase recruitment. Eleven nurses agreed to be interviewed and comprised one of the two 
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matrons, three Sisters, three senior staff nurses, three staff nurses and one student nurse who was 
due to qualify the same year and had been involved in the administration of medication on several 
different types of clinical specialty. 
Design 
Interview questions were designed to elicit participant's views on the causes of medication errors. 
This subject was deemed particularly sensitive, especially within the nursing group and so vignettes 
containing hypothetical error scenarios were designed to complement interview questions. 
Research has indicated that using a vignette technique enables participants to disclose views which 
they feel may be potentially threatening using reference to a 'non-personal story' (Rahman, 1996; 
Hughes, 1998; Schwappach & Koeck, 2004), particularly in nursing research (Gould, 1996; Gott et 
al., 2004). In this way, participants were able to choose the degree to which they drew upon their 
own experience of error. 
Error Scenarios 
Liaising with the two recruited matrons, eight hypothetical examples of medication error were 
developed (appendix VII) from the medical literature (e. g. NPSA 22 , AERQ23 and other patient 
safety websites), the matrons own extensive clinical experiences and the researchers experience of 
working in a hospital according to the following three parameters; 
Written in clear generic language which did not require significant clinical practice to 
understand. This was considered important since vignettes should be equally interpretable for 
both qualified nurses and also managers who may not have a clinical background. 
0 One paragraph in length which could be read in approximately five minutes. It was decided 
that vignettes should provide sufficient detail to describe one or more errors in the process of 
medication delivery. 
22 See foresight patient safety training - 
(http: //www. npsa. nhs. uk/patientsafety/improvingpatientsafety/humanfactors/foresight/) 
23 Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, USA 
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No information presented which could potentially bias interviewees' responses. such as 
patient outcome 24 or stated potential latent variables. In this way, participants were free to 
generate their own hypotheses on causation rather than ones which were already stated or 
biased by the impact of the error on the patient. 
The interview schedule 
The interview schedule was semi-structured and based around Reason's organisational model of 
human error (see chapter 2). Questions aimed to guide participants through each stage of the model 
in a retrospective discussion of the vignette from the unsafe acts immediately preceding it to the 
local working conditions which may have triggered these and finally on to latent aspects of the 
organisation which may have brought about these conditions. Interestingly the interview schedule 
had to be amended due to the considerable difficulty both nurses and senior managers had 
interpreting organisational terminology such as system, human factors, latent, and local working 
conditions. Revised interview questions took a less structured approach and invited participants to 
discuss causes of medication errors from individual, environment and organisational perspectives 
(see appendix VIII for interview schedule). One benefit of this type of schedule was to enable 
participants to understand the hierarchical nature of error occurrence and to explore the ways in 
which downstream variables might impact on working practices. 
Procedure 
Management interviews were conducted during working hours in the manager's offices or suitable 
conference room in Bradford Royal Infirmary and lasted between 20 and 60 minutes depending on 
how much time the interviewee had to spare (and how much they wanted to say). These interviews 
were not incentivised since the ethics committee agreed that it was the responsibility of these 
24 Research has shown that the more severe the consequences of an error are, the more likely responsibility 
will be attributed to the individual(s) involved, regardless of the actual cause of the error. This is known as 
severity bias. 
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managers to be involved in this type of patient safety research. Interviews with recruited nurses 
were conducted during working hours, usually during the nurse's lunch break and lasted between 30 
and 90 minutes depending on how much time they could spare from the ward. Interviews were 
conducted on the ward in a private room away from other staff memberS25 
All interviews were recorded using a digital voice recorder and the researcher Informed participants 
that notes would be taken during the course of the interview to aid understanding of the issues and 
ask relevant follow-up questions. As per B pS26 ethical guidelines, all participants were assured that 
any infor-mation discussed would be anonymous and confidential and that only the inter-viewer 
would have access to transcriptions and audio recordings. Participants were advised of their right to 
refrain from answering any question, to refuse to be recorded, to withdraw from the interview 
altogether or withdraw their data from the study at any point without providing reason for doing so. 
The interviewer read participants the information sheet which they had previously received during 
the recruitment phase in case they had not read it to ensure they understood the purpose of the 
study. Participants were asked to sign a consent form before commencing interviews to ensure they 
understood their rights (appendix IX). 
The first few minutes of the interview were spent introducing participants to the idea that errors are 
inevitable. This was considered especially important given that a common viewpoint in health care 
risk management concurs that errors should be avoided at all costs and individuals are often blamed 
for their mistakes (Reason, 2000; Spath, 2000; Vincent, 2006). In order to introduce the idea of 
error inevitability, participants were given a sheet of paper with a list of everyday errors which 
people execute whilst driving (Reason et al., 1990; Parker et al., 1995). Since 
driving is behaviour 
which most people can identify with it was thought that examples of these types of errors would 
25 Although it would have been preferential to conduct interviews away from the hospital setting 
in a neutral 
location to encourage a more open and frank discussion of such sensitive issues (Elwood & Martin, 
2004), 
this was not possible since most nurses reported they would not participate if they had to travel elsewhere 
to 
be interviewed. 
26 British Psychological Society 
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encourage interviewees to feel more confident that error behaviour is common (appendix X). 
Furthen-nore, it was intended that discussing errors in the first part of the interview would act as an 
effective 'ice-breaker' before the topic moved on to more sensitive issues. 
Once the ice-breaker reached a natural end, participants were advised that the interview and 
recording of the interview would commence. They were told that they would be given a 
hypothetical example of a medication error and that they should try to think about what might have 
been the main causes of this error. Vignettes were selected randomly by each participant by 
choosing a number from one to eight representing each vignette. Once one participant had selected 
a particular vignette it was removed from the next interviewee's selection until the 8th interviewee 
had only one vignette to choose from. This ensured that all vignettes were discussed twice (since 
there were 19 interviewees). In this way it was hoped that a broad discussion of variables would be 
generated rather than a discussion of the same vignette. Participants were given a few minutes 
alone to read the vignette (it can be difficult to take in written infon-nation when being watched) and 
were advised they could make notes if they wished, while the interviewer left the room. Participants 
were advised they could use examples from their own experience of error to illustrate their views of 
causation, but were advised they could simply use the scenario presented to them if they were not 
happy to do this. Once interviewees were ready, audio equipment was started and questions began. 
A printed diagram of Reason's organisational model was given to participants who struggled to 
understand the concept of error causation as an aid to understanding the inforination the interviewer 
was trying to elicit (appendix XI). No latent causes of error which might bias responses were 
detailed within this diagram. If interviewees continued to find the interview questions difficult, it 
was decided that as a further aid to understanding the error causation trajectory, participants could 
be provided with examples from the Ladbroke grove rail crash incident analysis (see chapter 2, 
section 2.5.1.2. ). These examples were intended to give interviewees an idea of how multiple 
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organisational factors can impact on local working conditions and ultimately unsafe acts. Examples 
were not considered to be those which would be evident in secondary care and so would not bias 
responding (e. g. bright sunlight obscuring danger signals) but illustrate what was meant bý *causal 
factors'. 
Once interviews had reached a natural end or interviewees had to leave, participants were asked if 
they had any questions about the research and whether they felt the experience of discussing errors 
had been a positive one. All interviewees said they felt it had been a positive experience, 
particularly the nursing staff who said they were rarely given the opportunity to be so open. 
4.2.3. Study 1c: Incident report review 
Incident reporting in the NHS. - A brief overview 
The system of reporting incidents in the NHS (in 2005 when this study was carried out) relies upon 
NHS staff documenting events which are classified as 'significant' under a number of headings 
such as medication-related events, patient complaints, slips and falls, issues with medical records, 
delayed diagnoses and equipment problems. Incidents are not reported anonymously and staff 
members are required to provide their own details and those of the patient concerned with a brief 
description of the event they consider to be problematic. Completed incident forins are reviewed by 
immediate nursing managers and can either be dealt with at a ward level if the incident is relatively 
minor or can be investigated by the risk management department. The risk management team 
categorise incidents based on the severity, likelihood of recurrence and implications on 
organisational costs and patient safety outcomes of the incident based on a 'traffic light' system 
(from red-'severe/highly likely/high costs' to green-'minor/unlikely/low costs'; National 
Patient 
Safety Agency (NPSA), 2007) and collate and submit all reports to the NPSA. 
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Aims 
To obtain a well rounded perspective of the types of drug errors occurring and their respective 
causes, a sample of formally reported medication incidents occurring in general medicine were 
reviewed. Since observations were and interviews would be conducted within general medicine, it 
was decided that incident data should also originate from the same source to ensure relevance and 
appropriateness of reports. Only errors which were associated with medication administration 
deemed to directly involve patient care (some drug errors did not directly involve patients) were 
selected for review. This review would serve two additional purposes; 
To corroborate latent factors generated during interviews 
To identify any factors not identified during interviews (see section 4.3.1 for descriptions of 
data triangulation for completeness and confirmation). 
Data Source 
The nsk management department of the collaborating hospital agreed to allow the researcher access 
to a large dataset of medication incidents fon-nally reported between 1999 and 2003. Consent was 
given to review a sample of these reports on the provision that any staff or patient details which 
would make identification possible were removed before review. It was initially decided that only a 
small sample of incident reports would be analysed (n=30) since this was not the main source but 
was intended as a complementary source of data with which to achieve a holistic perspective of 
medication errors. After preliminary review of these incident reports it became apparent that very 
little infori-nation. was actually recorded (usually only two or three sentences); many reports 
containing extensive amounts of abbreviation and sparse detail regarding the incident itself or 
potential causation which made any in-depth qualitative analysis virtually impossible. Early 
analysis revealed it was only possible to hypothesize error causation from approximately 20 per 
cent of these reports. The decision was subsequently made to increase the number of incidents to be 
reviewed. A 50 per cent random sample of all medication incidents reported on general medical 
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wards between 1999 and 2003 in 2 hospitals was provided (n=155). From this sample, 18 reports 
(12 per cent) were excluded because they did not contain enough detail to be understandable or to 
be analysed and 8 (5 per cent) because they did not directly involve patient care. A further 22 (14 
per cent) were excluded because they did not comprise an actual preventable error (e. g. patient had 
an adverse reaction to an administered drug which they had never reacted to before). The 
remaining 107 medication incidents were entered into the qualitative analysis package NVIvo and 
their content analysed for potential organisational factors and workplace conditions of drug errors 
using thematic content analysis. 
4.3. Data Analysis 
Handwritten raw observational field notes, recorded interviews and incident reports were all 
transcribed in Microsoft Word and saved in the qualitative analysis package NVivo7. The method 
used to analyse data will be described in more detail in section 4.3.3 although in short an inductive 
approach was taken. Inductive analysis uses the data to generate ideas as opposed to deductive 
reasoning which uses data to 'confirm or negate pre-held ideas and hypotheses' (Thorne, 2000). 
Given the exploratory nature of the study, an inductive approach was considered the most 
appropriate method and is one that is often employed within nursing research (Appleton & King, 
1997; Thorne, 2000; Upenieks, 2002). When selecting the best method of data analysis there were 
a number of considerations including the best possible use of the data to achieve a holistic 
perspective of error causation and also how the data sources should be combined in order to 
accomplish this. 
4.3.1. Triangulation 
One particular methodological consideration was how the three data sources should be combined to 
obtain an unbiased, meaningftil and realistic perspective of medication error causation. One 
particular method of combining data sources in order to strengthen the design and reduce 
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subjectivity in interpretation of the data is known as triangulation (Denzin, 1970; Kimchi, Polivka 
& Stevenson, 1991). Although there are several types of triangulation, methodological 
triangulation involves the combination of more than one research method or data collection 
technique (e. g. structured instruments, observations and interviews etc; see Thurmond, 2001). In 
this way, different methods of data collection can tap different aspects of the phenomenon being 
studied to obtain a multi-dimensional viewpoint (Knafl & Breitmayer, 1989). 
However, Shih (1998) suggests it is important to first identify the rationale behind triangulating data 
sources. He identifies two disparate purposes; confinnation (Knafl & Breitmayer, 1989, Webb ct 
al., 1981; Anderson, 1997) and completeness (Jick, 1979; Fielding & Fielding, 1986; Murphy, 
1989). He argues that while triangulating data can be conducted solely for the purposes of 
validating findings as is often cited in qualitative literature, it should also be about obtaining the 
most holistic picture possible. Achieving this holistic viewpoint has been noted as a particular 
priority within nursing research which is notorious for various sources of bias (Jick, 1979; Fielding 
& Fielding, 1986; Murphy, 1989). Shih (1998) wams that when triangulating data sources for the 
purpose of completeness health care researchers should not anticipate multiple sources of data to 
confirm one another. He recommends that multiple data collection strategies should be selected and 
combined because of their 'inimitable contribution' towards addressing the research question. A 
brief synopsis of each data source collected is presented to determine whether data sources were 
likely to converge; thus dictating whether triangulation should focus on validating findings or using 
data sources to obtain a complete picture of medication error causation. 
4.3.2. Methodological disparity 
Although the combined findings will be described in more detail in section 4.4, the nature of both 
incident reports and observations will be described along with their respective similarities and 
disparities with interview data which represented the richest data source. 
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Incident reports 
Medication related incident reports were by far the 'thinnest* qualitative data source collected. It 
was anticipated that these reports would represent the link between observations and interviews 
highlighting the unsafe acts and local working conditions preceding errors which were difficult to 
observe and those which nurses may have been particularly uncomfortable discussing during 
interviews. Unfortunately a number of factors meant that this source of data offered very little to 
the understanding of medication error causation. Firstly, the infori-nation provided on incident 
forms was minimal at best and often comprised only one or two sentences stating only the bare facts 
of the incident. For example; 
,... patient given stemetil oti 5 occasions by 3 nurses. Brought to ward sister's 
attention by SN (Staff Nurse) who was "extremely upset on the telephone". Dr 
informed of incident and discontinued the drug... ' 
In this case and for more than 70 per cent of the other incident reports it was difficult to infer any 
potential cause of the error from the details provided. This is due in part to the wording of incident 
reports which specifically requires those completing the forrn to provide the facts without surmising 
causation. On the rare occasions that error causation was implied in reports this was often a blame 
reference to another department or health professional in order to assuage responsibility. For 
example (most relevant section is highlighted); 
,... enrolled nurse T, allowed a nurse who has not received a PIN number or been 
assessed as competent to give medications without supervision. Nurse who gave 
the medication has been told by myself and other members of staff that she must 
not do it alone. Cause: nurse had been told on previous occasions that she should 
not do medicines unsupervised, does not recognise her limitations in practice... ' 
This finding is particularly relevant and in terms of assuaging personal responsibility, was 
witnessed first hand. During two of the nine observation sessions, this researcher observed senior 
nursing staff 'coaching' more junior staff in their wording of incident reports. On one particular 
occasion a student nurse wrote three drafts of incident report which the Sister of the kvard reviewed 
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and edited before submitting a 'polished' (and considerably shorter) version four. When asked why 
this was necessary both members of staff insisted 'you have to be careful what you put so you don't 
get sacked'. 
Combined with the paucity of details provided on incident forms, the way in which errors were 
reported revealed significant biases which made any reasonable attempt at causation analysis near 
impossible. In the broader scheme of error management, such a finding suggests that opportunities 
for organisational learning are being lost. To some extent this was bome out in other incident 
reports which stated the cause and subsequent action taken after particular incidents; 
'... cefotaxime 2 grams was accidentally given to the patient, noticed 12 hours later. 
Doctor informed. Statement reads - "on night duty I had gone to assist SN (Staff 
Nurse) and given the task of administering IV antibiotics, I was given the correct 
details but gave the medication to the wrong patient. I make no excuse for the 
mistake made by me, despite the fact that we were busy". 
Cause: did not follow correct checking regime. 
Action: SN has been stopped from further IV procedures and an education package 
has been developed for her based on revisiting the medicines policy... ' 
Although in this incident the immediate cause of the error was explicitly stated by the nurse (that 
she was excessively busy), the action taken is not reflective of this, ignores the cognitive constraints 
cited by the nurse and recommends a course of action which is not consistent with the cause - 
education. A similarly narrow approach to error management is evidenced here; 
'... 1 have given the patient the wrong dose of the correct insulin. I (staff nurse) 
read a fellow patient's drug chart, and had given her 60 units by mistake. I 
informed senior nurse and house officer immediately. Relatives informed. 
Cause: staff nurse has had two separate insulin prescriptions for different patients 
and was administering the insulin one after the other -I reminded her that this is 
unsafe practice (matron), I said all drugs should be administered on an individual 
basis. 
Action: suggested she should work through one drug chart at a time, complete this 
and move to next, double check her TV drugs and insulins. Staff nurse T said she 
has already learned from the error... ' 
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As with the previous incident report presented, this excerpt suggests that learning has taken place at 
an individual level but makes no reference to latent preconditions of this mistake and so will more 
than likely occur again due to inevitable cognitive constraints. interviews Yielded significantly 
more information on error causation which was simply not evidenced within incident reports. 
Observational data 
There are several important points of interest regarding the observational method of data collection. 
Firstly, the researcher was not clinically trained as is usually the case for this type of observation in 
health care settings. For this reason, it was not always easy to know what behaviour should be 
observed and when something of importance had occurred. For example, when initially observing 
nurses conducting their medication rounds, it was common for nursing staff to be interrupted by 
various other health professionals, patients and visitors. Although it seemed obvious to the observer 
that distraction during complex tasks would place considerable cognitive strain on an individual, it 
was not immediately apparent whether such practices were detrimental to medication administration 
errors since the researcher was not trained to detect errors. It was also noted that this particular 
method of collecting data was especially difficult because there were so many nurses and activities 
occurring simultaneously and for a detailed and reliable observation technique to be employed (for 
recurrent practices) a team of observers was probably necessary. 
One particular criticism of this type of overt naturalistic observation approach and inextricably 
linked to the observers non-clinical background is the possibility that 'best' behaviour rather than 
natural behaviour was being observed. In the early stage of observations (the descriptive phase) 
several nurses asked the observer how she thought they were 'doing' and seemed concerned their 
behaviour was being audited; a regular practice within NHS hospitals. This was indicative that at 
least to some extent their behaviour was not as reflective of their everyday practice. It is possible 
that this behaviour was a display of the Hawthorne effect (Landsberger, 1958); participants 
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behaving positively because of the extra attention being received during observations. Sim and 
Wright (2000) suggest that this form of observer reactivity can be mitigated if obsen, ers maintain 
an unobtrusive position in the field of observation. Furthermore, research has shown that spending 
time in the research setting before formal observations will allow participants to become habituated 
to the presence of the observer and behaviour will become more natural over time (Bogdewic, 1992, 
Smith, 1996). It is hypothesised that since both of these recommendations were carried out, 
observed behaviour was an accurate reflection of usual behaviour. 
Although observations proved useful in observing workplace problems and unsafe acts at the ward 
level, it became apparent that it was difficult to directly observe the manifestation of organisational 
failures. For example, nurses were observed administering medication without first checking 
patients I. D. wristbands. However, it was not observable why such a workplace condition should 
occur. It is possible that this was a cultural problem, i. e. this deviation from standard practice had 
become culturally accepted over time and nurses hardly noticed they were not conforming to 
standards which were not reinforced. Alternatively, it is possible that nurses were consciously 
aware of their violation, but felt justified in this behaviour due to workload or other related issues 
such as staffing levels. Since it was vital for the observer to remain impartial during observations to 
gain the nurses trust and belief that they were not being assessed, it was not always possible to 
follow up observations with questions about their reasons for behaving in any particular way. 
Nevertheless, this information was useful in subsequent interviews where follow-up questions were 
more appropnate. 
Data obtained during observations proved invaluable for subsequent interviews both in ternis of 
aiding the interviewers understanding of what was being discussed and also helping to generate 
well-infonned questions. When presented with behavioural observational evidence during 
interviews, interviewees were often surprised they had not really noticed the behaviour in question 
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or that they had never really thought of it as problematic. For example, it was observed that doctors 
were starting ward rounds at 9am while nurses were in the middle of drug rounds. Doctors were 
then observed asking nurses to break off from the drug round to attend to their needs before 
returning to the task. It was obvious to the observer that such poor scheduling of two major ward 
activities would be likely to increase the likelihood of nurses making a subsequent error in 
medication administration; the impact of such poor timing of activities was rarely elicited without 
prompting by nurses during interviews. However, when presented with the observation of this 
scheduling clash during interviews, almost all nurses agreed it was a major problem but one which 
had been accepted practice for so many years they didn't immediately think of it as a patient safetý, 
concern. By using such observations to complement interviews nurses were able to suggest a 
multitude of reasons this problem might have occurred including communication problems, role 
insight and the perceived hierarchical relationship between nurses and medical staff. 
Although observations were useful to a certain extent in supplementing interviews and alerting 
interviewees to potential workplace conditions which might promote error, the data obtained from 
incident reports was generally less comparable. The difference in quality and quantity of the 
inforination obtained from the three sources made it clear that it was not possible to use one source 
of data to validate the other. For this reason, it was decided that data would be combined for the 
purposes of obtaining a holistic perspective of medication errors rather than to validate each data 
source. The following thematic analysis technique was applied to each data source in turn to 
explore error causation. 
4.3.3. Data analysis technique 
Several qualitative analysis methods were considered for the interpretation of data collected in this 
study. It was a broad aim of this analysis to identify multiple commonly discussed preconditions of 
medication error from the data. Thematic content analysis (TCA) was deemed the most appropriate 
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method of achieving this. Research has described this form of inductive analysis as a method of 
interpreting qualitative data through the 'systematic classification process of coding and identifying 
themes and pattems' (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; pp. 1278). Qualitative researchers have also 
recommended TCA for the analysis of studies with substantial pools of data, as was the case in this 
study (Patton, 1990; Weber, 1990; Berg, 2001). As study 2 would involve the development of 
safety indicators which represented each of the themes identified in this analysis, it was important 
that these themes were valid and reliable. TCA is a method which is largely thought to achieve this 
level of methodological rigour because it involves the 'application of set procedures for processing 
data using step-by-step rules' (Mayring, 2000, pp. 5). 
In a recent and particularly comprehensible research paper, Braun and Clarke (2006) outline the 
'rules' of applying TCA. The authors recommend TCA is conducted M five stages of analys's. 
Notably, examination of the qualitative methodology literature revealed that there were many 
articles which had specified step-by-step guidelines. However, there was a general agreement that 
the five stages proposed by Braun and Clarke would be sufficiently rigorous to achieve valid and 
reliable interpretation of the data (Tesch, 1990; Miles and Hubennan, 1994; Schilling, 2006). 
Phase I -familiarisation with the data 
Braun and Clarke recommend it is vital for researchers to immerse themselves in the data before 
analysis takes place, which usually involves repeated reading in an active way, initially searching 
for meaning and patterns of key words. They recommend this is most effective when the sample 
size is moderate and any field notes or verbal data are transcribed into a written forin by the 
researcher (as opposed to employing a transcriber). In this study there were a total of 281 pages of 
transcript which comprised 107 incident reports (29 pages), 9 observational field notes (23 pages) 
and 19 interviews (229 pages; 74 for senior managers and 155 for nurses). All data was transcribed 
verbatim by the researcher. 
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Phase 2- Generating initial codes 
Braun and Clarke recommend researchers next generate a list of initial ideas of interest across the 
entire data set and extract data excerpts which represent these ideas. These excerpts are then 
condensed into initial 'codes', defined as 'the most basic segment, or element, of the raw data or 
infon-nation that can be assessed in a meaningful way regarding the phenomenon' (Boyatzis. 1998, 
pp. 63). Table 4.3.3. a illustrates how this was done in this study. Braun and Clarke recommend that 
researchers should aim to code for as many different themes or patterns as possible, even if a code 
seems like a 'one-off - it may be useful during later stages of analysis. In doing this, more than 
150 different codes from all three data sources were generated in this study. 
Table 4.3.3. a: Phase 2 generation of initial codes 
Data source Data excerpt Code 
1. Inappropriate design 
Incident Patient prescribed 
insulin on insulin chart (attached), 81 of drug charts 
units prescribed and nearly given - should have been 8.1 report units. 2. Legibility of 
handwriting 
Staff Nurse trying to locate a certain piece of information 1. Design of medical 
in patient medical notes but loose sheets keep falling out. notes Observation She places them back anywhere in the notes - not 
necessarily where they came from. 2. Procedure of filing 
On a drugs round, if a patient is receiving 4 or 5 different 
drugs, all the information you have to process on that drug 
1. Ability to 
round are things like; diagnosis, the medications that concentrate on one task 
you re actually giving them - is it appropriate for them, 
drug interactions, sometimes you'll go to the drugs trolley 
2. Complexity of 
Interview and there will be 2 items missing, so you're broken off, patient condition 
close the drugs trolley, go all the way back to the clinic, 
retrieve the items you need or you might not stock a drug 
3. Availability of stock 
* 
so you will have to go and order it from pharmacy ... so 
items in drug trolley 
your level of concentration deteriorates just in that one 4. Ward design 
correct drug administration. 
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Phase 3- Searchingfor themes 
This phase begins when all data sources have been reviewed and initial codes extracted. In this 
way, the analysis considers how codes might be distinct or combined to form hierarchical themes. 
This phase also considers the different levels of themes. Since there were so many codes in this 
study it is beyond the scope of this chapter to fully present the way in which this was done. As an 
illustrative example, Table 4.3.3. b indicates how this was done for 2 themes; 
Table 4.3.3. b: Transforming related codes into themes 
Code Sub-theme Theme 
1. Inappropriate design of drug charts 
2. Legibility of handwriting 
3. Excessive paperwork 
4. Inter-departmental information sharing 
channels Communication 
5. Over-reliance on informal verbal 
information sharing 
. Problems with multi-cultural information 
sharing 
1. Information overload 
2. Being interrupted mid-task by other health Mental workload professionals 
3. Task complexity Workload 
1. Ability and time to plan ahead 
2. Unpredictable environment 
Workload planning 
Phase 4- Reviewing themes 
Once 'candidate themes' have been developed, phase 4 of the analysis involves revisiting the data 
in two stages. Firstly, coded excerpts are reviewed to ensure that they represent the theme or sub- 
theme category they were initially assigned to. This allows the researcher to check whether the 
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proposed theme or sub-theme makes sense. It may be the case that sub-categones or codes wlilcli 
were initially assigned to a particular theme may not fit the overall theme very well or may eveii 
comprise a standalone theme. Once this level of analysis is complete, original data sources are 
reviewed to ascertain firstly whether themes 'work' in terms of the entire dataset and secondly to 
code any additional excerpts which may have been missed during phase 2 but which add strength to 
proposed themes. Table 4.3.3. c indicates how this was done in this study; 
Table 4.3.3. c: Refining themes and sub-themes 
Code Sub-theme Theme 
1. Inappropriate design of drug charts Written 2. Legibility of handwriting 
3. Excessive paperwork 
Communication 
1. Inter-departmental infon-nation sharing 
channels Communication 
2. Over-reliance on informal verbal Verbal 
information sharing Communication 
3. Problems with multi-cultural information 
sharing 
1. Being interrupted mid-task by other health 
professionals 
2. Being expected to perform tasks which are 
Inter-professional regard/Role insight 
not within your role responsibility 
This fon-n of refinement allows themes to be collapsed into overarching themes or segregated into 
smaller sub-themes. As Table 4.3.3. c illustrates, it became evident at this stage that the theme 
communication could be subdivided into two distinct forms; written and verbal. Similarly this 
phase of analysis enabled a clearer picture of the code 'being interrupted mid-task by other health 
professionals' which had previously been assigned to the theme workload since this code was often 
discussed in terms of its impact on planning workload. After careful review and in the context of 
the whole dataset, it was decided to move this code into the theme inter-professional regard1role 
insight since it became clear that this behaviour was more a complex relationship between health 
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professionals who were not making their role boundaries clear. After continuous review during this 
phase of analysis, this code was later subsumed under the overarching theme of ii'ard climate and 
will be presented in more detail in the following results section. 
Phase 5- Defining and naming themes 
Braun and Clarke recommend that once a 'thematic map' of the data has been developed themes 
and sub-themes should be refined further to ensure their titles encapsulate the data they represent. 
They recommend that it is important for researchers to ensure that if this task is particularly difficult 
it is likely that there are too many sub-themes under a given theme. This was evident in the 
development of an initial theme of team functioning which initially incorporated communication, 
supervision and leadership and professional regard. Braun and Clarke warn against attempting to 
make a theme 'do too much' and so this theme was divided into smaller themes. This was 
particularly important for the next phase of the study which aimed to generate safety indicators for 
each theme. It was hoped that a relatively equal number of indicators would be generated for each 
theme and so a disproportionately large number of indicators would have been needed to represent 
the theme team fUnctioning which may have affected subsequent statistical analysis. 
Weber (1990, pp. 10) suggests that 'the best content analytic studies utilise both qualitative and 
quantitative operations on text by including the calculation of Erequencies and percentage 
frequencies of comments coded in each category'. Whilst thematic analysis was the predominant 
qualitative method used to analyse the data in this study, the endorsement frequencies (the number 
of times the item was classified in a data source) of each theme, sub-theme and code were also 
generated for each of the three data sources. In this way an additional comment could be made on 
the ability of each respective method of data collection to identify latent causes of error. The 
frequency of higher-order theme endorsements during interviews for managers and nurses were also 
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compared to note any differences between the latent failures attributed to medication errors between 
the two groups. 
4.4. Results and discussion 
Results will be presented and discussed here according to the type of analysis conducted. Findings 
from thematic analysis will be presented first followed by findings from content analyses. 
4.4.1. Thematic analysis 
After completing all stages of thematic analysis, 10 overarching 'higher-order' themes emerged. 
Several themes comprised 'secondary' and 'tertiary' sub-themes. In a typical report of thematic 
analysis, each theme and its related descendents would be addressed fully in tenns of how it was 
manifest within the data, providing additional supporting evidence where appropriate. 
Unfortunately, since so many themes and sub-themes were generated from this analysis, describing 
each theme in full is beyond the scope (and word limit! ) of this thesis. Only one theme - ", ard 
climate will be discussed in full with additional supporting evidence to give a general idea of how 
all themes were identified as latent preconditions of medication errors. This theme was chosen in 
particular since it was one of the most complex and frequently endorsed themes. A thematic map is 
also provided to illustrate the hierarchical nature of the various themes and sub-theme descendents 
(Figure 4.4.1). The remaining nine themes and their related sub-theme descendents will be 
summarised with brief definitions, a sample of the most reflective excerpts and appropriate citations 
where supporting evidence exists in Tables 4.4. l. b - j. The most reflective excerpts representing 
higher order- and secondary themes will be presented. For the purposes of continuity and because 
this was the most detailed source of qualitative data, only excerpts from interviews will be 
presented. 
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Theme 1: Ward climate 
Definition: The overall atmosphere of a hospital ward deten-nined by predominantly unspoken 
multi -disciplinary shared assumptions, rules and norins of 'the way it is', which have evolved over 
time and forced individuals and teams to adapt to this environment. 
Table 4.4.1. a: Interview excerpts reflective of the theme ward climate 
Higher Secondary Tertiary 
Excerpt 
order theme theme theme 
... people come to you [as a senior nurse] all 
the time for every little thing, to the point 
where it gets pathetic, they come to you for 
Over- the most ridiculously easy things that 
dependence on anyone would know ... they come to you for 
senior nurses everything ... anybody who's seen in a 
sister's uniform is automatically a target for 
everybody, for doctors, relatives, visitors, 
everybody wants to speak to the sister. 
General multi- 
disciplinary ... [providing safe care] is partly down to 
ward beliefs Commitment the staff themselves, whether they 
feel 
to caring for 
comfortable in that environment or not, 
whether they just come to work to come to Ward climate patients work and go away again or whether they 
want to do the best that they can. 
... you can have the climate on the ward 
isolated but you can have a climate that's a 
bit wider than that, say a group of wards on Ward ethos a unit where the prevailing culture is on 
speed rather than on safety and 
individualised care. 
... certainly some of the more 
junior staff 
would think "well the doctor knows best- Nursing attitude towards and so their instructions must be right. Its 
challenging others tradition isn't it. People don't like militant 
nurses. 
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Table 4.4.1. a: continued 
Higher Secondary Tertiary 
order theme theme theme Excerpt 
... newly qualified staff think everything has 
- 
to be done and dusted by the time the sister 
comes on so they can hand over a straight 
Explicit shift, everything done and organised. They 
proficiency think if they haven't done that. then it's a 
reflection on how they cannot manage their 
time. This often means people are rushing 
to get these jobs done. 
Nursing 
insecurities ... anybody in any working environment is 
trying to prove themselves... an 
inexperienced nurse would be trying to 
Implicit prove to other people they are capable and 
proficiency so 
they may take risks because of that. I'm 
sure there are senior nurses who are maybe 
doing the drug round who won't ask [for 
help] because they think "well, they'll think 
I'm stupid, I should know that". 
... I can say quite comfortably and I'm sure Ward climate it's happened that loads of people have 
made drug errors and haven't reported them 
Nursing attitudes towards 
because they're just frightened of the 
reporting mistakes consequences... 
I will be extremely cagey 
about how and if I reported another drugs 
error, not just of mine but of anybody 
else's. My reaction now is say nothing, it 
didn't happen. 
Agenda ... people come and 
interrupt you all the 
' 
conflict (incl. 
time when you re doing the drugs round, 
' ' interruptions it s just dangerous, really 
dangerous. It s 
and role one of 
the main [causes 
* 
of error], being 
insight) 
interrupted. People are just working to very 
Professional separate agendas. 
regard ... you might come on to shift on a weekend 
and find out which doctors are on and you 
Medic-nurse might think "oh, great, he's alright, I like 
relationship him" or it might be somebody you've no 
confidence in ... when I'm interrupted it s 
usually by rude and ignorant medical staff 
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It became apparent from thematic analysis that the higher order theme of ward cliniate was a 
synthesis of multiple facets of the ward environment. Each facet will be addressed separately in 
terms of how each secondary theme was defined, any tertiary theme descendents and how these 
would manifest in the process of delivenng patient care. 
General multi-disciplinaty ward beliefs 
This particular secondary ward climate theme can be defined as an overall implicit 'feeling' about 
the general way patient care is delivpred on a ward. Interviewees suggested that this type of 
embedded climate was 'driven' by particular individuals and represented unspoken values which 
should be adopted by all individuals working in that ward or unit. They added that these individuals 
were not necessarily supervisors (which is why these ideas were not subsumed within the 
supervision and leadership theme) but were often particularly assertive nurses to whom other 
nurses would look up to. The theme comprised three tertiary themes which will be discussed 
separately: 
0 Ward ethos. This was described as an overall ward atmosphere, driven by matrons and 
senior sisters who would be more concerned with either the speed or the safety of delivering 
patient care. Several interviewees sugges-ted that nurse managers who had the most extensive 
experience would be more likely to encourage other nurses to focus on delivering safe care 
regardless of the time taken to do so. Comparatively, nurse managers with less experience 
would focus more upon task completion and less on the methods selected to complete them. 
Several nurses alluded to the likelihood that focus on speed over safety would inevitably lead 
to 'cutting comers' and violating safe practices (e. g. 'speeding up' during the drug round). 
One particular interviewee hypothesised that this may have been because initial training and 
early clinical experiences of nurses who had been nursing for many years would have been 
during a time where the provision of health care was less driven by government targets and 
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there were fewer, less acutely ill patients. These nurses would therefore have been and are 
more likely to remain less target-focussed. Although there is very little written on this type of 
sub-climate within health care, this finding Is supported to some extent by evidence In the 
manufacturing industry. Zohar (2000) argues that work groups can develop sub-climates 
which are distinct from the overall safety climate of the organisation and driven largely by 
supervisory commitment to safety and in particular their expectations of productivity over 
safety. 
0 Commitment to caring for patients. Notably, this theme was only cited during management 
interviews. Several managers claimed that nurses who perceive their role as 'just a job' are 
therefore not committed to the role of caring for patients and as such are less likely to adhere 
to safe practices. Evidence has suggested that nursing cannot be exclusively understood as 
the delivery of a number of expert cognitive and technical skills but should be considered as 
an integration of these concrete skills with an 'inner attitude of caring' (Morrison, 1991; 
Gastmans, 1999). Although Gastmans argues that being committed to care for patients 
enables nurses to reach the 'goal of nursing practice', he does not intimate whether this 
commitment facilitates safe practice as suggested by senior managers in this study. He adds 
that if nurses act without commitment to care, there is a risk that they will 'lose sight of the 
patient as an individual and become fixated on "the problem"' (pp. 217). Neither Gastmans 
nor managers interviewed in this study hypothesize whether commitment to care attitudes are 
learned or innate or suggest ways in which other factors such as excessive workload to staff 
ratios and organisational expectations and targets might attenuate the motivation to care. For 
example, Laschinger et al. (2000) found that nurses who considered themselves 'empowered' 
by leaders in the workplace (perceptions of power, access to information, support, resources 
and opportunities) reported significantly higher levels of trust in the organization and 
commitment to their role. 
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0 Over-dependence on senior nurses. Although intrinsically linked to 'task delegation' in the 
higher order theme of sipervision 27 , this phenomena was both observed on the wards and also 
discussed in nurses' (but not managers) interviews. Nurses described an unspoken *rule' of 
the ward that all queries should be routed through the most senior member of nurse on shift, 
regardless of the nature of the problem and the task the senior nurse was currently involved 
with. During observations junior nurses, patient's visitors, doctors and other health 
professionals were all witnessed approaching the most senior nurse on shift with a range of 
queries such as where the fax paper was kept and whether test results had been sent to the 
ward despite the fact this nurse was in the middle of conducting the medication round. Senior 
nurses claimed that they were 'over-used' because of a long-standing belief of everyone 
entering the ward that senior nurses would 'know the answer to everything'. They added that 
while the role of senior nurse involved aspects of ward coordination they were unable to 
fulfill this role effectively because of staff shortages which meant they were also allocated a 
patient load. 
It is possible that this over-reliance on senior nurses was to some extent facilitated by senior 
nurses themselves. For example, junior nurses stated that senior nurses often appeared 
unwilling to allow them to take on responsibilities which they were capable of carrying out 
because they said it was quicker to do it themselves. This could be due in part to traditional 
elitist perceptions of senior nurses and the impact of poor task delegation. In a qualitative 
study of the perceptions of senior nurses in adult intensive care, Bowler and Mallik (1998) 
suggest that senior nurses adopt an 'elitist position' in relation to junior nurses who as a result 
may experience feelings of 'alienation, subordination and oppression'. These feelings ultimately 
result in junior nurses who have low self-esteem and who are disempowered to take on 
27 It is important to distinguish between this tertiary cultural theme and that of 'task delegation' which was 
defined more in tenris of the concrete ability to delegate tasks mediated by factors such as training, workload 
and skill mix. 
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responsibility and so will ensure all decisions are pre-approved by senior nurses. Bowler and 
Mallik suggest that by relinquishing overall responsibility for eve7y activity, senior nurses would 
have to accept a less elitist position in the nursing ranks which contradicts the hierarchical grading 
structures in nursing. Senior nurses interviewed in this study claimed the over-reliance on their 
skills and knowledge was not instigated by them and it was a hindrance to the efficient 
perfon-nance of their nursing duties (see also interruptions under 'professional regard' tertiary 
theme). Conversely, while junior nurses agreed that this over-dependence on senior nurses was a 
long-standing and unspoken rule of the ward, they maintained it was nevertheless a deliberate 
attempt by senior nurses to justify their higher position. 
Nursing attitudes towards challenging others 
This secondary theme was defined as the perceived ability or confidence of health care staff to 
challenge the decisions of colleagues they believe to be incorrect and the openness of those 
individuals to act upon this contradictory advice. During interviews, both managers and nurses 
suggested that nurses were less likely to challenge decisions made by doctors and proposed two 
main reasons for this. Firstly, nurses suggested there was a long-standing tradition of deference 
where 'the doctor knows best' within the field of nursing which can have a disempowering effect on 
nurses who feel it is not their place to question someone in a position of perceived power. Senior 
nurses suggested there was a perceived 'expertise gap' between doctors and nurses which ultimately 
affects the confidence of junior nurses to challenge doctors and affect the likelihood that doctors 
would be open to be challenged on their decisions by junior nurses. Several senior nurses claimed 
that if a junior and senior nurse approached a doctor with exactly the same problem and advice, 
he/she would be much more likely to act on the advice of the senior nurses due to the perceived 
smaller expertise gap. Such a proposition is consistent with evidence by Sasou and Reason (1999) 
who found 'excessive professional courtesy' (e. g. 'doctors know best"), and 'excessive authority 
gradient' (the real or perceived difference in power between two or more individuals) were 
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significant predictors of failure to highlight and correct mistakes. Similarly, Mearns, Flin and 
O'Connor (2001) postulate that where many sub-groups interact with one another, it may be unclear 
within that organisation exactly who has ultimate authority. This is particularly true of health care 
which has a multitude of different professions, each with their own line- middle- and senior- 
managers responsible for their decisions and actions. Although this was not frequently endorsed 
within nursing or management interviews, two senior nurses did suggests that although they felt 
confident enough to challenge a decision they thought was wrong, they were unsure whether they 
were 'allowed' to challenge doctors because they were not in charge of them. Helmreich and 
Merritt (1998) suggest that 'status differentials' between doctors and nurses make it virtually 
impossible for those considered culturally (by themselves or by others) as having a lower status of 
authority to challenge their real or perceived superiors when they make errors. 
By comparison, several managers interviewed suggested that nurses do not challenge mistakes that 
doctors make since they believe it is the doctors own responsibility and that of their own 
management (e. g. registrars and consultants) to monitor and question their behaviour and decisions. 
In this way, managers suggested this was a deliberate distancing of responsibility (e. g. 'it's not my 
job as a nurse to check doctors are doing everything right') by nurses for ensuing errors. Managers 
argued this attitude to challenging potential mistakes would undoubtedly be affected by the 
relationship held between nurses and medical staff on any given ward (see also professional regard 
sub-theme). 
Nurses also stated that over the last few years within their hospital (as with many other NHS Trusts) 
there had been a large influx of nurses recruited from the Philippines (Buchan, 2002). Alongside 
language barriers (subsumed under the higher order theme team communication) nurses 
hypothesised that these nurses had been trained in a hospital climate which does not encourage the 
challenge of doctors' decisions and where nursing staff are viewed as much lower down the chain 
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of expertise. Unfortunately it was not possible to interview any of these nurses since they -vvere not 
nominated by the matrons as potential candidates. During observations, a clear cultural divide 
between English and Philippine nurses was witnessed and significantly less communication was 
evident between the two groups. Evidence suggests that nursing in Asian countries is 'high- 
context' which means individuals depend to a large degree upon nonverbal signals rather than the 
spoken word (Bola, Driggers, Dunlap & Ebersole, 2003). Research indicates that nurses trained in 
such environments can be perceived by western nurses as inattentive and subservient to medical 
staff (Yi & Jezewski, 2000). 
Senior nurses and managers suggested that promoting an acceptable challenging climate on a ward 
relies in part on increased emphasis during initial nursing and medical undergraduate training. 
Managers further speculated that improving communication between the different disciplines would 
improve nurse-physician relationships overall. This improved relationship would both empower 
nurses with confidence to challenge decisions they thought were potential risks to the safety of 
patients and also attenuate any perceived threat to expertise felt by challenged doctors. 
Furthen-nore, senior nurses felt that challenging the decisions of others was a skill which could be 
learned like any other clinical skill. They believed it was their responsibility to 'lead by example', 
and demonstrate to junior members of staff the 'right' way to challenge colleagues and other health 
professionals. 
Nursing insecurities 
This theme is distinct from other secondary themes in the sense that it relates only to idiosyncrasies 
pertaining to nurses and as such is not driven or mediated by any other health professional. Nurses 
described feeling a constant pressure and awareness that they should prove their worth and was 
descnbed in two main ways; 
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0 Explicit proficiency. This was described by nurses as the perceived need to prove their level 
of concrete skill and knowledge. Nurses described feeling that they must prove daily to other 
nurses that they have a good level of skill and expertise. This was thought to occur in a 
cyclical way. Senior nurses suggested that they were unlikely to seek advice for something 
they didn't know from a nurse who was one or two grades below them for fear they would be 
judged as 'unworthy' of their superior position and salary. They reported that they would feel 
4ashamed' asking for help from a more junior nurse, and that nurses were judging them on 
something they should already know according to their grade. Junior nurses claimed that they 
would be similarly unlikely to seek advice from senior nurses due to a desire for respect and a 
need to prove themselves. As a result of this expertise 'stand-off, both senior and junior 
nurses suggested they would sometimes rather take (lie risk of being wrong than ask for help. 
0 Implicit proficiency. This was described by nurses as the perceived need to prove their 
intrinsic ability to manage under pressure and that they were a 'good' nurse. Both senior and 
junior nurses suggested there was an unspoken expectation within nursing that each shift 
should start on a 'clean sheet' without outstanding jobs from the previous shift. Nurses 
suggested that because of this expectation they would be likely to cut-comers and speed up 
during tasks (including the medication round) in order to appear to the next shift that they had 
managed their time well. Nurses reported feeling defensive and experiencing high levels of 
anxiety when unpredicted events occurred on the ward which might mean they would be 
behind in their shift plan and would be unlikely to complete all tasks before the next shift 
began. 
Although there is little published evidence on nursing insecurities which might explain risk 
taking behaviour, such a finding is consistent With research conducted in adolescent 
avoidance of help-seeking in the classroom. Ryan et al., (2001) note that low-achieving 
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students or those who believe they are not particularly competent are more likely to think that 
other students will perceive their need for help to solve a problem as a sign of incompetence 
and therefore will be less likely to seek help (Butler and Neuman, 1995; Butler, 1998; 
Karabenick and Knapp, 1991). In previous research, Ryan and Pintrich (1997) found that in 
asking for help, these students would worry about being negatively judged as 'dumb' by 
teachers and other students. This could explain the finding in this study of the unwillingness 
of junior inexperienced nurses to seek help from more experienced nurses. Research has also 
indicated that the avoidance of help seeking may also be governed by achievement-goal 
orientations. Hicks (1997) proposes help avoidance may be largely driven by a status-goal 
orientation. Individuals with an achievement-goal orientation are overly concerned with 
maintaining a particular image or reputation of expertise and have a heightened awareness of 
the self in relation to others (Hicks, 1997). Ryan et al., (1997) report that students who have a 
status-goal orientation are more likely to avoid help-seeking because they perceive it as a 
threat to their perception of self-worth. It is possible that senior nurses' reluctance to seek 
help and advice from others can be explained by a desire to protect their perceived social 
status. 
Attitudes towards reporting mistakes 
This sub-theme relates to the attitudes held by various health professionals on a ward or unit which 
govern the likelihood they will report errors. Surprisingly, managers did not cite reporting mistakes 
as an important precursor of future error. However all nurses interviewed suggested reporting 
climate was vital in understanding why the same errors repeatedly occur and targeting appropriate 
interventions to prevent them. Nurses identified eight main reasons reporting at a ward level could 
be affected; 
I. Derinition of error. Nurses indicated that they were unsure exactly what constituted a 
medication error which should be reported. It was observed in the review of incident reports 
in this study that although it was recommended 'significant incidents' should be reported, no 
definition of significant, incident or error was presented on this form. Forms provide a 
classification system for reporters to categorise the type of error or incident they are 
reporting. However, it became evident during the incident report review that no clear 
guidelines or definitions for these were offered to reporters. Furthennore, analysis revealed 
that this list of potential categories of incident comprised outcomes (e. g. patient slip/fall, cut 
with sharp object), causes (e. g. medical records problem, staffing shortages, communication 
failure) and incidents not related to errors (e. g. physical assault by patient, theft of property). 
2. Severity of error. Nurses claimed that in general they knew what comprised a 'serious' error 
but they were unsure what constituted a near miss. Furthen-nore, nurses generally stated they 
would be unlikely to report a medication error if it had been averted before reaching the 
patient or administered to the patient without consequence. Nurses suggested that while they 
would not officially report such errors, they would disclose them to colleagues as an informal 
local warning. This would imply that the number of medication errors being reported is a 
significant underestimation of the actual number occurring. 
3. Reporting responsibility. Nurses suggested they would be more likely to report medication 
errors which they or another nurse had been responsible for but would be unlikely to report an 
error made by a doctor or other health professional. This was in part due to a lack of time to 
complete forms (see design of incident forms) but also as a professional courtesy. Nurses 
suggested that reporting the actions of another health professional, particularly doctors would 
not benefit the ward climate, especially the relationship between the two professions. 
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However senior nurses stated they felt it was their duty to try to persuade doctors to complete 
their own forms but added that this rarely resulted in a form being completed. 
4. Design of incident forms. Nurses suggested that the likelihood of reporting a medication 
error was adversely affected by the design of incident forms which often meant that 
completing forms could take in excess of 20 minutes depending on the level of detail 
provided. This was supported by the incident report review conducted in this study which 
observed that very little detail was provided in any of the reports. For this reason, nurses 
stated that they would make a quick mental calculation of the severity of the error (in terms of 
patient outcome) and the likelihood of it occurring again before considering whether to report 
it. 
5. Confidentiality of reporting. Nurses suggested that they were reluctant to report medication 
errors or near misses which could have had severe or even fatal consequences because 
reporting was not anonymous. They added that they would be more likely to report any error 
executed by themselves or others if they did not have to submit their own details. 
6. Poor experience of reporting. There was a general acknowledgement that although 
reporting errors was the 'right thing to do', the likelihood of reporting was significantly 
affected by either a punitive personal experience or a particularly negative experience of a 
colleague. As an illustration, one senior nurse described her experience of reporting an error 
the previous year. This nurse had administered a double dose of IV antibiotic to a patient 
mistakenly believing she had not yet administered it. After reporting the error this nurse was 
reprimanded, demoted and was banned from administering medications for six months after 
which time she was shadowed by another senior nurse until it was felt she had achieved a 
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suitable level of competency. She revealed she would never report another medication error 
regardless of who was involved or the outcome for the patient. 
7. Lack of feedback. Nurses in general perceived the lack of feedback from previous error 
reporting to be a substantial barrier to reporting future errors. All nurses said they had 
completed one or more incident forms in the last 12 months and all nurses except one stated 
they had not received any feedback, either positive or negative regarding the incident. In 
general it was felt that this would be a deterrent to reporting all but very serious errors in the 
future. 
8. 'Blame culture'. Nurses reported that there was a palpable blame culture surrounding error 
reporting which acted as a barrier to reporting some types of error. They added that this was 
not necessarily driven by a poor personal experience of reporting but it was just something 
they 'felt' within the hospital. This awareness was directly observed during this study on 
more than one occasion whereby junior nurses were 'coached' by senior nurses on the 
6 correct' way to write incident fonns (see section 4.3.2. ). During observations, senior nurses 
suggested this coaching was necessary to protect nurses from culpability. 
There is a considerable degree of evidence to support both the existence of a 'reporting culture' 
within health care organisations and the likelihood that this will indubitably affect organisational 
learning and the probability of future errors. In support of the reporting issues identified in this 
study, Jeffe et al. (2004) found that uncertainty surrounding less serious errors and the need to 
report them, fear of reprisals, lack of confidentiality, time taken to complete forms and absence of 
feedback were cultural barriers to reporting errors for both doctors and nurses. In a similar focus 
group study, Uribe et al. (2002) identified multiple barriers to error reporting including incident 
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form complexity, error severity, organisational blame culture, ambiguous definitions of error and 
lack of guidelines on who is responsible for reporting. 
Proftssional regard 
This secondary theme was distinguishable from the way different health care disciplines explicitly 
communicate with each other and concerns the way in which these professionals implicitly relate to 
one another on an inter-personal level and the subsequent impact of this implicit relationship on 
providing safe patient care. This sub-theme was especially complex and comprised two tertiary 
themes which overlapped considerably with other ward climate sub- themes; 
0 Nurse-medic relationship. Nurses referred to their relationship with medical staff as being a 
particularly important predictor of medication errors. Senior nurses suggested that junior 
nurses were not taken seriously by doctors who were more likely to act on the advice of a 
senior rather than junior nurse, even if that advice was the same. This relationship was 
described as having a knock-on effect on the confidence of junior nurses to challenge doctors' 
mistakes (nursing attitudes towards challenging others) which in turn lead to an over-reliance 
of senior nurses by junior nurses and the medical team (general multi-disciplinaiýv ward 
beliefs). All nurses reported that there were some doctors they were happy to work with and 
others in whom they had no confidence or rapport. Several nurses said they would rather wait 
for another doctor to come on shift than bleep the doctor they did not have a good working 
relationship with if they needed medical support or advice regarding a patient. Several nurses 
suggested that a perceived steep hierarchy gradient of doctors meant that nurses were 
generally less likely to see consultants as 'approachable'. As a result nurses would be 
reluctant to seek their help and advice, even though the consultant would be the most 
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knowledgeable source. Several senior nurses referred to the risk of having their 'head 
snapped off during ward rounds if they were to question a consultant. 
The working relationship between nurses and doctors has been well documented. In some of 
the earliest literature, Stein (1967) describes this relationship as the 'doctor-nurse game' 
whereby nurses learn to show initiative and offer advice while appearing to 'defer passively 
to doctor's authority'. Stein argues that this game ensures that disagreements are avoided at 
all costs which although appears on the surface to be effective, is indicative of poor 
communication which may ultimately affect patient care. Revisiting his theory in 1990, Stein 
noted there had been a significant 'deterioration of public respect for doctors and recognition 
of their fallibility' and an increase in the number of female doctors and male nurses which 
had shifted the dynamic relationship between doctors and nurses (Stein, Watts & Howell, 
1990). Stein et al. suggest these changes have resulted in an empowennent of nurses who 
feel less passive in their relationship with doctors and more actively involved in the provision 
of patient care and ultimately 'more valued in their own right'. These changes have therefore 
lead to a more overt awareness of the poor relationship between doctors and nurses. More 
recently Mackay (1993) suggests that the historical change in the doctor-nurse relationship 
over the last 20 years may have been affected by educational developments such as the 
expansion of university based nursing degrees and the introduction of diploma courses based 
in institutes of higher education. Mackay argues that these changes have increased 
knowledge and autonomy for nurses and may have altered their power relations with doctors. 
In terms of how these changes might be expected to affect patient safety, Adams, Bond and 
Arber (1995) emphasised the impact of inter-disciplinary working relationships in a 
qualitative study to identify organisational features which detennine effective nursing 
practice. In particular, Adams et al. refer to the importance of the effective collaboration 
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between doctors and nurses in terms of planning patient care activities, asking for advice or 
opinion and sharing of ideas. In a review of the literature surrounding the determinants of 
patient mortality, Tourangeau, Cranley and Jeffs (2006) cite two studies which found 
hospitals with the highest patient mortality rates had the worst nurse-physician relationships 
(Knaus et al., 1986; Mitchell et al., 1989). 
Agenda conflicts. This tertiary theme represents the 1nter-d1sciplInary disparity In planning 
essential patient care activities in order to achieve the same goal. This theme was discussed 
as a manifestation of two main problems; lack of role insight and interruptions and will be 
discussed separately. 
1. Role insight. Nurses suggested that although the aim of nurses, doctors and other 
health professionals working in the hospital was essentially the same - to provide safe, 
timely and effective treatment for patients, the methods each discipline applied to 
achieving this goal was not considerate of other disciplines. For example, during 
observations and also discussed frequently in interviews, it was noted that doctors 
arrived on the ward to conduct ward rounds while drug rounds were still being carried 
out. In one particular observation, ten house officers, two registrars, two 
physiotherapists and a phlebotomist arrived on the ward at exactly the same time as the 
senior nurse conducted the drug round. All professions were observed on a number of 
occasions approaching the senior nurse in order to achieve their own objectives, 
significantly impairing her ability to concentrate or even complete the task. During 
interviews nurses said this was 'just the way it was' and previous attempts to coordinate 
the timing of these activities had failed. 
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Nurses suggested that other departments simply didn't understand the priorities of 
nurses and the nature of their role and often asked nurses to undertake tasks which were 
not explicitly their responsibility but ones which over time they had 'adopted' because 
no one else had. For example, during one observational period from the central nursing 
station it was noted that a ringing telephone was left unanswered by a group of seven 
doctors who were standing nearby, three of whom were having a non-work related 
conversation. The telephone rang continuously for several minutes before a nurse 
broke off from changing a patients bed sheets at the other end of the ward to answer the 
call, which ironically was for one of the doctors. It was apparent that linked with this 
'role ignorance' was the absence of formal communication strategies which would 
promote the sharing of role responsibility information. 
West (2000) argues that lack of role insight may in part be due to the fact that members 
of health care delivery teams are generally educated separately without reference to 
other disciplines. She adds that the role of nursing has become much more specialised 
over the last 20 years. While nurses are aware of the aspects of patient care which are 
currently their responsibility, it is probable that other disciplines are not aware of the 
features of nursing for which nurses are no longer responsible (e. g. ward cleaning, 
ancillary services, administrative duties etc. ). Vaughan (1996) refers to this as 
4structural secrecy' and suggests that compartmental i sing knowledge in this way can 
lead to increased potential for errors when tasks or infonnation falls between the 'gaps' 
in role responsibilities. West (2000) advises that to improve this cultural phenomenon, 
health care organisations need to implement or improve formal methods of inter- 
disciplinary communication. Interestingly, one particularly senior nurse said that she 
had never had a meeting with any other department regarding their general working 
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relationship, role boundaries or coordination of multi -disciplinary activities (which was 
not related to the care of a particular patient) in the 15 years she had been a nurse. 
2. Interruptions. It should be noted that during inter-rater reliability tasks (presented in 
section 4.4.3) there was some disagreement between raters in the most appropriate 
categorisation of interruptions. It was postulated that interruptions may have 
represented poor team communication, written policies and procedures (i. e. the non- 
adherence of standard policy not to interrupt) or local working conditions (i. e. 
interruptions are a condition of the physical working environment). However, it was 
eventually agreed between raters that the predominant factor governing interruptions 
was an implicit unseen and unspoken ward phenomenon where there was no specific 
protocol stating nurses should not be interrupted during complex tasks and nurses did 
not specifically ask not to be interrupted during tasks. Moreover, this behaviour had 
become accepted practice over time and although nurses and senior managers who were 
interviewed acknowledged this behaviour was 'poor practice', they suggested it was the 
cultural 'nonn'. 
Both managers and nurses to a much greater extent referred to the prevalence of 
interruptions during complex nursing activities such as the preparation and 
administration of medication. During one particular observational session, a senior 
nurse was interrupted over the course of 60 minutes on 17 separate occasions by several 
health care professionals, patients and visitors while conducting the drug round. The 
nature of these interruptions ranged from patients' visitors asking how their relatives 
were faring to a ward clerk asking where the fax paper was stored. All nurses 
emphasised that interruptions were frequent and a constant source of annoyance and 
stress. In support of this finding, Wolf et al. (2006) found during clinical obsenations 
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that nurses were interrupted mid-task on average 3.4 times per hour which resulted in 
them changing focus from one patient to another an average of 9.1 times per hour (once 
every 7 minutes). In a similar observational study, Potter et al. (2004) found one nurse 
was interrupted mid-task 43 times during a 10 hour shift in order to source materials, 
equipment or personnel. 
Perhaps the most immediately obvious and direct impact of interruptions and one cited 
often during interviews is the likelihood that distraction during a cogntively complex 
task such as the administration of medication will lead to errors and mistakes. There is 
considerable evidence within cognitive psychology supporting a relationship between 
task distractions and errors. Pani and Chariker (2004) argue that when an individual is 
interrupted the contents of their working memory are immediately discarded to allow 
them to attend to the distraction. When attempting to resume the original activity 
individuals often believe they are farther along in the process and will omit parts of the 
procedure or will repeat steps already taken (Mandler, 1982; Rudolph & Repenning, 
2002). Pani and Chariker (2004) suggest that this is particularly likely in the 
administration of drugs, a task which over time may become automated and require 
little conscious attention due to constant repetition. However, despite abundant 
evidence which has reported the perception that interruptions precede medication errors 
(Conklin et al., 1990; Scholz, 1990; Walters, 1992; Davis, 1994; Segatore et al., 1994; 
Williams, 1996), there has been very little health care research conducted to measure 
whether interruptions actually cause medication errors (O'Shea, 200 1 ). 
The following tables (4.4. l. b - j) will summarise the remaining nine 
higher order thernes with 
definitions and secondary and tertiary theme descendents illustrated with relevant excerpts from 
interviews. 
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Theme 2: Team communication 
Definition: Aspects of an intra- or inter-departmental team or communication channels which 
prohibit effective communication between individuals or departments. 
Table 4.4.1. b: Interview excerpts reflective of the theme team communication 
Higher order Secondary Tertiary 
theme theme theme Excerpt 
Paperwork ... there is so much information in these paper 
tracking records that we have difficulty storing them, 
W i transferring them, keeping tabs on them r tten 
Handwriti ... I think it's an absolute scandal that we have ' ' (Gladstone, legibility to rely on doctor s handwriting that s often 
1995; Howell, completely illegible. 
1996; Osbourne ... on the front of drug charts, the majority of et al, 1999; people have got [their allergies] documented, Phillips et al., 
2001) Document but you open the drug chart up and it's not 
design there. A lot of them miss off documenting 
the name, the unit number and the allergies 
inside the drug chart. 
Absence of ... 
doctors do things and write things up in 
formal their own notes and expect it to be 
done 
information without 
informing anyone what they've done. 
Verbal They expect you to look in the patients notes sharing every 5 minutes to check T . eam 
communication 
(Dean et al., 
2002; ... 
the patient had been incorrectly written up 
Wakefield et al., Over-reliance 
for Magnapen on a verbal order by the 
2008) on informal 
Consultant, the house officer had written it up 
' re without looking at the notes. I think we communication over-reliant on verbal orders and information 
handed over verbally. 
... the more people are 
involved, the more 
communication there is, the more time is 
Team size needed and I think it takes more time doesn't 
it and you've got lots of people that know lots 
(West, 2000; Temple, 2004) of little bits but you haven't got one person 
that knows everything so I think things slip 
through the net sometimes. 
... a lot of errors are caused 
by 
Multi-cultural issues communication problems since a lot of the 
nurses are from the Philippines and they often (Bola et al., 2003; YJ & Jezewski, misinterpret instructions they have been 2000) 
given. 
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Theme 3: Routine procedures 
Definition: Procedures routinely carried out by nursing staff in the course of a patientýs staY iii hospital regardless of the patient's condition. 
Table 4.4.1. c: Interview excerpts reflective of the theme routine procedures 
Higher 
order theme 
Secondary theme* Excerpt 
... they get complacent they're used to doing the 
Checking procedures procedure or 
they know the patient and they 
just decide that they wont check numbers, 
(Pani & chariker, 2004) check 
drug charts, they'll just give people 
medicines without going through the right 
checking procedures. 
... quite a lot of the time on here, people are 
admitted and you'll come on the next morning, 
be in ward round and there will be the name of 
Patient admission procedure the patient that was in the bed before them. I 
don't think we have a proper admissions 
(Cornish et aL, 2005) procedure on here, I think it's very laissez-faire. 
Routine There is a standard of what should happen (in a 
procedures 
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patient admission) but it is implied, there is 
nothing written down. 
... the handover is essential, that's where so Patient handover many of these things go wrong and particularly 
if the handover is multidisciplinary, between (Cook et aL, 2000; Coxon el aL, 2003 
Potbier et aL, 2005) 
different groups of staff, this is much more 
error prone. 
... I would have thought that the time when 
you're most likely to make mistakes, any 
Patient discharge procedure mistakes with regards 
to patients, would be on 
' ' patient discharge because that s when you ve 
got to get everything together, all the 
information together, all the systems working. 
* No tertiary sub-themes extracted 
28 The routine procedure of medication administration is notably absent. This is because after inter-rater 
reliability task (section 4.4.3. ) issues such as ward drug stock levels, drug round timing and interruptions were 
reassigned to other themes (LWC, workload & ward climate respectively). 
122 
Theme 4: Workload 
Definition: Facets of nursing care which place significant physical and/or mental demands upon 
nursing staff which could affect their ability to care for patients effectively. 
Table 4.4.1. d: Interview excerpts reflective of the theme workload 
Higher Secondary Tertiary 
order theme theme theme 
Excerpt 
... you've got x amount of drugs to do 
and so many IV's to do and you know 
you've got the doctors coming on and 
Task demand you know that you've got to speak to a 
Volume of 
load of relatives ... when you're that 
work 
busy you forget things because you 
just don't have time to do everything 
(Conklin el al. that you should 
be doing. 
, 1990; Pani & ... first thing in a morning is desperate 
chariker, 2004; time... it's the biggest drug round, 
Wolf et al., you've got doctors coming doing 2006) 
rounds at the same time ... you've got Task timing Physio's who come on and get going, 
social workers phoning up, the OT's 
come on saying "excuse me, so and 
soýs not in her bed... " 
... you have a piece of paper in your 
pocket and you write down some of 
Workload the jobs you need to do but you don't 
write every single thing down that Over-burdened 
you're ever likely to need to do ... with memory all the best will in the world when 
Co nitive 9 you're tired and you're at the end of 
workload 1 your shift and you re handing over you 
can't always remember everything. 
(Beaudoin & ... people do think that you 
know 
Edgar, 2003; everything and you'll be able to take 
Pani & Cbariker, all this information on board. It 2004; Wolf et 
al., 2006; 
doesn't matter how much they give to 
Wakefield et al., you, you're just gona take it and take it 
2008) and that's it ... you don't 
have that 
Information overload opportunity where you might have 10 
minutes where you've not got a 
hundred things in your head to actually 
be able to think a little bit because you 
just don't have that mental capacity 
sometimes. 
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Table 4.4.1. d: continued. 
Higher 
order theme 
Secondary 
theme 
Tertiary 
theme Excerpt 
... there are lots of patients being 
admitted, or very sick patients in need 
of a lot of attention, dealing with 
Shift prioritising/ relatives and visitors. It can fluctuate 
unpredictable throughout the day. It's very 
environment unpredictable. You might have a 
Workload patient that just suddenly becomes ill 
Planning and it can change your whole plans for 
that shift. 
Workload (Wolf et aL, 
2006; Lundgren 
& Segesten, 
... you are sort of fire-fighting and 2001; Tucker & 
Spear, 2006) running round all the time and I 
suppose a lot of nursing is very 
Ability/time to plan reactive and some of that's because 
. ahead you're 
doing that all of the time, I 
suppose it affects your ability to plan 
ahead because you're not given 
enough opportunity to do it. 
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Theme 5: Human resources 
Definition. - Aspects of the provision of health care personnel including the number of available 
permanent qualified staff, their respective skill-base and the employment of contingent workers. 
Table 4.4.1. e: Interview excerpts reflective of the theme human resources 
Higher Secondary Tertiary Excerpt 
order theme theme theme 
... you've got to be with them (agency 
Temporary/contingent workers staff) all the time, showing them what to 
do, teaching them, keeping an eye on 
(Roseman & Booker, 1995; Anderson et al., them, checking everything they've done 
1996; Rousseau & Libuser, 1997) rather than being able to get on with your 
own job, your own role for that day. 
... on weekends, it's just so awful trying 
to get medical staff onto the ward... after 
Medical five o clock on a week day or all day at 
Staffing levels Support the weekend it's just an on-call assistant 
doctor so there's very few doctors about 
(Roseman & Booker, and they tend to be over worked. 1995; Blegen et al., 
1998; Aiken et al., 
2002; Needleman et ... when there's not enough of you, you 
Human al., 2002) cut comers, do things quickly, rush 
resources Nurses things, don't communicate as well... we 
just haven't got enough staff to cover the 
nights and the days as well. 
I suppose whether an error is likely to 
occur would depend on the skill mix on 
the ward at the time ... written into the 
shift rota is other things like 'well, she's 
Skill mix ok, she's aD grade, she's 
fine, level 
headed, she'll be able to manage anything 
(Leape et al., 1995; Lankshear et al., 2005; and then that person will want to change 
Seago et al., 2006) [shifts] with somebody else who's not 
quite the same ... on paper they are the 
same grade, but they're still not the same. 
And I think all that probably contributes 
towards a good shift and a bad sh ift. 
125 
Theme 6: Local working cOnditions 
Definition: Aspects of the individual or the immediate working environment such as work patterns 
and physical working conditions which hinder the provision of safe patient care and encourage the 
perfon-nance of unsafe acts. 
Table 4.4.1. f: Interview excerpts reflective of the theme local working conditions 
Higher Secondary Tertiary 
order theme theme theme 
Excerpt 
... every drugs round that I do, there 
will be at least one patient that's got 
Non-compliance their own medicine in their locker and 
they've already taken them despite 
denying on admission they had any. 
... a lot of the patients are on a lot of Patient medications... some people are on 2 or Illness 3 drug charts full of tablets When you 
(Barber, 2002; complexity/medication do your medication round it takes a Dean et al., 
2002) volume long time, some people might be on 20 
tablets not including nebulisers and 
things. 
... when you know the patients and you 
Familiarity know who they are, you 
don't always 
Local check wristbands because you already 
working know it's them. 
conditions 
... having to go to the other end of the 
ward to the clinic room for medication 
not on the drugs trolley does increase 
Ward design your potential for making errors ... you 
get so many interruptions, the patient's 
(Hendrich & Lee, 2003; Marck el al., 2006) don't care which team you're working 
for so they will stop you and ask for 
things ... you end up 
forgetting what 
you set out for. 
... I know 
in my heart of hearts that I 
Personal issues can't expect her to function as she 
non-nally would because of what's 
(Combs & Taylor, 1952; Helmreicb & Merritt, going on at home ... what goes on in 
1998; Sandal, 1999; Sexton et al., 2000) their personal life is bound to affect 
performance at work. 
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Table 4.4.1. f: continued. 
Higher Secondary Tertiary 
order theme theme theme 
Excerpt 
Shift patterns ... night shifts are long and tiring, trying 
to keep busy and awake. By your 4"' 
(Narurni et al., 1999; Gold night you might handover and miss 
et al., 1992; Lowden et al., something which could be quite Fatigue and 1998) important. 
body 
rhythms Inadequate staff 
breaks ... sometimes you might work II hours 
without a break at all because you've 
(Hawkins et al, 1985; been so busy, that does happen quite 
Rogers et al., 2004; Dean ei frequently. 
al., 2006) 
... it's noisy on the ward, that's a really Ward Noise levels big factor. You've got 'patient-line' 
TV now at every bed ... sometimes (Monison et al., 2003. Topf, 2000; Walsh-Sukys you'll think "god, I cant' concentrate, et al., 2001) it's so noisy. 
... we often struggle to get hold of IV Local Equipment design and availability pumps and have to ring round loads of 
working other wards to borrow them. Some 
conditions (Tucker, 2004) wards have this equipment and won't 
share which is a problem. 
... the expiration 
dates on the boxes are 
Expired stock embossed and so you can't always read 
what the date is. It's really easy to give 
(Lisby et al., 2005) it when it's actually gone out of date 
because you just didn't notice. 
Labelling and ... there's quite a 
lot of packaging for 
packaging drugs that's very similar ... very often Pharmacy & you'll have a cupboard full of pastel or 
dispensing (Cohen, 2000) white boxes which are confusing. 
issues 
... sometimes 
drugs you've ordered 
Ward stock levels doesn't arrive until the following day, 
and ordering 36 hours sometimes. Pharmacy is an 
absolute nightmare for that. 
Drug names 
... there are a number of 
drugs which 
have trade names which are virtually 
(Carothers, 1999; Phillips et identical. 
al., 2001) 
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Theme 7: Bed manapement 
Definition: Organisational procedures to manage either the number of available in-patient beds or 
the ways in which patients are allocated appropriate beds. 
Table 4.4.1. g.: Interview excerpts reflective of the theme bed management 
Higher Secondary 
Excerpt 
order theme Theme* 
... when MAU or bed managers want us to make room 
they'll say sleep people out so we have to send our 
patient's to other wards. We transfer patients to hospital X 
Transfers and during the middle of the night, the lights are off and we're 
6sleepouts' packing people up in the dark. The potential for things 
going wrong when there isn't as many staff on you can't 
fathom. You end up sleeping patients out to inappropriate 
wards which is a terrifying potential for mistakes. 
... we haven't got fewer people in the country or we've got less ill people, it's just that you are under constraints to put 
them through faster ... there's pressure on the beds and 
Patient wanting to get people out as soon as possible and 
throughput [consultants] are the ones who are trying to discharge Bed people really really quickly even though, they might be 
management'l ready medically bit they're not ready what we call 
4socially'. 
. patients are rushed through to any ward that they can get 
a bed on because they've got this silly 4 hour waiting thing 
on A&E. Everything's done in a big rush in order to free 
A&E breach rule up a bed up here, so MAU can free up a bed for the person 
on the trolley in A&E ... this isn't done 
in a nice planned 
way, it's done in a horrible rush taking no heed of what's 
good and nice for the patient, what's safe. 
... there's only a 
limited amount of beds and the beds have 
been reduced over the last couple of years dramatically, Bed availability wards have closed and there's I ess beds now but just as 
many poorly people. 
No tertiary themes extracted 
t No literature was found exploring the indirect relationship between inappropriate bed management on 
patient safety 
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Theme 8: Supervision and leadership 
Defiinilion: Aspects of immediate line management which impacts upon the ability of subordinates 
to provide or be motivated to provide timely, coordinated and safe patient care. 
Table 4.4.1. h: Interview excerpts reflective of the theme supervision and leadership 
Higher 
order theme 
Secondary theme* Excerpt 
I do think it is part of control as well because there are 
leaders which are good leaders who can organise and sort 
things out quite well and delegate quite well. There are 
others that don't delegate who try and take on too much Task delegation then which cause further problems... if particular people 
are on, you do find a senior sister I know of for example (Walston & Kimberly, 
1997; Miller, 2005) can end up increasing the workload further by trying to 
take on too much, not letting others help then there ends 
up being problems, things get missed and don't get done 
and then it kind of passes on to the following day adding 
more and more to their workload. 
Supervision 
and ... if the ward sister's perception on that unit 
is that to be 
leadership efficient you have to have the medicines finished by half 
past 9, that's her perception of what efficiency is all 
about. If you get a different sister on there whose 
perception of efficiency is getting things done properly, 
Leadership style not necessarily in the most timely way then that's a 
different perception. I think most things that happen at a 
(Firth-cozens & Mowbray, ward level are driven by the sister and their individual's 
2001; Flin &Yule, 2004) styles and their style of leadership. To a large degree they 
become the role model for the whole ward. You get a lot 
of students on the ward and you'll see them doing a drug 
round and the senior nurse or whoever's doing it with 
them will say "right, we'll do it properly this time, this is 
not the way I normally do it but we'll do it properly". 
* No tertiary themes extracted 
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Theme 9: Training 
Definition: The availability, appropriateness and process of delivery of training to newly qualified 
and existing nursing staff. 
Table 4.4.1. i: Interview excerpts reflective of the theme training 
Higher Secondary Tertiary 
order theme theme theme 
Excerpt 
... you're meant to get a preceptorship package 
when you start where you get loads of 
information and things, I never received one; I 
was just thrown in at the deep end. Some people Induction and preceptorship do start work before they've started their 
(Bain, 1996; Hautala et aL, 2007) 
induction program and when a new nurse comes 
to the ward, there's nobody saying to them 'right, 
this is how we do this, this is how we do this, this 
is how we do this and this is how it must be 
done'. 
a lot of nurses have been using equipment for 
Training in years 
by have never actually been taught how to 
' 
procedures 
ve just been shown by use it properly, they 
' re relying on them to someone else. So you 
Training know what they are doing but they Might not. 
... because of the constraints of time and the 
fact 
that we don't have any extra time, if we've got a 
Time new nurse starting they could end up running one 
Ongoing allocated to side of the ward by themselves on their first day. 
training training To have the ability to teach junior members of 
staff is not there like it was, you just have too 
many patients. 
... places are available 
for training but it's 
whether at a senior level they will allow staff to 
Training go on study leave. A lot of areas are quite 
resources stringent. The hospital is busy and short staffed 
so they won't let X number of nurses go off the 
ward to be trained. 
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Theme 10: Written policies and procedures 
Definition: Aspects of the development and dissemination process of explicit written policies, 
guidelines and procedures which impact upon the knowledge of and subsequent utilisation by 
nursing staff. 
Table 4.4.1. j: Interview excerpts reflective of the theme written policies and 
procedures 
Higher order Secondary ertiary Excerpt 
theme theme theme 
... you couldn't know what's in every policy, 
there's that many. I don't think anybody, even 
No. of policies 
the people who write them probably know them 
' ' s that many... because there s so all, there 
many, it's knowing and trying to keep all that 
information in your head. 
... some wards give individual policies to the Policy individual staff in like pigeon holes and ask 
communication them to read them. Now then it becomes the 
(incl. ineffective onus on the individual to update themselves. dissemination Some areas have signing sheets to say "I have 
strategy and time read the above policy", so that they know but and ability to 
disseminate) you can't guarantee that that nurse has actually 
sat and gone through it. Most of the time they 
(Woolf et aL, 1999) just come 
in the post and there's no 
Policy explanation. It could just appear somewhere 
Written policies knowledge and it would be put on the shelf 
and procedures 
(Feder et aL, 1999) ... 
It's difficult because there are so many 
policies and to keep remembering what the new 
version is. Many a time I'll look at the new 
Updates and version but I don't know what's different on 
revisions this one, what have they changed. Nothing's 
highlighted so you can quickly look to see 
what's changed. All these different complex 
policies are changing all the time. 
... we have protocols and procedures 
for 
everything you can think of. It's a good thing 
but having time to read them all is a different 
thing altogether... to actually go and start Time allocated to reading through policies you would probably 
read have to stay behind your shift or on your break 
or if there was something that you just didn't 
know how to do or were unsure about, to get on 
I the computer might be difficult. 
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Table 4.4.1. j: Continued. 
Higher order Secondary Tertiary Excerpt 
theme theme theme 
User-friendly ... [policies] are not user friendly, they're too long winded which Is probably why people 
(Marck et al., don't approach them and look at them as often 
2006) as they should. 
... if you absolutely followed every policy to 
the letter you wouldn't have time to do your 
job. They're written in a way of how things 
Policy should happen but sometimes realistically 
Written policies development Workability they don't happen that way. If you were to 
and procedures give out the medications exactly according to (Cooper, 1995; all the guidelines and protocols half the Feder et al., 1999) patients on the ward wouldn't get their 
medications. 
... it's quite an 
hierarchical structure in the 
NHS and people that are quite senior are Blunt-sharp detached from the shop floor and they see a 
end policy and they can't understand why people translation haven't adhered to that policy because they 
are detached from what's happening. 
4.4.2. Content analysis 
Content analysis was conducted to calculate the number of excerpts relevant to each 
higher order 
theme to compare frequencies for all three sources of qualitative data sources and also 
for manager 
and nurse interviews. 
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4.4.2.1. Comparison of data sources 
Excerpts were considered endorsements of themes and frequencies and percentages for each theme 
are presented in Table 4.4.2.1. Themes appear in descending order of their number of total 
endorsements. 
Table 4.4.2.1: Endorsement frequency by type of data source 
Theme 
Endorsement frequency 
(% of total endorsements) 
Interview Observation Incident Total 
Ward climate 139(79%) 37(21%) 1(0.6%) 177 
Local working conditions 64(61%) 15(14%) 26(25%) 105 
Workload 61(79%) 12(16%) 4(5%) 77 
Human resources 70(91%) 4(5%) 3(4%) 77 
Team communication 40(57%) 16(23%) 14(20%) 70 
Routine procedures 49(72%) 3(4%) 16(24%) 68 
Bed management 44(100%) 0 0 44 
Written policies and procedures 38(100%) 0 0 38 
Supervision and leadership 17(68%) 8(32%) 0 25 
Training 18(82%) 0 4(18%) 22 
TOTAL 540 (77%*) 95 (14%*) 68 (9%*) 703 
* Percentage of all excerpts extracted 
Although each theme and their respective endorsements will not be discussed individually, 
particularly salient findings will be highlighted here with a view to illustrating the relative 
contribution of each data collection method. 
Methodological strengths and weaknesses 
A total of 703 endorsements of the 10 higher order themes were made during interviews, 
observations and incident reports. The majority of these endorsements were made during 
interviews and reflects the benefit of this method of data collection over observations and incident 
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report analysis. The comparatively lower number of theme endorsements made during observations 
is likely to be partly due to the researcher's lack of clinical training w1iich may have limited the 
identification of certain themes. It is also likely that some themes or components of higher-order 
themes manifest implicitly in the nursing environment and as such would be particularly difficult to 
observe. This is particularly true of the ward climate theme. For example, during inter-views nurses 
discussed the ways in which the absence of a challenging climate on the ward might lead to nurses 
allowing doctors mistakes to go unchallenged. The absence of a certain behaviour would be 
difficult to observe without first being aware that a mistake had been made but had gone 
unchallenged which is likely to require significant training in drug chart review. Other aspects of 
ward climate were easier to observe and required no clinical training, such as professional regard 
and interruptions. Notably, 37 per cent of the total number of ward climate endorsements related to 
mid-task interruptions. However, only one of these endorsements was extracted from incident 
reports which stated that a nurse had been interrupted during medication administration which had 
led to a dosage error. This was the only endorsement of the theme ward climate from incident 
reports. It is possible that this lack of endorsement in incident reports was due to a nursing 
perception that although interruptions (or other ward climate problems) pose a significant risk to the 
safety of patients, they are a common occurrence so ingrained in hospital culture there is little point 
in citing it as the cause of error when reporting incidents. 
Table 4.4.2.1 shows that only 9 per cent of the total number of theme endorsements were identified 
from incident reports. This reflects the general paucity of detail provided on incident forms on 
which staff are requested to provide only factual detail of the incident and not sunnise causation. 
Where causation themes were present on incident reports, these tended to focus on local working 
conditions such as problems with pharmacy (e. g. expired stock and delivery issues), checking 
procedures (e. g. checking patient wristbands) and written communication problems such as unclear 
prescriptions. It is worth pointing out that although causation themes were extracted from incident 
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reports, causes were often implied rather than an explicit description. For example, one incident 
read '-patient prescribed insulin on insulin chart, 81 units prescribed and nearly given. Should 
have been 8.1 units... '. Although it is reasonable to assume this was a prescribing error and the 
decimal point was either not present ot not clear due to illegible handwriting, this is only implied on 
the incident report. 
Another interesting finding is the relative lack of supervision and leadership endorsements overall 
but more importantly the prevalence of such endorsements within interviews compared with those 
during observations and incident reports. It is hypothesised that supervision and leadership issues 
would be particularly unlikely to be presented as a cause of error on an incident fon-n since these 
reports would initially be read by immediate nursing managers and reporting is not anonymous. In 
one particular observation a nursing manager was observed shouting at two junior nurses to speed 
up a patients discharge procedure due to the imminent arrival of a new patient who needed the bed. 
As a result the previous patient's details remained written on the board above the bed for the 
duration of the shift at which point the new patient had been on the ward for more than five hours. 
Discussions with staff members during observations uncovered this nursing manager was 'always 
like this' and nurses suggested they would never ask her for advice or help or disclose any errors 
they had made. 
There was a notable absence of any bed management or written policies and procedures 
endorsements during observations and incident reports. It is hypothesised that these particular 
themes represent 'organisational' factors which affect local working conditions. For example, it 
was postulated by nurses that constant pressure from bed managers and other departments to 
discharge patients quickly due to a back-log of potential 'breach' patients in A&E'9 and lack of 
29 This government scheme was initiated in 2004 and aimed to reduce waiting times in Accident and 
Emergency departments. The 4-hour rule states that 98 per cent of patients entering Accident & Emergency 
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available space in the Medical Admissions Unit often involved making significant compromises to 
the safety of existing patients. Several nurses suggested that this pressure frequently resulted in 
transferring patients 'in the middle of the night, in the dark' or 'in a real rush'; something nurses 
said was an 'accident waiting to happen'. The organisational. effects of bed management on patient 
safety were viewed as indirect effects on local working conditions such as increased workload, 
interruptions, admission and discharge and checking procedures which were rushed or omitted 
altogether. The lack of observational endorsements of written policies and procedures was to be 
expected since no policies were developed, updated or disseminated during observational periods. 
Furthermore, it was considered highly unlikely that nurses would cite the workability or 
dissemination strategy of a policy as a cause for not adhering to it on an incident report. This is 
partly due to the fact that policies are created predominantly by managers and so, as with 
supervision and leadership, nurses would be extremely unlikely to formally assign responsibility for 
an error or violation on the workability of a policy or the way in which it was disseminated. 
One limitation of the interviews was that due to the purposive method of sampling, it was not 
possible to interview any foreign nurses. Matrons did not recommend any of these nurses to be 
interviewed and suggested that these nurses had only worked on these wards for 12 months or less 
and as such were not senior or knowledgeable about ward practices. However, by conducting 
observations it was possible to gain insight into the issues surrounding foreign nursing (e. g. 
language issues, cultural differences) and raise these issues in interviews, which may not have been 
possible otherwise. Additionally, this study was conducted in only one NHS Trust which may to 
some extent compromise the generaliseability of findings. However, it was not possible at this 
stage of the research to recruit further hospitals due to ethical and time constraints. By conducting 
research in general medicine it was anticipated that the themes and issues observed extracted and 
discussed observations, incident review and interviews were common to multiple areas of care and 
should be seen, treated and admitted or discharged within 4 hours of arrival. Hospitals who achieve this are 
awarded an incentive of f 100,000. 
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also to secondary care environments in general. The fact that there was considerable research 
support for the themes and relative descendents generated in this study suggests that findings aFe 
generalisable. 
It is apparent that data obtained during interviews was significantly richer and offered a more varied 
perspective of medication error causation than both incident and observational data. Interview data 
allowed for the identification of themes which were not evident during observations and frorn 
incident review. There were no higher order themes identified from observations and/or incident 
reports which were not proposed, during interviews. It is possible that the significantly larger 
number of endorsements obtained during interviews was due to the size of data sources which may 
not have been equal. However, many of the themes which arose during interviews were not always 
directly observable (e. g. ward climate) and so conducting more observations would have been 
unlikely to yield more endorsements. Furthermore, the paucity of detail contained within incident 
reports and the bias with which events are reported suggests that by increasing the number of 
reports reviewed, the number of thematic endorsements would not have increased. This finding 
highlights the difference between triangulating data sources for the purposes of confinnation or 
completeness discussed in section 4.3.1. As predicted, the disparity between data sources prevented 
using one source to validate another. However, it is proposed that by conducting interviews, 
observations and incident report review, a more complete perspective of medication administration 
error causation was achieved. 
4.4.2.2. Comparison of interviewee 
Thematic endorsement frequency was also calculated on interview data to allow comparison 
between management and nurses' responses. Table 4.4.2.2 summarises these frequencies. 
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Table 4.4.2.2: Endorsement frequency by interviewee type 
Endorsement frequency 
Theme Management 
=8) 
Nurses 
(n=l 1) 
Actual Weighted* 
Ward climate 
Local working conditions 
35 
8 
104 
56 
76 
41 
Workload 16 45 33 
Human resources 23 47 34 
Team communication 8 32 23 
Routine procedures 17 32 23 
Bed management 1 43 31 
Written policies and procedures 24 14 10 
Supervision and leadership 8 
] 
9 7 
Training 9 
E 
9 7 
TOTAL 149 [-391 285 
*Weighted endorsements for nursing group calculated by dividing 'actual' endorsements by II (nursing N) 
multiplied by 8 (management N) to ensure management and nurse group sizes are comparable. 
The purpose of interviewing both managers and nurses was to obtain a holistic perspective of the 
causes of medication errors from the blunt and sharp end of the organisation (Reason, 1997). As 
Table 4.4.2.2 shows, nurses suggested significantly more causes of medication error than managers. 
Even after weighting nurses' endorsements to ensure group sizes were comparable, the endorsement 
of all themes by nurses was almost double the number of endorsements made by managers. The 
data indicates that managers were more likely to cite two or three potential causes of medication 
errors, namely ward climate, human resources and written policies and procedures. By comparison, 
nurse endorsement of themes was considerably broader and more frequent. 
Of particular interest was the bed management theme. This theme was endorsed during interviews 
on 43 occasions by nurses yet was mentioned as a potential cause of error only once by a senior 
manager. Added to the finding that bed management was never endorsed within incident reports, 
lack of managerial endorsement suggests that there could be a communication gap between the 
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sharp and blunt end of the organisation which prevents organisational learning. Although nurses 
perceived bed management to pose a significant patient safety risk, by not citing this as a potential 
cause of errors on incident forms (mainly because they are not asked to provide such details), senior 
managers seemed unaware of the albeit indirect implications of the management of beds. It is also 
possible that that managers are less likely to cite causal factors which are temporally removed from 
adverse events (Reason, 1997), such as bed management as potential causes of error due to their 
distance from the 'shop-floor'. As evidence of this, managers were more likely in interviews to cite 
causes which were much closer (in time or space) to unsafe acts such as nurses commitment to care 
and inadequate checking procedures. Interestingly, neither of these secondary themes was 
discussed during interviews by nurses. 
4.4.3. Inter-rater reliability 
In order to test the reliability of the 10 proposed themes and decrease subjectivity interpretation, 
inter-rater comparison were conducted to test whether selected excerpts (from interviews only) were 
reflective of the themes to which they had been assigned. Although there are more rigorous tests of 
reliability, such as asking raters to analyse raw data transenpts and extract themes in a similar way 
to the initial analysis, the complexity of thematic analysis and time constraints did not allow for this 
depth of testing. Since some themes were significantly more complex than others it was decided 
that secondary themes would also be tested to assess the extent to which other raters would place 
them in their assigned higher order theme. One clinical rater (former senior nurse) and a non- 
clinical rater (senior lecturer in health psychology) were recruited for this task but did not undertake 
it at the same time. In the first part of the task, raters were presented with a 25 per cent random 
sample of interview excerpts printed on small slips of paper (n=135) from each of the secondary 
themes. Secondary themes and corresponding definitions (n=37) were printed on A4 paper and 
were spread out on a large table. Raters were asked to read each excerpt and assign it to a theme 
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which they perceived best represented the excerpt. This task took approximately I hour to 
complete. Excerpts which were either placed in a theme which was not the one it had originally 
been assigned to during thematic analysis or those which raters struggled to categorise altogether 
were discussed to reach a consensus. The mean inter-rater agreement for the first task was 83 per 
cent. 
In the second stage of the task, raters were presented with the 10 higher-order themes printed on A4 
paper and were asked to assign each of the secondary themes to the one which they felt represented 
it the most. This task took approximately 30 minutes to complete. The mean inter-rater agreement 
for this task was 89 per cent. The level of agreement between the original placement of excerpts 
into secondary themes and secondary themes into higher-order themes and subsequent rater 
judgements was considered excellent given the recommendation that 70 per cent inter-rater 
reliability is considered adequate (Miles & Huberman, 1984). 
4.5. Conclusions 
Ten overarching preconditions of medication administration error were extracted from three sources 
of qualitative data. Overall, interview data comprised the richest data source and while 
observational data was useful to some degree as a complementary data source, incident reports 
offered very little insight into the causes of error. Nevertheless, review of incident reports did 
highlight a potential organisational learning gap through which opportunities for identifying error 
causation may be lost. Nurses offered significantly more explanations than managers during 
interviews as to why errors occur but are not asked to disclose these causes in current NHS 
reporting systems. Furthermore, poor reporting culture means that some if not most errors are not 
reported which further prevents organisational learning. It is proposed that unless a more open, 
honest, encouraging and less punitive stance is taken to error management, incident reports will 
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continue to be overly-brief and defensive, providing reduced opportunities for organisational 
leaming. 
Research evidence was found which supported the 10 themes and their sub-theme descendents 
identified within the qualitative data. However, the majority of this research reported perccptions 
of error causation amongst various health care professionals but very few had empirically measured 
whether these causes predict errors. Only by developing a valid and reliable measure of these 
preconditions and testing their relationship with medication or any other type of medical errors will 
appropriate interventions to reduce error be effective. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ORGANISATIONAL SAFETY 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
.......... I 1.1ha A# a4b ............ .......... .. "" . I. ..... . .,.................... . -. A I .......... 
5.1. Introduction 
The primary objective of this thesis was to explore the organisational and workplace preconditions 
of drug administration errors. The secondary objective was to conceptualize this knowledge within 
an instrument which could effectively measure the presence (and hence absence) of safety in a 
secondary care environment. Using the qualitative data obtained in study I- study 2 explored the 
ways in which each organisational failure would manifest on a hospital ward. For example, what do 
poor communication or training issues look like on a particularly good or bad working day. This 
study involved content analysis of data obtained in study I to generate 'safety indicators' followed 
by two pilot studies to test the face validity of indicators in order to develop the OSQ 
(Organisational Safety Questionnaire). 
5.2. Method 
Although it was the original intention to use focus group sessions, similar to those employed by 
Groeneweg (1992; see chapter 2 for details) to elicit safety indicators of each causal factor there 
were a number of problems with this approach in a busy clinical setting. Firstly, initial discussions 
with nursing staff indicated that they would be unwilling to attend focus groups outside the hospital 
unless they were being paid for their time and expenses. Secondly, nurses said they would only 
participate in focus groups if it was during a shift that they were already working. Nursing 
managers said they would only be able to release two nurses at a time to attend a focus group for a 
period of 20 minutes at which point these nurses would have to return to the ward and two more 
nurses would be sent in. This approach was not feasible since remaining in the focus group for the 
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duration of the session is essential to the dynamics of this type of group work. It was decided that 
this would not promote the depth of discussion necessary. 
As an alternative to collecting new data from focus groups, the data from the interviews was re- 
examined to see whether any useful indicators of each theme could be extracted. Using similar 
methods to those used to generate causal themes (described in full in chapter 4, section 4.3.3), all II 
nurse interview transcripts were re-read with a view to extracting explicit indicators of each causal 
theme 30 . Often, original excerpts which had led to the development of themes in study I were 
relevant indicators of poor safety. For example, one nurse stated '... I think it's an absolute scandal 
that we have to rely on doctors' handwriting that's often completely illegible... '. In study I this 
excerpt was used as an endorsement of the theme team communication1written 
communication1handwriting legibility (see Table 4.4. l. b) but was also an explicit example of the 
way that this theme could lead to errors and was translated into an objective indicator. Table 5.2. 
presents examples of translation of excerpts into indicators for each theme. - 6 
In line with error management tools developed in other industries (e. g. Tripod-DELTA, REVIEW, 
MESH) items needed to be objective, tangible indicators of safety failures which could be answered 
with either a yes or no (Groeneweg, 1992). As discussed in chapter 2, section 2.3.1.1, indicators 
were developed for the Tripod-DELTA measure during several studies which included detailed 
observations of employees during high-risk activities followed by several focus group sessions to 
discuss observed practices. A similar methodology was employed in this study using observations 
of nursing practices to inform subsequent in-depth interviews. Only indicators which were 
considered generalisable to multiple areas of secondary care were extracted. There was no limit 
imposed on the number of indicators generated since it was the intention to test the face validity of 
30 Manager's interview data was inappropriate for this stage of the analysis since these interviewees rarely 
gave specific examples of the ways in which latent variables could manifest at a ward level in the same way 
nurses did. 
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all indicators with a group of expert nurses to ensure that only those which were the best reflection 
of each theme were included on the final tool. However, due to the breadth of the data, more 
indicators were generated for themes which were more frequently endorsed (Le, ward climate, local 
working conditions). Indicators were developed which reflected the thematic structure of each 
higher-order theme. For example, 14 items were developed for the complex higher-order theme 
local working conditions which comprised 5 fatigue and body rhythm items (3 shift patterns and 2 
staff breaks items), 1 equiPment availability item, 2 ward noise items and 6 phan-naceutical items 
relating to expired stock, ward stock levels and labelling and packaging. Comparatively, the simpler 
theme supervision and leadership comprised only 10 items which related to either task delegation or 
leadership style (see chapter 4, tables 4.4. l. a-j* for breakdown of each latent theme). 
Indicators developed for the Tripod-DELTA tool (Groeneweg, 1992) were framed to reflect the 
occurrence of problems across a standard time period (e. g. in the last month/accounting period). 
However, it was evident from interviews in this study that there was a large variation in the 
frequency of occurrence of each causal theme. For example, nurses suggested that being 
interrupted (an indicator for the theme ward climate) was a daily occurrence. Conversely, problems 
which related to the dissemination of policies and procedures were significantly less frequent, 
although equally problematic, and occurred only a few times each year. Asking participants whether 
they had been interrupted or received a policy they did not understand in the last four weeks would 
undoubtedly have resulted in ceiling and floor effects respectively. It was not practical therefore to 
frame all items in exactly the same way. To account for this, each indicator was framed in terms of 
its relative frequency as indicated during interviews. This was particularly difficult due to the wide 
variety of indicators. However, a pilot study was conducted to examine the validity of these time 
frames (see section 5.3). All items were negatively framed since there is evidence which suggests 
negatively worded items can reduce response bias (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). Although it is 
common in test construction to develop both positive and negative items, Schmitt and Stults (1985) 
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showed that this can create problems in subsequent factor analysis when there are a large number of 
items (as was the case in this study) and participants have failed to recognise the reversal of 
wording. Therefore, all items (except four which were neutral) were negatively framed as safety 
failures. 
Table 5.2: Examples of the translation of raw excerpts into safety indicators 
Causal theme Qualitative raw extract Translated indicator 
,... when you come on to a shift you like to think 
' In the last 2 months I that you re starting with a clean sheet and if 
' 
, have rushed through that clean sheets blottedfrom the start cos 
' outstanding jobs towards Ward climate you ve tofinish chores that the previous staff 
' the end of my shift so the should have done it doesn t always go down next shift did not have to vei-v well so people rush round trying to get dothem 
their chores done... 
In the last 2 months, I 
Local Working half the time I 
haven't even had anything to have worked 6 or more 
Conditions eat all shift and then it 
becomes difficult to hours into my shift 
concentrate even on minor tasks... without anything to eat or 
drink 
lots ofpatients being admitted, or very sick In the last 2 months, I patients in need of a lot of attention, dealing have found it difficult to 
Workload with relatives and visitors. 
It can fluctuate 
' prioritize duties 
for the 
s difficult to plan a shift throughout the day. It 
' 
day because all tasks s going to happen as it's so unpredictable what seemed equal Iy important at what time.... 
... there's very 
little medical support on nights. 
In the last 4 weeks, I have 
experienced difficulty Human You've got to practically beg. You need a getting an on-call doctor Resources really good reason as to why you need a doctor to come to this ward out of 
up here at night... hours 
one potential systems error on every ward In the last 4 weeks, I have I've ever worked on is that drug charts tend to discovered a drug chart 
Team 
befree of the nursing or medical notes. They belonging to one patient in 
Communication get 
lost andpeople have to try to remember a different patient's 
what was on them and rewrite them. Doctors nursing/medical 
carri, them round all day and charts often get notes/bedside locker/bed tidied away in the wrong patient's notes. 
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Table 5.2: continued 
Causal theme Qualitative raw extract Translated indicator 
,... people do mad things like put a patients 
In the last 2 months, I 
identity bracelet and the allergy bracelet on 
have encountered a patient 
Routine different wrists so You pull the arm out of bed on 
this ward who's allergy 
Procedures 
that you think you're lookingfor and see the 
bracelet was on the 
identity band but not the allergy band... opposite wrist to their 
ID 
wristband 
,... we sometimes have to transfer patients to 
In the last 3 months, this 
hospital X in the middle of the night because we wa i 
rd has transferred a 
Bed need their bed. Thepotentialfor things goi . ng patient 
to another ward 
Management wrong packing people up in the dark when 
' ' 
during the night or early 
hours of the morning there s not as many staff on vou can t because their bed was fathom... 
needed for another patient 
In the last 12 months, I 
have received an updated 
Written Policies many a time I'll 
look at the new version [of version of a written 
and Procedures an existing policy] 
but I've no idea what's policy, protocol or 
different on this one, what have they changed? ' guideline without knowing 
which part of the original 
had changed 
there are leaders who are good and can In the last 2 months, there 
organise and sort things out and delegate quite has been an important task 
Supervision and well. There are others who don't delegate, who outstanding at the end of 
Leadership take on too much, don't let others help and the shift which I didn't do 
things get missed, jobs don't get done which because I thought another 
adds to the workload... ' nurse had done it 
,... you're supposed to get a preceptorship 
In the last 12 months, all 
newly qualified nurses 
package and induction when you start where starting on this 
Training you get 
loads of information and things. I ward/unit/dept have 
never did, I was thrown in at the deep end. received the standard People do sometimes start work before they've induction training 
started their induction.. programme required 
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A total of 145 indicators were developed across all 10 themes which could be answered with either 
yes or no. It was especially difficult to develop 'tangible' indicators for the ward climate theme 
since many of these excerpts ref erred to a general perception or implicit feeling of 'the NkaY things 
are' on the ward. Developing tangible indicators necessitates removal of emotive words such as 
think, believe or feel to avoid subjective interpretation by respondents. For instance, nurses 
suggested during interviews that there were some doctors they did not 'get along with' which was 
assigned to the secondary theme professional regard. This would have been difficult to translate 
into an observable indicator without knowing how not getting along with another professional is 
manifested. 
5.3. Pilot study I 
An initial pilot study was conducted to assess the face validity of all 145 generated safety 
indicators. The collaborating partners were keen to produce a tool which was considerably shorter 
than 145 items based on concerns for the utility and response rates from excessively long 
instruments. The aim of the pilot therefore was to also highlight indicators which were the most 
useftil or represented the most risk to patient safety for inclusion in the final version. 
5.3.1. Method 
Participants 
Twenty-four qualified nurses who worked on four non-specialist wards and who had not previously 
been involved in interviews (e. g. general medicine, medical admissions, and elderly medicine) were 
invited by letter to participate in the initial pilot study. Participants were advised that the study was 
testing the workability of a new questionnaire which had been developed by researchers at the 
University of Leeds to measure aspects of their working environment which might promote risks to 
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patient safety. In agreement with the hospital's Research and Development office it was agreed that 
because the pilot study was expected to take nurses approximately two hours to complete they could 
be provided with lunch and offered f 10 each to participate. Ten nurses agreed, coinprising one 
matron, three sisters, four senior staff nurses and two staff nurses. 
Questionnaire and task design 
Two tasks were designed to measure face validity of the indicators and questionnaire as a whole. 
Participants were first asked to simply complete the 145 item questionnaire which comprised 
indicators presented under their parental themes in tables on double-sided A4 paper in a booklet 
format (Dillman, 2000; Sudman & Bradburn, 1982; Bourque & Fielder, 1995). The name of each 
theme and its definition (see chapter 4, section 4.4.1 for definitions) was presented at the top of each 
table. Participants were instructed to read each question carefully and respond by circling either 
'yes' or 'no, the event had or had not happened on their ward in the stated time scale or circle 'not 
applicable' if they did not know. Table 5.3.1 gives an example of this presentation. The final 
version of this questionnaire is included in the appendices (appendix XII). 
Table 5.3.1: Questionnaire presentation with corresponding response options 
TEANI COMMUNICATION 
Aspects of the ways in which ward teams and intra-professional teams Yes / No / Not 
communicate. Includes written (i. e. document design, tracking and Applicable 
legibility) and verbal (i. e. inter and intra-departmental information 
sharing) communication, team size and multi-cultural communication 
issues. 
In the last 4 weeks, lia\,, e you sought assistance fi-oin a colleague to Q] Z_ N, N, NA 
interpi-et the handwriting on a patient's dmo chart? 
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In line with face validity studies conducted to develop the Tripod-DELTA error management too] 
(Groeneweg, 1992), the second task invited participants to make comments on any questions they 
considered problematic. Participants were given an answer sheet and asked to provide details on 
problematic questions under the following four headings; 
Clarity - whether the item was clearly worded and understandable using appropriate 
terminology 
Time frame - whether the stated time frame was appropriate (i. e. 'In the last 4 weeks... ') 
Patient safety impact - whether the item would impact on the safety of patients 
Inappropriate category - whether the item was not reflective of the theme to which it had 
been assigned or more related to another theme 
Additional space on the answer sheet was provided for participants to comment on any other 
changes they thought would improve the questionnaire or any aspects of patient safety they thought 
were not addressed within the items. 
Procedure 
Once nurses had agreed to participate, a meeting was scheduled with the researcher to discuss the 
purpose of the study and what was required of participants. This was considered particularly 
important since these nurses had never met the researcher before, having not been involved in the 
previous study. It was hoped that this meeting would enable participants to feel more at ease giving 
feedback on the questionnaire, something they may have been reluctant to do if they thought the 
questionnaire had been designed to assess performance. Participants were asked to complete the 
questionnaire first, followed by the second task and were given two weeks to complete both. After 
this deadline, participants were revisited to collect questionnaires and to discuss any issues they 
wished to raise. 
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5.3.2. Results 
Once questionnaires had been completed, a debriefing meeting was scheduled to reassure 
participants their data would be confidenti ipants to provide any feedback 'ally treated and for partici 
regarding the questionnaire in general. Overall, nurses were positive about the questionnaire. Items 
were removed if five or more participants (50 per cent) agreed the item was unlikely to impact on 
patient safety (n=9)31. Items were also moved to recommended categories if five or more 
respondents agreed on a more appropriate placement (n=3). Items judged unclear by any 
respondent were amended to improve its understanding. Several participants commented that some 
items were too similar and seemed to be measuring the same thing. Again, when five or more 
respondents agreed this was problematic for a particular item, the item was either removed or 
consolidated with its similar counterpart (n=7). A further 15 items were removed because they had 
all been answered 'not applicable'. 
Of particular interest was the relative lack of variability in responding whereby most participants 
answered the majority of items with a yes response. This was encouraging to some extent in that it 
suggested the indicators represented commonly occurring safety failures and were less likely to be a 
subjective interpretation of qualitative data. However, in terins of the final tool this lack of 
variability would present statistical problems in discriminating between wards and determining the 
predictive validity of the items. It is possible that this lack of variability in responding was due in 
part to the item time frames since there were a number of comments made by participants that these 
were generally underestimated. For example, one indicator asked participants whether in the last 4 
weeks they had been interrupted during the drug round by a patient, visitor or other health 
professional. The vast majority of participants responded yes to this question. It was possible that 
by reducing the time frame to 'in the last week' the sensitivity of such items would be increased. 
However, observations, interviews and pilot study responses revealed that frequent interruptions 
31 Lawshe (1975, pp. 568) recommended that if more than half the raters in a pilot study indicate an item is 
essential or relevant to the construct being measured, that item has face/content validity. 
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during the drug round by patients, visitors and other health professionals are a dailv occurrence. 
Even by reducing the time frame to 'in the last shift', ceiling effects on using dichotomous response 
options would always occur. This posed a significant problem for items which represented frequent 
and significant risks to patient safety compared with those which were equally problematic but not 
frequent (e. g. poor knowledge of current policy driven by ineffective dissemination of written 
policies and procedures). 
Development of the Tripod-DELTA tool (Groeneweg, 1992; see chapter 2 of this thesis) principally 
aimed to detect latent failures in an organisation with a low rate of adverse incidents compared with 
those occurring in health care. Research in general has shown a much lower incident rate and an 
4almost complete absence of catastrophic failures over many years' in many high-risk industries 
(Reason, 2000, pp. 769). The much higher rate of errors and other adverse incidents in health care 
suggests the prevalence of latent failures is likely to be much greater than in other high-risk 
industries which is supported by the ceiling effect responses observed in this pilot study. In the 
development of other error management tools in aircraft maintenance (MESH) and railway 
operations (REVIEW), Reason (1997) notes that ceiling and floor effects led to researchers 
employing frequency rating scales as opposed to more restrictive 'yes' and 'no' options. Although 
rating scales are generally viewed as being more subjective, Reason emphasises that individuals are 
extremely competent at judging the frequencies of different events. Indeed studies have shown 
correlations between estimates of the frequency of events and the actual number of these events to 
be +0.9 or above (Hasher & Zacks, 1984). Since it was not possible to explore further the relative 
frequency of each indicator, response options were changed to a Likert frequency scale to enable 
comparisons between wards (see pilot study 2). Colla, Bracken, Kinney and Weeks 
(2005) reviewed 
nine measures of aspects of organisational safety in health care settings and revealed all 
had 
employed a five-point Likert scale and so five response options were developed 
for this tool from 
&not at all' to 'nearly all the time'. 
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After removal of items, the questionnaire was reduced from 145 to 114 items. It was the original 
research aim to develop a tool which respondents would be happy to complete every 6-12 months 
and which would take approximately 15 minutes to complete. The collaborating institute had 
concerns that the 114 item revised questionnaire was still too long for this purpose based on 
previous experiences of poor responding with longer questionnaires. A further concern was that 
some of the items might not be generalisable beyond general medicine or elderly care. To address 
these concerns, a second pilot study was conducted. 
5.4. Pilot study 2 
Pilot study 2 was conducted to examine whether the tool had face validity beyond elderly care and 
general medicine wards, whether it could be completed in less than 20 minutes and whether nursing 
staff would be prepared to complete the tool every 6 months. 
5.4.1. Method 
Participants 
Fifty qualified nurses who worked on eight wards not involved in earlier phases which comprised 
surgical, neonatal, paediatrics and gynaecology wards and a large medical admissions unit (MAU) 
were invited by letter to participate in this pilot study. As with pilot study 1, participants were 
advised that the study was testing the workability of a new questionnaire which had been developed 
by researchers at the University of Leeds to measure aspects of their working environment which 
might promote risks to patient safety. Participants were offered paid lunch and af 10 incentive to 
participate. Twenty nurses agreed comprising six sisters, ten senior staff nurses and four staff 
nurses from two surgical and two paediatric wards and the MAU. 
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Questionnaire design 
As with pilot study 1, the revised 114-item questionnaire was printed in a double-sided A4 booklet 
with indicators presented under each of their parental themes in separate tables. The name of each 
theme and its definition was presented at the top of each table. Beneath each indicator was a Likert- 
type frequency scale. As with pilot study 1, participants were instructed to read each question 
carefully and respond by circling the frequency with which each event had happened on their ward 
in the stated time scale or circle 'not applicable' if they did not know. Response options were not at 
all, occasionally, quite often, frequently and nearly all the time. 
Procedure 
Meetings were held between the researcher and each participant to discuss the purpose of the 
research and to describe the tasks they were required to undertake. Essentially, this pilot study was 
identical to pilot study 1, asking participants to complete the questionnaire and make comments on 
problem items for clarity, time frames, impact on patient safety and category 'belongingness'. In 
addition, participants were also asked to rate the questionnaire on overall presentation, length and 
ease of use as being 'poor, 'fair', 'good' or 'excellent'. They were also asked whether they would 
be prepared to complete the questionnaire every 6 months and if not, to provide details of their main 
reason for not doing so. A final question asked respondents how long it took them to complete the 
questionnaire. 
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5.4.2. Results 
Face validity 
In terms of item clarity, very few comments suggesting any items were unclear were made. Items 
were removed if 10 or more respondents (50 per cent) suggested they would be unlikely to affect 
the safety of patients (n--4). A further three items were removed which were judged too similar to 
other items. No comments or recommendations were made by participants on the belongingness of 
any item to its respective category. 
Variability 
Analysis revealed that even with the revised five point response scale, five items had no variability 
in responses and a further eight had extremely limited variability of responses and were 
subsequently removed. Interestingly, four of these removed items related to reporting culture on the 
ward and asked participants whether factors such as not being directly involved in the event or fear 
of disciplinary repercussions had prevented them from reporting an error they had made or 
witnessed. All 20 participants responded to these questions with 'not at all'. 
Notably, three of the eight reduced variance items referred to the impact of supervision and 
leadership on patient safety, in particular the leadership style of immediate supervisors. These 
items asked respondents whether they had been advised by a supervisor in the last two months to 
4cut comers' or go against standard practice in order to complete an aspect of patient care. 
Although cited frequently and openly during interviews, most nurses in this pilot study responded 
ýnot at all'. It is possible that reassuring participants that their questionnaire responses were 
anonymous, and would not be seen by immediate nursing managers was not effective and nurses 
were reluctant to make what could be perceived as disparaging comments about their supervisor. 
Additionally, these items were more likely to be construed by respondents as admitting they had 
committed violations of standard procedures which they may be unwilling to disclose. 
154 
Alternatively, it is also possible that for this group of respondents, there were fewer problems with 
their supervisors than in the group of nurses who were interviewed. 
Questionnaire design 
All 20 respondents rated the overall presentation and layout of the questionnaire and the ease of use 
as either 'good' or 'excellent'. Only one respondent rated the length as being 'poor', six rated It 
'fair' and the remaining thirteen respondents rated it as 'good'. When asked whether they would be 
happy to complete the questionnaire once every six months seventeen participants said yes and 
three said no but did not provide details why not. On average respondents stated the questionnaire 
had taken approximately 20 minutes to complete but several nurses commented this was difficult to 
judge because they were constantly interrupted. 
5.5. Methodological concerns 
After analysis of pilot study 2 data, the revised questionnaire comprised 94 items which it was 
estimated would reduce the completion time to 15 minutes. It was the intention to administer this 
questionnaire to a large sample of qualified nurses in study 4 (chapter 7) in order to measure 
multiple aspects of validity and reliability. This study would have enabled revision of the number 
of items using factor analysis to produce the final error management tool. However, the 
collaborating institute suggested that previous attempts at administering questionnaires of this 
length at this hospital had resulted in poor response rates. A review of nine similar measures of 
patient safety climate by Colla, Bracken, Kinney and Weeks (2005) revealed that the number of 
items to be completed in these measures was (with one exception) less than 71 with an average test 
length of 43 items. Several options were discussed in order to reach a compromise between 
producing a tool which would meet the pragmatic requirements of usability in busy clinical settings 
and wbich would also be valid and reliable and proactively predict medication errors. 
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It was considered essential that each latent theme was represented by as many indicators as possible 
which would enable redundant items to be removed and retention of only Items with the highest 
factor loadings and to achieve the highest alpha levels. Firstly, it was proposed that the 
questionnaire could remain as 94 itemS32 providing the available sample size was large enough to 
accommodate poor response rates. It was predicted that approximately 300+ participants would be 
required for factor analysis with this number of items (Kass & Tinsley, 1979; Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2001 )33 . Accounting for the poor response rates of approximately 20 per cent that are common 
within nursing research would mean that approximately 1500 qualified nurses would need to be 
sampled which would involve recruitment of at least one more hospital. Although two other 
hospitals were contacted and showed initial interest in being involved, conflicting research 
commitments at one hospital and an inability to commit to the study within the necessary time scale 
of the PhD at the other hospital meant that recruiting nurses beyond the collaborating hospital was 
not possible. 
The second possible option to meet the needs of the hospital and the researcher might have been to 
reduce the number of latent variables measured. It was proposed that the tool could have been a 
measure of three to five latent preconditions of MAEs (as opposed to one which measured ten), 
each with approximately ten indicators. However, this would involve making a judgement on the 
themes which were most or least important predictors of medication errors. It was difficult to 
ascertain from interviews exactly which latent factors were the most predictive of error. 
Additionally, this was the purpose of the final study. Since it was a main aim of the research to 
develop a tool which was a broad reflection of multiple latent causes of MAEs, reducing the tool 
would have produced a much narrower perspective of latent failures and would be less likely to 
32 Although not discussed in this chapter, it became apparent at this point that additional items would need to 
be developed in order to measure the tool's predictive validity due to inherent reporting bias in fonnally 
reported incidents. See chapter 6 for full discussion of this study. 
33 Kass & Tinsley (1979) recommend having between 5 and 10 participants per variable up to a total of 300 at 
which point parameters tend to be fairly stable regardless of participant to variable ratio. Similarly 
Tabachnick & Fidell (2001) agree it is 'comforting to have at least 300 cases for factor analysis'. 
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represent overall organisational safety. Reason (1997) argues that errors are more likely to occur as 
a result of a culmination and complex interaction of multiple latent failures. A tool which measures 
only a limited number of these failures is unlikely to capture the complexity of this relationship. 
The third option discussed to reduce the length of the questionnaire was to further reduce the 
number of items within each of the 10 latent factors. The disadvantage of this was that individual 
items were considered as representing scales measuring each underlYing latent theme. The premise 
of scale and indeed questionnaire development is to include more items than one would expect to 
measure each construct, thus allowing for the removal of weak and unrelated items during factor 
analysis. Clark and Watson (1995) advise that researchers should 'err on the side of over- 
inclusiveness' and ensure that each construct is well represented in the initial item pool. However, 
the problem of having too many items was complicated by an additional need in study 4 to add 
another 20-25 items which would measure the both the predictive and concurrent validity of the tool 
(see chapter 6). Since inter-rater agreement that excerpts were reflective of each theme had been 
high and face validity of each translated indicator had yielded positive results, it was decided that 
reducing the number of items per latent factor was the best option of the three proposed. All three 
sources of qualitative data were revisited in order to remove items (n=12) which were less 
frequently endorsed overall (from interviews, observations and incident review) within each higher- 
order theme and also those less frequently endorsed within descendent themes (see chapter 4, 
section 4.4.2). Items which were frequently endorsed but which would make intervention difficult 
were also removed. Table 5.5. a illustrates how this was done for the theme 'local working 
conditions'. 
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This final review led to a further 12 items being removed. Table 5-5. b shows the remaining 82 
items which comprised the Organisational Safety Questionnaire. 
Table 5.5. b: Organisational Safety Questionnaire items (n=82) 
Item TEAM COMMUNICATION 
code* 
In the last 4 weeks, a patient's clinical investigation paperwork (e. g. blood test. e. c. g report TO 
etc. ) has been sent to this ward/unit/dept and subsequently lost 
In the last 4 weeks, I have discovered a drug chart belonging to one patient in a different TC2 
patient's nursing/ medical notes/bedside locker/bed 
TC3 I have attended a ward/unit/dept meeting in the last 3 months 
In the last 4 weeks, I have encountered a patient's allergy status written on their main drug TC4 
chart but not on their PRN chart 
In the last 4 weeks, a patient's drug chart has gone missing from this ward/unit/dept and had TC5 
to be rewritten 
In the last 4 weeks, I have encountered a drug chart where the details of a particular drug (e. g. TC6 dosage, frequency/route of administration) had been crossed out and altered 2 or more times 
In the last 4 weeks, I have sought assistance from a colleague to interpret the handwriting on TC7 
a patient's drug chart 
In the last 4 weeks, a doctor or other health professional has written instructions in a patient's TC8 
notes for the nursing team to carry out without verbally advising them they had done so 
There has been an incident debriefing or team meeting to discuss the last 'significant' clinical TC9 
incident to happen on this ward/unit/dept within one month of its occurrence 
In the last 4 weeks, I have encountered a patient's drug chart which had been changed by a TC10 doctor since the previous drug round without my knowledge 
L ROUTINE PROCEDURES 
In the last 2 months, I have encountered details on a patient's ID wristband NN, hich did not RP1 
correspond with their drug chart 
This ward regularly uses a standardised list (written document) of tasks which should be RP2 
carried out for each new admission 
This ward uses a standardized list (written document) of information which must be passed RP3 
on to colleagues during patient handover 
In the last 2 months, I have encountered a patient on this ward whose allergy Wristband was RP4 
on the opposite wrist to their ID -vwlstband 
In the last 2 months, I have had to telephone the ward after my shift had ended because I RINS 
remembered infori-nation I had previously forgotten to pass on during handover 
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In the last 2 months, I have experienced difficulty writing all the infori-nation passed on to 
RP6 me during patient handover because I didn't hear or understand everything or there Wasn't 
time to write everything 
In the last 2 months, I have encountered a patient who had been on the ward for more than RP7 
24 hours who did not have this ward's ID wristband on 
In the last 2 months, I have encountered a patient on this ward wearing an allergy \NTristban RP8 
j 
whose allergy was not documented on their drug chart or vice versa 
In the last 2 months, I have come across details written on the board abo\, e a patient's bed RP9 
L 
for the patient who had prei, ioitsli, occupied that bed 
I WORKLOAD 
In t he last 2 months, I have been unable to coordinate the ward/unit/dept because of illy WLI 
. patient allocation 
In the last 4 weeks, I have sped up during a drug round to avoid a backlog of jobs later in the WL2 
shift 
In the last 4 weeks, I have sped up during a drug round to avoid making the next drug round WL3 
late 
In the last 4 weeks, the number of doctors arriving for morning ward round has slowed my WL4 
drug round progress 
In the last 2 months, I have found it difficult to prioritize duties for the day because all tasks WL5 
seemed equally important 
In the last 2 months, 2 or more new admissions have arrived within minutes of each other on WL6 
this ward 
_ 
pecte new admission on this ward has meant that other In the last 4 weeks, an un! ýLy WL7 
important tasks were incomplete by the end of the shift 
HUMAN RESOURCES 
In the last 4 weeks, I have worked a shift when an agency nurse was requested but did not HR1 
arrive, leaving the ward/unit/dept understaffed 
In the last 2 months, as a qualified nurse I have had to leave the ward to accompany a patient HR2 
to another department leaving the ward short of qualified nurses 
In the last 2 months, a doctor has refused to carry out something I needed them to do because HR3 
the patient concerned was not theirs 
In the last 2 months, I have worked with an agency nurse who did not know how to carry out HR4 
a skill or procedure required of their nursing grade 
In the last 2 months, an agency nurse has been sent to this ward/unit/dept who was less HR5 
qualified than the grade of nurse we requested 
_ 
In the last 6 months, there has been a deterioration in the level of experience within the tearn 
HR6 
on this ward/unit/dept 
HR7 In the last 4 weeks, I have bleeped a doctor -1 times or more ýNithout receiving a response 
E 
HR 
_ 
H 
jý8 
In the last 6 months, there has been an increase in senior nursing turnover on this \vard/unit! dept 
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In the last 4 weeks, I have expenenced difficulty getting an on-call doctor to come to the HR9 
I 
ward out of hours 
LOCAL WORKING CONDITIONS 
LWC1 In the last 3 months, I have worked _33 or more 'long shifts' (7ain - 9pm) one after another 
In the last 2 months, I have worked 6 or more hours of my shift without anything to eat or LWC2 
drink 
In the last 2 months, I have encountered boxed medication which did not correspond with tile LWC3 
outer package labelling 
In the last 2 months, I have been unable to get hold of IV medication equipment because I LWC4 
could not find it in the hospital or it was all in use on other wards 
In the last 2 months, a patient on this ward has missed 3 or more doses of their prescribed LWC5 
medication because it had been ordered but not sent from phan-nacy 
In the last 2 months, a patient from this ward/unit/dept has been discharged without taking LWC6 
home their medication because it had been ordered but not been sent by pharmacy 
LWC7 In the last 2 months, I have worked an entire shift without a rest break 
In the last 3 months, I have encountered medication (e. g. boxed or IV) in the drug trolley or LWC8 
clinic room which had expired by more than a month 
In the last 4 weeks, I have encountered drugs packaging for two different types of inedicati LWC9 
which was virtually identical 
WARD CLIMATE 
Senior nurses on this ward/unit/dept prefer all patient quenes to corne through them in the CLT1 
first instance - even if there are other nurses on shift who would know the answer 
In the last 2 months, a senior nurse has complained that jobs from the previous shift were left CLT2 
unfinished 
In the last 2 months, I have refrained from bleeping a particular doctor because I wasn't CLT3 
confident they had the necessary skills to help me 
In the last 2 months, I have been asked by a consultant to carry out a task which was really CLT4 
the job of a junior doctor rather than a nurse 
In the last 2 months, I have rushed through outstanding jobs towards the end of iny shift so CLT5 
the next shift did not have to do them 
In the last 4 weeks, I have had to break off from a drug round because I was interrupted by CLT6 
another health professional (e. g. doctor, nurse, physio) 
In the last 2 months, I have refrained from bleeping a particular doctor again because I knew CLT7 
they would be annoyed I had bleeped them several times that shift 
In the last 3 months, I have made or witnessed an error which I did not 'forrnallý' report CLT8 
because the patient wasn't harmed by it in any way 
In the last 6 months, I have formally reported a safety concern on this Nvard/unit/dept '., vithout 
CLT9 C L T 
receiving any feedback 
L 
C L= T ,o In the last 3 months, I have followed instructions against my better j_udgement because a 
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doctor or more senior nurse told ine it was what I should do 
In the last 2 months, a doctor on this ward has refused to wait until I was finished with a CLT11 
particular task before conducting their ward round without me 
In the last 3 months, I have experienced difficulty challenging a doctor about a prescription I CLT12 
thought they had written incorrectly 
BED MANAGEMENT 
In the last 3 months, a patient. fi-om this it, ard has been -slept out* elseýý here but had to retuni BEDI 
the next day because they were unwell 
In the last 3 months, I have been pressured into arranging to discharge a patient quicker than BED2 
had been originally planned 
In the last 3 months, this ward has transferred a patient to another ward during the night or BED3 
early hours of the morning because their bed was needed for another patient 
In the last 3 months, this ward has had an 'inappropriate admission' because A&E did not BED4 
want to breach the 4-hour waiting rule 
In t he last 3 months, this ward has had to rush an existing patient's discharge to admit a neýN BED5 
, patient from MAU or A&E to avoid a patient breaching the 4 hour rule in A&E 
In the last 3 months, a patient has been discharged froin this ward before all the necessary 
BED6 agencies needed to care for them at home (e. g. community nurse, social worker) had been 
arranged 
In the last 3 months, a patient has been 'slept out' to this it, yrd who needed speciallsed care I BED7 
thought this ward could not effectively deliver 
SUPERVISION AND LEADERSHIP 
All senior nurses on this ward/unit/dept dernonstrate a safe example of patient care for staff to SPI follow 
All of the senior nurses on this ward/unit/dept are approachable if a nurse needs help or SP2 
advice with a work issue 
In the last 2 months, a senior nurse has advised me to cut comers in order to complete all SP3 
jobs planned before the end of the shift 
In the last 2 months, I have been confused as to what jobs were supposed to be rny SP4 
responsibility during the course of a shift 
In the last 2 months, senior nurses have been rushing around the ward/unit/dept completing SP5 
most tasks while other nurses have less to do 
In the last 2 months, there has been an important task outstanding at the end of the shift SP6 
\\1hich I didn't do because I thought another nurse had done it 
TRAINING 
In the last 6 months, I have perfon-ned a clinical procedure or used a piece of equipment for TRI 
which I was not formally trained .. 
In the last 6 months, I have been taught a clinical procedure or how to use a piece of 
TR2 
i ing equipment by a nurse N\ho had not received the relevant *fornial' traini 
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In the last 12 months, I have mentored a newly qualified nurse belbre I have attended TR3 L 
mentorship and teaching and assessment programs 
In the last 12 months, all newly qualified nurses starting on this warct/unit/dept have been TR4 
given and have worked through a preceptorship pack 
In the last 6 months, I have booked a training course or study day which was cancelled due TR5 
to budgetary constraints 
In the last 6 months, I have booked a training course or study day xhich was cancelled due TR6 
to a clash with work requirements or staff shortages 
In the last 12 months, all newly qualified nurses starting on this ward. /unit/dept have received TR7 
the standard induction training p rograrnme required 
F-- T WRITTEN POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 
In the last 12 months, there has been discussion of a policy or guideline that I was not aware WPM 
existed until after an incident had occurred 
In the last 12 months, I have signed to say I have read and understood a new policy, WPP2 
procedure or guideline when I haven't either read it or understood it 
In the last 12 months, I have received an updated version of a written policy, protocol or '"TP3 
guideline without knowing which part of the original version had changed 
In the last 12 months, I have been asked to read a written policy, protocol or guideline but WPP4 
only skimmed it to get the gist because it was too long 
In the last 12 months, I have encountered a wi-itten policy or procedure that I thought would WPP5 
be impossible to follow in the course of my job 
In the last 12 months, all the reasons have been rnade clear why a new procedure or policy WPP6 
has been introduced 
* Item codes provided for the purposes of cross-reference in chapter 7 
5.6. Conclusions 
The aim of this study was to conceptualize latent preconditions of medication administration error 
identified in chapter 4 within an organisational safety tool. Employing qualitative data collected in 
study 1, this study explored the ways in which each organisational failure would manifest on a 
hospital ward. Using content analysis of qualitative data obtained In study 1,145 safety indicators 
were generated based on these manifestations of poor safety. Pilot studies to test the face validity of 
indicators and subsequent content analysis to remove less commonly endorsed items led to 
refinement of the tool to develop the 82 item Organisational Safety Questionnaire (OSQ). 
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CHAPTER 6 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE DRUG ROUND BEHAVIOUR 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
II-aA. .......................... k t. 6- ................... i ................................. . ............................. I ........... ýa o"A., 
6.1. Introduction 
In order to show predictive validity, the proposed Organisational Safety Questionnaire (OSQ; see 
chapter 5) should be able to predict medication administration errors. However, this depends on 
there being a readily available valid measure of these types of error. This chapter describes current 
NHS incident report data which are commonly employed within health care research as error 
outcome measures. Multiple drawbacks and biases inherent within such formal reporting systems 
are discussed to emphasise the need to develop an independent error measure which is not reliant 
upon such organisational reporting systems. To inform the development of an independent measure 
of medication errors, medical and psychological literature were reviewed and relevant evidence will 
be presented here which has attempted to understand and categonse everyday errors, medical and 
medication errors. Study 3 will then be described which employed the qualitative data obtained in 
study I to explore the types of medication administration errors which can arise in secondary care 
as a direct or indirect result of the ten latent preconditions identified in chapter 4. The ultimate aim 
of this study was to develop a measure of drug administration errors which was not reliant upon 
adverse patient outcome which cur-rent systems of formal reporting would be unlikely to identify. 
6.2. NHS incident reporting: Problems and biases 
As was noted in chapter 4, the system of reporting incidents in the NHS relies upon staff 
documenting 'significant' incidents such as medication-related events, patient complaints, slips and 
falls, issues with medical records, delayed diagnoses and equipment problems. Staff members are 
required to submit their own details and those of any other staff members involved in the incident. 
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Completed incident forms are reviewed by immediate nursing managers and can either be dealt with 
at a ward level if the incident is relatively minor or will be forwarded to risk management for more 
serious events. There are several fundamental problems with such systems of reporting errors 
which are well documented within the medical literature and are outlined below. 
Underreporting 
One particular shortcoming of NHS reporting systems is that 'most medical errors are not reported* 
(Cullen et al., 1995). It is generally recognised that in the current UK NHS system of error 
reporting, only those errors which have resulted in negative patient outcomes Oudged on a spectrum 
of severity and impact) are commonly reported by clinical team members. While clinical risk teams 
might encourage staff members to report near misses (those errors which had the potential to result 
in an adverse patient outcome but did not), most patient safety researchers agree that this is 
currently not happening (Classen et al. , 1991; Cullen ct al., 1995; Leape, 2000). In a study 
investigating the nature and causes of error in intensive care units, Donchin et al. (1995) found that 
over a period of 4 months, whilst more than 1,000 actual errors were observed (by clinically trained 
observers), only 476 of these were formally reported. In the USA it is estimated that as few as 1.5 
per cent of all adverse events and only 6 per cent of adverse drug events are reported (O'Neil et al., 
1993). Cullen et al. (1995) argue that using incident reports as a proxy measure of errors might 
capture only 5 per cent of actual errors occurring in healtb care practice. Evans et al. (1992) 
revealed a 40-fold increase in detected errors (which had resulted in a negative patient outcome) 
after a computerized medication ordering/transcribing/dispensing system was introduced in one 
hospital. This system automatically detected errors in the medication process from ordering to 
dispensing compared to previous reliance on self-reported medication errors. This is especially 
important since this increase in detected errors involved only those which had resulted in an actual 
outcome and not those near misse's which had been averted, suggesting that even adverse incidents 
are under-reported. 
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This level of underreporting is likely to be the result of a culmination of several factors. One such 
explanation relates to a general lack of clarity amongst health care providers about what exactly 
constitutes an incident, adverse event or error and whose responsibility it is to report them. The fact 
that the NHS reporting system is known as incident reporting without a separate system of reporting 
errors combined with a lack of error training for health professionals is likely to lead to ambiguity 
as to what staff are supposed to report. In a questionnaire study by Evans et al., (2006) both 
doctors and nurses suggested that patient falls were the most important incidents to report while 
drug error near misses were the least important. Staff also suggested they were frequently unsure 
who was responsible for reporting errors and mistakes. Evans et al., (2006) found that doctor's 
decisions not to report errors was governed by a lack of organisational feedback on previously 
submitted reports, the excessive time taken to complete forms and a perception that some errors 
were too 'trivial' to be reported. By comparison, nurses reported an overall belief that near misses 
should not be reported and suggested that incident reports were often not completed if the ward was 
busy. 
Many researchers purport that despite recent plans to improve reporting systems by government and 
senior NHS management bodies, there remains a palpable fear of blame and penalty amongst health 
care professionals reporting errors which may explain the considerable level of underreporting. In a 
qualitative study which explored perceptions of medication error reporting, Osboume et al., (1999) 
found that this fear of reprisal was particularly evident within the nursing community. In the study 
by Evans et al., (2006) nurses were more likely to cite fear of disciplinary action as a barrier to 
incident reporting than doctors. 
In the Department of Health's document Building a safer NHS for patients (2001), 
recommendations are made for NHS organisations to encourage staff reporting of near misses in 
order to improve patient safety and quality of care measures. Among other recommendations, the 
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DoH suggests that organisations need to '... recognise that it is weak systems that create the 
conditions for and the inevitability of error', and that research should '... establish agreed definitions 
of adverse events and near misses for the purposes of logging and reporting them' (DoH, 200 1, pp. 
3). Furthermore, they encourage a 'reporting culture' within the NHS organisation as a whole. 
However, it is clear that at present, reported errors may not represent a useful outcome measure for 
studies of medical error. 
Assumed safety in 'closed' reporting cultures 
Where underreporting of errors exists there will be a level of assumed safety which is largely non- 
representative of actual safety. For example, wards or departments which are more susceptible to 
motivational and attititudinal barriers to reporting (closed reporting culture) will appear as though 
they are relatively safe compared with wards less susceptible to these barriers which report a larger 
proportion of their errors and mistakes ('open' reporting culture). To show validity the 
Organisational Safety Questionnaire (OSQ) should predict medication administration errors. 
However, the literature described above suggests that in fact wards with the poorest levels of safety 
would also be those which reported the fewest errors being those with a closed reporting culture. 
Therefore, such wards may appear safer in terms of the number of errors they report. Conversely, 
wards with more open reporting cultures which report a higher proportion of their errors and 
mistakes could actually represent the safest wards with fewer latent problems. In support of this, 
Cohen et aL, (2005) report an intervention to improve reporting culture in a community hospital 
resulted in an increase in reported drug errors from 35 per 1000 patient days in 2001 to 132 per 
1000 patient days in 2003. Similarly, Leape (2000) revealed a 20-fold increase in the number of 
reported medication errors when nurses were assured they would be immune from disciplinary 
action. 
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With these obstacles in mind, an independent measure of drug administration errors was developed 
with a view to testing the predictive validity of the OSQ. It was the obýjective of this study to 
develop a measure which was reflective of everyday drug administration errors in secondary care 
infon-ned by medical and psychological literature on known types of error. 
6.3. The psychology of human error 
A vast array of cognitive failures such as slips of the tongue and pen, lapses of consciousness and 
perceptual and memory illusions such as false recollection have been observed and documented 
from as far back as the late 1 gth - early 
20th century (Sully, 1881; Paul, 1880; Meringer & Mayer, 
1895; Jastrow, 1905). Over the next 50 years or more, an equally vast range of cognitive theories 
were also proposed to explain these cognitive 'anomalies' such as infon-nation processing 
'bottlenecks' (Broadbent, 1958; Nonnan, 1968) and divided attention theories (Knowles, 1963; 
Kahneman, 1973). Progressively more sophisticated and comprehensive cognitive models of 
explanation were developed towards the end of last century which attempted to incorporate both 
correct performance and error forms within the same conceptual framework (Newell & Simon, 
1972; Nonnan & Shallice, 1980). 
Perhaps the most notable psychological theory of human error was proposed by Rasmussen and 
Jensen (1974), originating ftom case studies of technicians in industrial installations. Their skill- 
rule-knowledge framework distinguished between three levels of information processing; skill-, 
rule-, and knowledge-based, which relate to the degree of conscious control an individual can exert 
over any given activity. When faced with a situation which is unfamiliar and novel, an individual 
must perform the task in a wholly conscious manner applying an analytical approach using stored 
knowledge. This mode of operation is known as the knoit, ledge-based level of performance and 
requires considerable mental effort to assess, respond and monitor actions to achieve optimum 
performance and avoid errors. Errors made at this level are likely to occur as a result of incomplete 
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or inaccurate knowledge or 'resource limitations' (Reason, 1990). At the opposing end of 
functioning is the Skill-based level of perfon-nance. This behaviour occurs when individuals are 
highly practiced in a task which requires little conscious effort to execute and will subsequently be 
performed in an automated manner. Because of the automated unconsciously monitored nature of 
such tasks, errors at this level often occur as a result of lapses of attention or distractions. 
In an extension of Rasmussen's skill-rule-knowledge framework (1983), and based on extensiý, e 
evidence obtained using diary studies (Reason, 1979), Reason (1987) proposed three basic error 
types: skill-based slips and lapses, rule-based mistakes and knowledge-based mistakes conceptually 
known as the Generic Error Modelling System (GEMS). As well as incorporating Nonnan's 
slip/mistake dichotomy (Norman, 198 1), GEMS also acknowledges the existence of rule violations 
as a distinct forrn of unsafe act identified as particularly important in high risk industries but 
previously ignored by other error theories (Lawton, 1998). 
Slips, lapses, mistakes and violations 
Reason (1990) describes an error as; '... a planned sequence of mental or physical activities which 
fails to achieve its intended outcome ... when these 
failures cannot be attributed to the intervention 
of some chance agency'. His conceptual Generic Error Modelling System (GEMS) distinguished 
three basic error types; slips and lapses, rule-based mistakes and knowledge-based mistakes which 
can be fundamentally dichotomised as actions which do not go as planned (slips and lapses) and 
plans which are inadequate (mistakes). Reason categorises slips and lapses as common when 
individuals execute highly familiar routine tasks with little conscious effort at a skill-based level of 
perfon-nance (Rasmussen, 1983). He defines these types of errors as those which result from 
'failure in the execution of an action sequence, regardless of whether or not the plan which guided 
them was adequate to achieve it's intended outcome'. In this way, slips can be observed as 
actions-not-as-planned' (e. g. slips of the tongue) and lapses as more coven failures (e. g. lapses of 
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memory) which may not necessarily result in observable behaviour or negative outcome by anyone 
other than the protagonist. 
By comparison, Reason defines mistakes as 'deficiencies or failures in the judgemental and/or 
inferential processes involved in the selection of an objective or in the specification of the means to 
achieve it'. In other words, mistakes are errors which represent a failure in the formation of an 
accurate plan of action and the means by which to achieve this goal. Reason acknowledges that this 
form of error often goes undetected since individuals perceive their action sequences to be accurate 
in achieving their desired goal and as such do not always result in a negative outcome. As an 
extrapolation of Rasmussen's framework, Reason's distinguishes between rule-based and 
knowledge-based mistakes which operate respectively at the rule-based and knowledge-based 
performance levels of Rasmussen's model. Unlike slips and lapses which occur at an automated 
level of sensory infon-nation processing, rule-based and knowledge based mistakes are more likely 
to occur when individuals are involved in some conscious problem solving actiVity. Knowledge- 
based mistakes occur when individuals have inappropriate or insufficient information upon which to 
formulate their decision or action plan. By comparison, rule-based mistakes occur when individuals 
either do not know or understand the rules which apply to the current circumstance, or they 
misapply the rule due to lack of experience or knowledge. 
It is important at this stage to emphasise that although GEMS comprised three basic error types, 
Reason also makes the distinction between these 'cognitive aberrations' and more deliberate 
violations of practices deemed by the organisation to be necessary for the safety of the system 
(Reason, 1993). He acknowledges that while violations are Intentional deviations from practice 
they are less likely to involve deliberate sabotage of the system, although this can occur in rare 
cases. Moreover violations are likely to be intentional but 'nonmalevolent infringements' of safe 
practice. Reason makes the further distinction between routine i4olations, governed by a 
human 
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tendency to take the 'path of least effort' in an 'indifferent environment' which neither monitors nor 
punishes violations and reasoned violations (which can be situational, exceptional or optimising) I 
which individuals believe they have good reason for making. Time constraints, unusual 
circumstances and policies which do not seem to fit the current circumstances are often cited as 
reasons for these types of violation. Later work by Reason, Parker and Lawton (1998) 
distinguished between 10 types of rule-related behaviour governed by the presence or absence and 
correct or incorrect application of appropriate rules or procedures. 
It would be useful here to place this theory into relevant context for this research by providing 
health care specific examples of each error type. A slip or lapse in the medication delivery process 
could manifest as a physician unintentionally prescribing 5mg instead of 0.5mg, a pharmacist 
forgetting to add a solution to an IV fluid preparation order due to an interruption during the process 
or a nurse picking up the wrong IV fluid which has similar packaging to the one required. Mistakes 
on the other hand are notoriously difficult to detect. This is particularly true of rule-based mistakes 
which could be alternatively construed as deliberate violations depending on the protagonist's 
intention. A rule based mistake could occur if a paediatric doctor follows a treatment regime 
relevant for a 10 to 15 year old child when the patient is 10 years old but very small for her age, 
potentially leading to overdose. A doctor who prescribes and a nurse who subsequently administers 
Heliclear without knowing the medication contains penicillin to a patient with a known penicillin 
allergy are both examples of knowledge-based mistakes. 
Violations from safe practice are commonplace in everyday life (e. g. driving 35mph in a 30mph 
speed limit area, driving through an almost red traffic light because we are late for an appointment 
etc. ). Although violations from safe practices in health care are also likely due to the sheer 
proliferation of safety rules which must be adhered to, they are unlikely to be fon-nally reported, due 
in part to the fact that the outcome of violations is not always negative (Lawton & Parker, 2002). 
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For this reason, such deviations from rules and procedures can become tacitly accepted p tice rac 
over time either at an individual, team or organisational level (Reason et al., 1998). For example, 
cross-checking patient's identity wristbands with their drug charts before administering their 
medication is a well-documented example of a safety rule often broken for a variety of reasons 
(Murphy et al., 2007; Howanitz, Renner & Walsh, 2002; Skibinski et al., 2007), yet would be 
unlikely to be reported as a safety concern unless a significant and negative patient outcome had 
occurred as a result. 
6.3.1. Understanding medical error 
In the medical field, Pani and Chariker (2004) have drawn upon Reasons GEMS model to some 
extent in their attempt to explain errors which occur in medicine. They present examples of 
cognitive functioning and malfunctioning in health care which are likely to lead to slips, lapses, 
mistakes and violations. For example, they suggest that many procedures in health care become so 
routinely executed that individuals perform them with little conscious attention, often on 'automatic 
pilot' which can lead to slips and lapses of attention, particularly when individuals attempt to multi- 
task. Pam and Chariker refer also to the unpredictable nature of medical care which can actively 
prevent effective memory aids commonly employed such as chunking34 . They argue that when 
workload is beyond the capacity limits of working memory, important aspects of a task necessary 
for problem solving and decision making Will be pushed out of working memory. Pani and 
Chariker note that sequencing tasks in times of high workload is an essential skill in health care, yet 
constant interruptions prevent this ability, placing further demands upon working memory. They 
suggest that interruptions can lead to a belief that an individual was further along in the process than 
they were, thus skipping components of a task, or else repeating elements they had already 
completed. They add that it will be infinitely more difficult for an individual to remember where 
they were in a process when it was interrupted if the task is familiar or routine and emphasise that 
34 A cognitive strategy for making more efficient use of short-term memory by recoding information. 
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the activity of medication administration is particularly susceptible to the effects of interruptions, 
excessive workload (which in turn leads to high levels of stress) and automatic pilot. 
In a more overt attempt to utilise psychological error theory, Zhang et al., (2004) propose an 
'action-based cognitive taxonomy' of medical errors based predominantly upon Reason's GEMS 
model and Norman's seven-stage action theory (Norman, 1988). Focussing on slips and mistakes, 
Zhang et al. propose that errors can occur at any of the seven stages of action 35 . By extending 
Reason's definition of errors which focussed upon sequences of action, to include processes of 
evaluation following actions (e. g. misinterpreting feedback from medical equipment), they suggest 
both medical slips and mistakes can be conceptualised as either errors of execution or evaluation. 
However, there has been no further published evidence to support this taxonomy or to suggest it has 
been applied to measure errors in health care. 
6.3.2. Patient safety taxonomies 
Alongside research to understand the nature of human error, there have been significant attempts to 
classify and measure a wide variety of human errors. Many of these attempts have been to 
categonse errors specific to particular safety-critical industries such as aviation (Funk, 1991; 
Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997), nuclear energy (Smidts, Song-Hua & Mosleh, 1995) and railway 
networks (Gibson, Megaw, Young & Lowe, 2006). Of particular interest to this study are the 
multiple efforts to categonse medical errors or other aspects of patient safety. In order to develop a 
measure of medication administration errors, it would be useful to know the ways in which these 
errors have been categorised in the patient safety literature. Table 6.3.2. a provides a brief summary 
of four international patient safety classification systems which are most commonly utilised in a 
number of countries to classify medical errors. 
35 Establishing the goal, forming the intention, specifying the action specification, executing the action. 
perceiving the system state, interpreting the state, evaluating the system state with respect to goals and 
intentions (Norman, 1988) 
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It is immediately apparent from Table 6.3.2. a that there is considerable variation in the methods 
employed by the four international classification systems to categonse incidents and errors. 
Furthermore, variability in defining errors and incidents within these taxonomies make it difficult, if 
not impossible to know what types of errors or incidents occur in health care environments. 
Furthen-nore, several of the models purport to capture 'events', 'errors' and 'incidents' yet 
published articles did not make it clear how and at what point in analyzing reported problems this 
distinction was made. For example, Van der Schaaf (2005) suggests that the Eindhoven model 
captures active and latent errors. However, this suggests that latent conditions are an outcome 
rather than the consequence. Although Reason (1990, pp. 20) acknowledges that latent conditions 
were originally referred to as latent errors, these types of problems should be referred to as latent 
failures since they do not necessarily involve error or failure but represent conditions under which 
errors are more likely to occur. Furthermore, this author could find no published data on how active 
errors were subcategorized by this model or any other taxonomy reviewed. In terms of the 
development of a measure of drug administration errors, these taxonomies provided little value. 
There is however, a particularly notable taxonomy of medication administration errors which is 
employed widely in the US. This taxonomy was developed by the National Coordinating Council 
for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention (NCC MERP), formed in 1995 from 24 US national 
health care organisations. A primary objective of this alliance was '... to develop standardization or 
classification systems for the collection of medication error reports so that databases will reflect 
reports and grading systems' (NCC MERP, 1995). The NCC MERP group developed an index for 
categorising medication errors (since revised in 2001) based on nine criteria including error type, 
severity and patient outcomes. Of interest to this research is their category 'error type' which is 
subdivided into 12 types of medication error and presented in Table 6.3.2. b. Although adopted by 
many national organisations; and health care institutions in the US, the NCC MERP taxonomy has 
come under criticism for its lack of empirical reliability and validity. Attempts to address this 
by 
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Forrey et aL, (2007) revealed 'high to near-perfect' inter-rater reliability kappa coefficients usinL, 27 
medication error scenarios across all 9 index categories. However, whether the NCC MERP 
taxonomy is a valid index of medication errors remains to be seen since no published data could be 
found which has attempted to examine its validity. 
However, individual components of this taxonomy have been supported across a number of clinical 
areas in secondary and tertiary care hospitals. There is considerable evidence for example in the 
field of paediatrics; 
Improper dose (Raju et al., 1989; Kaushal et al., 2001; Paton & Wallace, 1997) 
Wrong drug (Selbst et al., 1999; Wilson et al., 1998; Ross et al., 2000) 
Wrong route of administration (Kaushal et al., 200 1; Kozer et al., 2002; Prot et al., 2005) 
Wrong frequency of administration (Raju et al., 1989; Vincer et al., 1989; Bordun & 
Butt, 1992) 
0 Dose omission (Aneja et al., 1992; Nixon & Dhillon, 1996; Schneider et al., 1998; Herout 
& Erstad, 2004) 
0 Wrong patient (Paton & Wallace, 1997; Selbst et al., 1999) 
0 Wrong rate of IV drug administration (Vincer et al., 1989; Paton & Wallace, 1997; 
Blum et al., 1988). 
Several other studies have attempted to measure the incidence of multiple types of MAEs. For 
example, Bates et al., (1995) carried out the Adverse Drug EventS36 Prevention Study to examine 
the frequency, type and preventability of medication errors associated with adverse outcomes on 
medical and surgical wards. All ADEs (n=247) occurring over a6 month period in II inpatient 
units in two US hospitals, formally reported by health care professionals and recorded by 
independent observers and chart reviewers were examined. This study identified 8 of the 12 NCC 
MERP MAE categories. Analysis revealed the most common type of MAE was 'ýNrong dose' 
"I an injury resulting from a medical intervention related to a drug' (Bates et al., 1995) 
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(classified as under- and over-dose) which accounted for 27 per cent of all medication errors. In a 
similar study, Malyn-Haw, Dickens & Stubbs, (2005) employed the NCC MERP taxonomy as a 
basis for quantifying MAEs occurring in one UK mental health hospital over a 29 month period. 
This study revealed support for 7 of the 12 NCC MERP MAE categories. In a US study of MAEs 
occurring over a3 month period in 5 intensive care units, Calbrese et A, (2005) found support for 6 
of the 12 categories. A summary of results for each MAE types relative frequency for each of the 
three studies are presented in Table 6.3.2. b. 
Table 6.3.2. b: Support for NCC MERIP medication error taxonomy 
NCC MER P No. of medication administration errors - 
medication error type Medical/surgical (Bates et al., 1995)* 
Mental health 
(Malyn-haw et al., (2005)t 
Intensive Care 
(Calbrese et al., 2001)A 
Dose omission 10(8%) 19(17%) 27(14%) 
I Over-dose 34 27% mprope. 
d Under-dose 
) ( 35(31%) 22(12%) 
ose Extra-dose 3(2%) 
Wrong strength 0 0 4(2%) 
Wrong drug 15(12%) 23(21%) (<I%) 
Wrong dosage form 5(4%) 2(2%) 0 
Wrong technique 18(14%) 0 0 
Wrong rout 
.e 
of 
administration 
3(2%) 2(2%) 0 
Wrong Too fast 0 0 75(40%) 
rate Too slow 
Wrong duration 0 0 0 
Wrong time 9(7%) 6(5%) 26(14%) 
Wrong patient 0 2(2%) 0 
.1 
Monitoring error 1 (<I%) 0 0 
*Percentages calculated from 126 total medication administration errors over fj monin periou 
t Percentages calculated from 112 total medication administration errors over 29 month period 
APercentages calculated from 187 errors measured over 3 month period 
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As this table shows, several of the NCC MERP MAE categories were not supported by some (e. g. 
wrong patient/wrong rate) or all three (e. g. wrong duration) of these studies. However, MAE 
categories overall were reasonably represented in three distinct fields of health care and so were 
considered an appropriate taxonomy on which to base the development of the drug administration 
error tool in study 3. 
6.4. Drug Round Behaviour Questionnaire 
It was necessary to consider several important criteria in the development of the DRBQ: 
0 Broad spectrum of errors - it was anticipated that by using the NCC MERP taxonomy of 
medication errors that this would be achieved. 
0 Tangible items - items were translated from interview and incident report excerpts which 
were considered directly observable and phrased as such. It was hoped that this would also 
ensure items were objective and not subject to interpretation. 
0 Concise scale - although a broad spectrum of medication errors was necessary to reflect 
nursing practice it was also necessary to ensure the scale was as short as possible to improve 
response. It was the intention to generate items to represent each of the 12 NCC MERP error 
types (see Table 6.3.2. b). 
0 Not reliant upon adverse patient outcomes - it was acknowledged that there were 
considerable biases within the current system of NHS incident reporting whereby only events 
which result in negative patient outcome are generally reported which may lead to 
underreporting (see section 6.2. ). For this reason, care was taken to phrase items which did 
not refer to patient outcome which could also encapsulate near misses. It was hoped that this 
would foster respondents' trust, increase the likelihood they would respond honestly, 
therefore providing a more accurate reflection of actual errors and near misses than currently 
captured by formal incident reporting systems. 
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6.4.1. Method 
Using the NCC MERP taxonomy as a template, interview and incident repori data collected during 
study I (see chapter 4) were reviewed with a view to extracting examples of each type of 
medication administration error 37 . Participants were not directly asked about any errors they or 
others had made during interviews since it was not the original aim to produce a drug error tool (see 
appendix VIII for interview schedule). Interviewees were however invited to use their own 
experiences of error to illustrate any points they made and so interview data was considered an 
appropriate source of data. 
Interview transcripts and incident reports were reviewed using the same method of translating 
excerpts into items described in chapter 5 (section 5.2), with a view to developing examples of each 
of the 12 NCC MERP medication administration error types. 
6.4.2. Results 
Examples of each error type were extracted (where evident) and translated into DRBQ items. Table 
6.4.2. a provides examples of each error type 38 , qualitative excerpts and their translated 
items. All 
excerpts provided in this table were taken from incident reports since this proved the best data 
source of actual drug errors. For details of qualitative data sources see chapter 4, sections 4.2.2 and 
4.2.3. 
37 Observational data was not used in study 3- since it was not possible to identify errors during observations 
38 Not all translated items are shown since many were removed during subsequent pilot studies. 
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Table 6.4.2. a: Translation of raw excerpts into DRBQ items using NCC MERP categories 
NCC MERP 
error type 
Qualitative raw extract* Translated DRBQ item 
In the last 4 weeks, I have 
Dose omission 
incorrect1v withheld dose of morphine slow 's 
withheld or almost 
withheld a dru which relea e during am drug round' g 
should have been 
administered 
In the last 4 weeks, I have 
... Mrs. * given 500mgs offrusemide instead of 
given or almost given a 
250mgs in error' patient the wrong 
dose of 
the correct medication 
In the last 4 weeks, I have 
,... patient prescribed 500mgs IV eiý, th rom ivin, 
infused or almost infused 
but infused . 1gram in error' 
an incorrect volume of IV 
Improper dose fluid to a patient (e. g. 
75mls instead of 50mls) 
In the last 4 weeks, I have 
given or almost given a 
... patient prescribed insulin on insulin chart, patient a dose of a drug 81 units prescribed and nearly given. Should which was 10 times more 
have been 8.1 units' or less than it should have 
been (e. g. 25mgs instead 
of 2.5mgs) 
Wrong strength 
Combined with 'improper dose' above. NCC MERP do not clearly 
' ' ' ' dose strength and distinguish the difference between 
In the last 4 weeks, I have 
over 2 days the patient was given the wrong given or almost given a 
Wrong drug medication, 4 doses ofprazocin have been patient a different drug to 
given instead ofpizotifen' the one they should have 
received? 
In the last 4 weeks, I have 
Wrong dosage ... gave a child of 13 years 15mls instead of given or almost given a form prescribed 15mgs of oromorph' patient the wrong unit of a 
drug (e. g. mcgs instead of 
mgs)? 
*All excerpts from incident report review data 
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Table 6.4.2. a: continued 
NCC MERP 
error type 
Qualitative raw extract* Translated DRBQ item 
In the last 4 weeks, I have 
given or almost given a patient 
Wrong medication using the wrong 
technique 
No examples in data technique (e. g. wrong 
technique when crushing 
tablets, omitting necessary 
aspects of drug preparation) 
I gave prescribed dihydrocodeine 1`1 In the last 4 weeks I have 
Wrong route of rather 
than IM' given or almost given a patient 
administration medication via one route 
(e. g. 
... mistakenly instilled ear drops into IV) when it should have been 
patient's eye' given by another (e. g. orally)? 
In the last 4 weeks, I have 
commenced IV saline with 2 7mmols of infused or almost infused IV 
Wrong rate KCI to be infused over 8 hours but given fluid over an incorrect time 
over] hour' period (e. g. over 8 hours 
instead of 16) 
Wrong duration Combined with 'wrong rate' above. NCC MERP 
does not clearly 
' ' ' ' distinguish between rate and duration . 
In the last 4 weeks, I have 
accidental second dose ofparacetamol given or almost given a patient 
given to patient in same meds round' the same medication twice in 
the same medication round 
In the last 4 weeks, I have 
given or almost given 
... patient administered IC antibiotics 
3 medication to a patient too Wrong time hours before it was due' soon after their last dose (e. g. 
only 4 hours after previous 
dose instead of 8 hours) 
In the last 4 weeks, I have 
'... drug discontinued on the 14"' but had given or almost given a patient 
been signed as being administeredfrom the a drug which I later discovere 
14 h to the I 9th by two nurses' should have been withheld or 
discontinued 
*All excerpts from incident report review data 
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Table 6.4.2. a: continued 
NCC MERP Qualitative raw extract* Translated DRBQ item error type 
In the last 4 weeks, I have 
I was doing a medicine round at 2 1: 00 and I given or almost given a 
gave medication prescribedfor patient x to patient medication which 
patienty' was intended for a 
different patient 
Wron atient gp 
In the last 4 weeks, I have 
,... patient given IV meropenem labelledfor given or almost given a ' 
anotherpatient as part of his take home medicine' patient someone else s medication to take home 
upon discharge 
,... methadone liquid lmg- in Im1found to have In the last 4 weeks, I have 
th 
expired on the 24 . Patient concerned has been given or almost given a 
given 20mls on 4 different occasions by 7 patient medication which 
members of staff' had expired 
,... patient states allergic to penicillin. Allergy 
In the last 4 weeks, I have 
band in situ but Ifailed to check before 
given or almost given a 
patient medication without Monitoring administering Heliclear. No adverse reaction. 
' checking their allergy/ID error Monitoredfor 48 hours 
wristband 
In the last 4 weeks, I have ,... patient allergic to codeine. Documented in given or almost given a 
admission notes, allergy band in situ and patient a drug that they documented on drug chart in red ink. cocodamol were allergic to (e. g. 
given on 29hafter being prescribed on prn side Heliclear with penicillin 
chart' 
I allergy) 
* All excerpts from incident report review data 
Following test construction recommendations, to develop twice the number of items required (Clark 
& Watson, 1995; Kline, 2002), a total of 27 items were generated from qualitative data excerpts 
which represented 10 of the 12 NCC MERP error types. Error types 'NNrong 
duration' and '\\, rong 
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rate' were collapsed as were 'wrong strength' and 'improper dose' since NCC MERP definitions 
made little distinction between these types and it was not always clear from the reported Incidents 
which type of error had been involved. To account for this, multiple items were developed to 
represent wrong duration/rate and wrong strength/improper dose collapsed categories. The error 
type 'wrong technique' defined by the NCC MERP taxonomy as; '... using an inappropriate 
technique to administer medication... ' (e. g. crushing tablets which should be given whole) was not 
reflected in the incident data. To overcome this, one item was developed to represent this error type, 
adapted from published examples on the preparation and administration of medication by the 
American Society of Consultant Pharmacists (ASCP, 1993). It is important to emphasise that 
interview data yielded very few examples of MAEs, perhaps because at the time of conducting 
these interviews, this was not an aim of the study and so participants were not directly asked to 
provide examples. Interviews may also have been less appropriate for gathering data in view of 
reservations about disclosure. To illustrate this point, Table 6.4.2. b indicates the frequency with 
which each MAE category was endorsed overall and between the two data sources. 
Table 6.4.2. b: Endorsements of each NCC MER-P error type by data source 
NCC MERP error Data source 
type hicident reports Interviews Total 
Improper dose/strength 122 3 125* 
Dose omission 84 7 91 
Wrong time 75 1 76* 
Wrong drug 69 0 69* 
Monitoring error 55 5 60* 
Wrong patient 33 0 33* 
Wrong route of admin 28 1 29 
Wrong rate/duration 16 0 16 
Wrong dosage form 
Wrong techniquel 
3 0 3 
* Error types with two or more translated items 
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In line with previous research (Bates el al., 1995; Malyn-Haw et al., 2005), Table 6.4.2. b shows that 
administering an improper dose to a patient was the most frequently endorsed error type followed 
closely by dose omission. NCC MERP error types were well represented in the incident report data. 
Two or more items were generated for 4 of the error types due to the volume and complexity of tile 
data since it was unclear which of the items would best represent the MAE category. For example, 
the category 'wrong time' was translated into 3 items as the incident data suggested that a patient 
could be administered a medication at the wrong time in a number of ways which would not have 
been encapsulated within a simple 'have you administered a medication to a patient at the wrong 
time' question. Furthermore, the ways in which medication could be administered at an incorrect 
time were also likely to be affected by distinct causes and so multiple items were needed to reflect 
this. To illustrate this point, incident data revealed three main ways a patient could receive a 
medication at the wrong time; 
1. Twice in the same medication round. This could be due to a lapse in attention due to 
interruptions or poor communication. 
2. Administering medication too soon after the last dose. This could be due to an administrative 
error (e. g. illegible handwriting) or poor communication (e. g. believing a previous dose had not 
been administered). 
3. Administering withheld drugs. This which could be due to poor design of documentation, 
illegible handwriting, a lapse in concentration due to interruptions or poor communication. 
6.5. Pilot study 
This study was conducted to assess the face validity of developed DRBQ Items with the ultimate 
aim of removing items which nurses thought were rare or had poor validity. It was the aim of this 
study to reduce the overall questionnaire length of the DR-BQ to approximately 10- 15 items, based 
on recommendations to increase response rates (Edwards et al., 2002). 
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6.5.1. Method 
Participants and recruitment 
Thirty senior nurses who worked on four wards which comprised surgical, paediatrics and a large 
medical admissions unit (MAU) from the collaborating hospital were invited by letter to participate 
in this pilot study. Since the final study would involve hospi II ital-wide dissemination of the final 
questionnaire to this hospital it was important that the same participants were not repeatedly asked 
to complete questionnaires to reduce response fatigue. Participants were therefore advised they 
should not have already participated in previous pilot studies associated with this research. As with 
pilot studies conducted for study 2, participants were advised that this study was testing the 
workability of a new questionnaire which had been developed by researchers at the University of 
Leeds to measure the frequency of 'clinical events and near misses associated with medication 
administration' which did not harm the patient. It was hoped that using non-judgemental language 
framed as near misses would encourage uptake. Participants were advised their participation would 
involve completing a short questionnaire (approximately 5-10 minutes) and a short task 
(approximately 10 minutes). As with the pilot for study 2, participants were offered paid lunch and 
a flO incentive to participate. Eighteen nurses agreed and consisted of three sisters, eleven senior 
staff nurses and four junior staff nurses from the MAU and surgical wards. 
Design 
DRBQ 
The DRBQ was presented in a folded booklet forniat in a similar way to the OSQ in study 2 (see 
chapter 5, section 5.4). Both university and collaborating hospital logos were printed on the front 
page which comprised a participant information sheet (appendix XIII) followed by DRBQ items in 
the booklet centre. Only the final DRBQ items are presented in this chapter (see Table 6.5.2.2). As 
with the OSQ, participants were instructed to respond to each question on a 5-point Likert scale 
from 'not at all' (1) to 'nearly all the time' (5) with an additional 'not applicable' option. All items 
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were phrased as 'given or almost given' medication, to incorporate near misses. Participants were 
assured their responses were completely anonymous and they were under no obligation to respond 
to any questions they felt uncomfortable answering. 
Face validity task 
This task was designed to measure the face validity of the DRBQ. A booklet forinat was used for 
participants to complete this task (appendix XIV) which instructed them to read each of the 27 
DRBQ items and respond to all questions as either yes or no in terms of, 
1. Comprehension - did the question make sense? Participants asked to proVide further comment 
if the answer was no. 
2. Frequency - were participants able to judge the item by its frequency of occurrence? (i. e. is the 
problem particularly common or rare). It was anticipated that even if respondents had said the 
drug error had not happened to them in the last 4 weeks it may have been that 4 weeks was an 
inappropriate time scale for a particular item. 
3. Examples - were respondents able to think of any examples of when such an event might have 
occurred either to them or to someone they know? It was anticipated that even if participants 
had said an item had not occurred to them in the last 4 weeks they may have been likely to 
admit they knew it had happened to someone else. Items which respondents said they could not 
think of a single example could therefore be judged as an anomaly and removed. 
At the end of this task sheet, participants were offered the opportunity to make any other comments 
regarding the DRBQ or describe any other types of drug administration errors they thought were 
significant but which had not been included. 
Procedure 
Ten minute meetings were scheduled with recruited participants to 
describe the nature of the 
research and the purpose for completing the validity task (since participants 
had not been involved 
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with previous stages of the research). Meetings were also intended to encourage and improve the 
likelihood that responses would not be affected by fear of reprisal. Due to the particularly sensitive 
nature of this pilot study, it was emphasised that the DRBQ was not an audit tool but a simple 
assessment of the validity of a general measure of drug round behaviour and that data would not be 
fed back to the organisation. Participants were assured their responses were completely anonymous 
and confidential available only to the principal researcher at the University of Leeds. While 
participants were given the opportunity to withdraw from the study at any time, no individual chose 
to do so. Participants were given 'task packs' which contained a participant infonnation sheet, a 
copy of the DRBQ, the face validity task and a freepost envelope with which to return completed 
documents anonymously to the principal researcher. All 18 participants returned completed packs. 
6.5.2. Results 
Results will be discussed separately in terms of the face validity and also response variability. 
6.5.2.1. Face validity 
This task was designed to measure the face validity of the DRBQ in ternis of comprehension, 
likelihood of occurrence and ability of participants to think of examples. Overall, participants 
responded that they had no problems with any of the 27 items in terms of thinking of examples or 
estimating the frequency each event occurred. This indicated that all items were relevant, current 
and frequent examples of drug administration errors. Several participants 
indicated they did not 
understand one or two of the items. However, no participant indicated the same item as 
being 
problematic or provided ftirther comment on why the question was not understandable or 
how it 
could be changed and so no items were removed at this stage. 
Lack of negative response on this 
task could indicate that there were no problems with any of the items. 
However, there was some 
degree of missing data and acquiescent responding (e. g. broadly circling the yes response 
for all 
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items down the page rather than circling yes for each item) which suggested that participants may 
not have taken the task as seriously as was necessary. It is possible that asking participants to 
complete this task face-to-face would have improved this type of responding. However, when 
invited to make any further comment about the questionnaire, most respondents made comments 
which were generally positive. In view of the lack of useful data yielded by this task and a need to 
remove redundant items, a meeting was set up with two of the matrons originally recruited for study 
I (see chapter 4) but who had not participated in this pilot study, with a view to discussing any 
items which they thought had poor face validity. Matrons said they had no problems with the face 
validity of any item but suggested that several items (n=12) appeared to be asking the same thing. 
Since both matrons independent of one another suggested changing or removing the same items, 
these 12 items were reduced to 6 by collapsing items or removing items which were virtually 
identical to another; leaving 21 items. 
6.5.2.2. Response variability 
Since it was an aim of this study to produce a measure which was approximately 10-15 items in 
length, variability in responding was analysed with a view to removing items which yielded reduced 
variability. Results revealed 8 of the 21 items had floor effects and were consistently answered 'not 
at all' by all 18 respondents (these errors had not happened in the last 4 weeks) and so were 
removed. It was possible that the time frame was inappropriate for these items. However, time 
constraints for this study meant that it was not possible to re-examine the time frames further (i. e. it 
was not known what would have been more appropriate time frames for these items) and conduct 
another pilot study before study 4. Also, the main purpose of developing twice as many items as 
the number needed was to allow for the removal of items such as these. Table 6.5.2.2. shows 
responding frequencies for the remaining 13 items. 
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The majority of items showed a reasonable distribution of responses considering the sensitive 
nature of the questions, with very few 'not applicable' responses. However, data did indicate that 
there remained a positively skewed distribution in favour of 'not at all' responses for most items. Of 
particular interest are items 4 and 11 to which the majority of participants responded 'not at all'. 
Given the possible consequences both to patients and to nurses committing errors reflected in these 
particular items (e. g. administering lOx the prescribed dose and administering medication to which 
a patient is allergic), this skewed response was to be expected. It is likely that these errors were 
considered by respondents as potentially more serious. This skewed response could also indicate 
respondents were not convinced their information would be treated confidentially. In this case, 
respondents may have attenuated the actual frequency of these behaviours. Alternatively the 
response bias may represent an accurate frequency of this behaviour. Since the final validation 
study (chapter 7) would administer these items to approximately 200+ participants, it was 
anticipated that this analysis would enable the removal of any further redundant items and so it was 
therefore decided that all 13 items would be retained. 
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6.6. Conclusions 
This study aimed to develop a measure of medication administration errors which was broad yet 
concise and not reliant upon adverse patient outcome with which to test the predictive validity of 
the Organisational Safety Questionnaire (OSQ). The 27-item Drug Round Behaviour Questionnaire 
(DRBQ) was developed using the NCC MERP taxonomy of 10 medication error types as a basis for 
item generation from qualitative data obtained in study 1. A pilot study and subsequent analysis of 
responding variability was conducted to measure the face validity of the measure and response 
patterns to items, resulting in the removal of 14 items. The remaining 13 which had good face 
validity and a reasonable response distribution items measure 7 types of drug administration error; 
wrong drug, wrong dose, wrong patient, wrong time, dose omission, wrong rate/duration and 
monitoring error. The 13-item DRBQ will be embedded within the 82 item OSQ for the final 
validation study (study 4 described in chapter 7). Further analysis on the scale reliability of the 
DRBQ and its concurrent validity with formally reported medication errors will be reported in 
chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 7 
VALIDATION OF THE ORGANISATIONAL SAFETY 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
............ ....... ....... ....... 1.1.66 ...... ...... I ............ ....... ...... ................... 
7.1. Introduction 
Study 4 was the final stage of this research and was conducted to measure the validity and 
reliability of the Organisational Safety Questionnaire (OSQ) according to the following criteria; 
0 Internal reliability - whether the overall OSQ scale and 10 component scales reveal good 
levels of internal consistency of responding. 
Concurrent validity - whether responses on the OSQ are correlated with a previously 
validated measure of organisational safety. 
Criterion validity - whether scores on the OSQ predict scores on an independent criterion 
measure (e. g. measure of drug administration errors) 
7.2. Method 
Materials 
The OSQ comprised 82 items which were considered to reflect a broad range of latent conditions 
(see chapter 4 for descriptions). Items were arranged in random sequence with no definition or 
reference to any of the 10 latent variables reflected in the items (as there was with the pilot studies - 
see chapter 5). Drug Round Behaviour Questionnaire (DRBQ) items were randomly placed 
amongst OSQ items to attenuate the risk of participants responding in a socially desirable or 
consistent manner. It was expected that had DRBQ items been presented separately participants 
may have anticipated the purpose of the study and responded accordingly. Research suggests 
embedding items which comprise an instrument intended to support the predictive validity of 
another instrument (as opposed to administering the measures separately) will reduce criterioti 
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contamination and lessen the chance that participants are aware of the expected outcome of the 
measures (Clark-Canter, 2004). Three additional validated items were embedded within the final 
questionnaire from the Hospital Suti, ey on Patient Safety Culture (Sorra & Nieva, 2004) regarding 
the likelihood of reporting errors. Since research has indicated errors are generally underreported 
(see chapter 6, section 6.2), it was hypothesised that these items would provide useful information 
on the fori-nal reporting habits of nurses in general and highlight any differences between 'safe' and 
4unsafe' wards (i. e. those with high and low OSQ scores respectively). These items were 
considered to capture the frequency of reporting adverse events in a way not represented by other 
OSQ items; 
1. When a mistake is made that could harm the patient, but does not, how often is this reported on 
your ward/unit/dept? 
2. When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the patient, how often is 
this reported on your ward/unit/dept? 
3. When a mistake is made, but has no potential to harm the patient, how often is this reported on 
your ward/unit/dept? 
Participants were instructed to respond to each question from 1 (not at all) to 5 (nearly all the time) 
or answer 'not applicable' if they felt the question was not relevant in their role. The questionnaire 
was printed in a booklet fon-nat with a participant information sheet on the front page which gave a 
brief description of the purpose of the research, instructions on how to complete the questionnaire 
and assurances of confidentiality and anonymity. Participants were also given the contact details of 
the principal investigator in case they wished to find out more about the study before participating. 
OSQ/DRBQ items were presented in the middle pages of the booklet with demographic questions 
detailed on the back page. Demographic items were taken from the Hospital Sui-vev on Patient 
Safety Culture (Sorra & Nieva, 2004) and asked participants for details such as length of nursing 
experience, number of hours worked per week and staff position (see appendix XII for full 
questionnaire). One further item was taken from this survey which asked respondents to grade their 
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ward/unit on patient safety (from failing to excellent). Participants were also given a large space in 
which to write any additional comments (Dillman, 2000). 
Several recruitment strategies highlighted in a recent systematic review of methods to improve 
response rates to postal questionnaires (Edwards et al., 2002) were employed. Edwards et al. 
reviewed 75 strategies for improving postal questionnaire uptake from 292 randomised controlled 
trials. Those strategies which were significantly successful in improving response rates and 
appropriate for this study are described here; 
0 Short questionnaires - Attempts had been made to keep the questionnaire as short as 
possible and answerable within 15 minutes allowing for the number of variables being 
measured (see chapter 5). The questionnaire was also printed in a double sided booklet to 
make it look shorter. 
0 Personalised questionnaires and letters - Access was given to a Human Resources 
database of all the names of every qualified and unqualified nurse working in the 
collaborating hospital. One questionnaire was sent to every nurse with a letter of 
introduction from the principal researcher addressed to each nurse by first name (see 
appendix XV). Each cover letter was signed by hand (Dodd & Markwiese, 1987). 
Monetary incentive - The collaborating hospital expressed concern that providing monetary 
incentive would discourage participants from participating in future in-house non- 
incentivised research such as clinical audits, and so participation in this stage of the research 
was not incentivised. 
0 Use of coloured ink - All questionnaires and cover letters were printed in coloured ink. 
0 Enclosing stamped return envelopes - Participants were provided with a freepost envelope 
addressed to the principal investigator at the University of Leeds with which to return 
completed questionnaires. It was hoped that this would also encourage participants to feel 
confident their individual responses would be treated confidentially which would in turn 
improve response rates. 
0 Contacting participants before sending questionnaires -A short email introducing the 
research project and advising nurses that they would be sent a questionnaire in the following 
2 weeks was written by the principal investigator and forwarded to all nurses by the Chief 
Nurse who also added her endorsement of the project. 
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Providing non-respondents with second copy of the questionnaire - Questionnaires were 
administered twice in 3 months. It was not possible to follow up non-respondents since all 
questionnaires were anonymous and so questionnaires were sent to all qualified nurses twice. 
0 Questionnaires originating from universities more likely to be returned than from other 
sources (e. g. such as commercial organisations) - All questionnaires and cover letters bore 
the University of Leeds logo and reference to the principal investigator being employed by 
the University of Leeds. The collaborating hospitals logo was also provided on this 
paperwork. 
In order to measure the concurrent validity of the OSQ, 9 items from a recent validated behavioural 
measure of localised safety culture (7he Safety Organising Scale; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007) were 
also added to the questionnaire. Because the response scale for these items differed from the OSQ, 
these items were presented separately from OSQ items. The 9-item Safety Organising Scale is a 
unidimensional behavioural measure of safety culture in secondary care nursing units with high 
internal reliability and good criterion validity with medication errors and other patient safety 
outcome measures. Participants are required to respond to 9 positively framed items on a Likert- 
type scale from I (not at all) to 7 (to a very great extent) (see appendix XII for items). 
Participants 
Although the OSQ was developed from information provided by qualified nurses working 
predominantly in the field of general medicine and elderly care, it was an objective of this stage of 
the research to determine to what extent the tool was generalisable beyond this sample. It was 
decided that all grades of qualified and unqualified (e. g. nursing assistants, student nurses, health 
care assistants) nursing staff working in two hospitals at the collaborating NFIS Trust would be 
sampled (n=201 0). The number and type of nursing staff who responded to the questionnaire xxill be 
presented in section 7.3.1 With a discussion of the generaliseability of the tool. 
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Procedure 
An email was forwarded to all potential participants which briefly described the purpose of the 
research (to explore aspects of the ward and hospital environment which make errors more likely) 
and encouraged nurses to complete the OSQ. All participants were then posted the OSQ with 
freepost envelopes with which to return completed questionnaires to the University of Leeds. Each 
questionnaire was sent with a personalised hand signed letter to each participant. All questionnaires 
were batch coded in order to determine the unit or ward each respondent was from but not the 
identification of individual participants (to maintain anonymity). Coding questionnaires in this way 
resulted in a clearer picture of the departments for whom the questionnaire was and was not 
applicable. Participants were asked to complete and return questionnaires within four weeks of 
receipt. A further email was sent two weeks after receipt to encourage nurses to complete their 
questionnaires, endorse by the Chief Nurse. Three weeks after the initial deadline had passed, the 
OSQ was resent to all participants (since questionnaires were anonymous and so non-responders 
were not known) to improve response rates. 
7.3. Results 
The OSQ was administered in two recruitment rounds to qualified and unqualified nurses (n=2010) 
from two Bradford hospitals in a three month period. All collected data was entered into the 
statistical package SPSS and analysed for generaliseability, validity and reliability. Results are 
presented in this section under each component heading. 
7.3.1. OSQ generaliseability 
After administering the questionnaire to 2010 nurses, 642 questionnaires were returned which 
represents an overall response rate of 32 per cent. After initial examination of completed 
questionnaires it became evident that a considerable number of OSQ items were 
largely not 
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applicable (NA) for many respondents (as indicated by a high degree of NA responding). Since it 
was a broad objective of developing the OSQ that items should be generalisable to as many 
different types of nursing staff in as many specialities of care as possible (to obtain the rnost holistic 
picture of ward and hospital activity) analysis was carried out to examine the type of nurses and 
departments for which the OSQ was most appropriate. It was possible that NA responding was 
entirely random; certain individuals in a variety of departments simply struggled to answer some 
questions (particularly since the items were developed with qualified nursing staff in general 
medicine only). It was also considered a possibility that particular grades of nurse (e. g. unqualified) 
could be skewing these responses particularly since the questionnaire was developed in 
collaboration with qualified nurses only. In order to examine this, questionnaire data was separated 
by self reported nursing grade and analysed for NA responding to OSQ items for each group. Table 
7.3. La summarises these findings. It should be noted that all data reported in this section relates to 
OSQ items only (n=82), since DRBQ items (n=13) were included in this study solely to test the 
criterion validity of the OSQ. These findings will be discussed separately in section 7.3.5. 
Table 7.3.1. a: Not applicable responding by nursing grade (n=642) 
Nursing grade* N Mean % NA (Std) Median % NA Min-Max % NA 
Matron 9 9.93 (13.62) 3.53 0-42.35 
Sister 112 20.04 (19.73) 13.53 0-76.47 
Senior staff nurse 141 14.57 (18.02) 5.88 0-71.76 
Staff nurse 196 16.72 (19.93) 8.24 0-84.71 
Student nurse 8 24.56 (21.97) 19.41 0-57.65 
Midwife 42 26.44 (20.51) 20.00 0-71.76 
Health Care Assistantt 83 45.24 (17.42) 43.53 17.75 - 98.82 
, 
ýýO-týert 
51 1 40.55 (24.86) 37.65 4.71-95.29 
*Sorted in order of seniority 
t Nursing grades with worst levels of NA responses which were removed after analysis 
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Not applicable responses were converted into percentages of OSQ responses overall. This was 
done to take missing data into account which for some participants was considerable. For example, 
if a participant had responded to only 60 of the 82 OSQ items, leaving 15 items blank their NA 
response rate was calculated as a percentage of the items they responded to (60) rather than all 82 
items. Mean and median % NA scores by type of nursing grade were calculated and findings 
revealed that OSQ items were generally not applicable to health care assistants (unqualified) and 
respondents describing themselves in the 'other' category (e. g. nurse researchers, theatre 
technicians etc. ). This was generally anticipated since these types of nurses were not involved in 
any stage of developing the OSQ. Additionally, OSQ items were those thought to cause errors in 
the administration of medication which is an activity neither group would be involved in. Therefore 
these individuals would be less familiar with the likelihood and frequency of these indicators of 
safety failure. Responses from these participants were excluded from further analysis (n=134). A 
further 13 cases were removed due to missing data levels which exceeded more than 35 per cent of 
respondents data set for OSQ items. 
Ranges and standard deviations for the remaining 6 nursing groups indicated there was still a high 
degree of within-group NA responding and median scores suggested that OSQ items were still 
generally not applicable to some individuals. It was possible that the questionnaire was not relevant 
for particular specialties and so NA responses were examined by ward/department. Table 7.3.1 -b 
shows the wards/departments for whom the OSQ was least applicable based on median NA 
responding and respective ranges. Data from these departments (n=14) were removed from further 
analysis. 
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Table 7.3.1. b: OSQ least applicable wards/departments 
Department N Mean % NA (Std) Median 
% NA* Min-Max 
Theatres - Modular 11 35.08 (8.36) 36.47 23.53 - 51.76 
Antenatal 5 42.82 (5.56) 42.35 34.12 - 48.24 
Theatres - ENT 2 42.35 (14.98) 42.35 31.76 - 52.94 
ENT Outpatients 12 44.71 (12.90) 45.89 21.18 - 65.88 
Theatres - general 2 46.48 (2.50) 46.48 44.71 - 48.24 
Radiology 5 46.82 (10.17) 48.24 34.12 - 56.47 
Orthopaedic Outpatients 6 52.94 (11.21) 50.00 42.35 - 71.76 
Diabetology 3 34.51 (29.88) 51.76 0-51.76 
Dermatology 6 56.86 (18.57) 54.71 32.94 - 84.71 
Community midwifer 15 43.62 (24.74) 55.29 3.53-71.76 
Pre-assessment Ward 7 60.00 (8.56) 55.29 52.94 - 72.94 
Dept of infect. disease & sex. health 5 60.24 (12.21) 57.65 44.71 - 75.29 
Pae iatric OPD 3 54.90 (10.87) 61.18 42.35 - 61.18 
Pain therapy 2 73.53 (4.16) 73.53 70.59 - 76.47 1 
It was important to distinguish between departments with outlier scores affecting the mean and 
range and those units for whom the OSQ items were generally inapplicable. Therefore mean 
scores, standard deviations, median and score ranges were obtained. Results revealed departments 
with the highest mean and median % NA responding levels and relatively small standard deviations 
were indicative of those for whom OSQ items were generally not applicable. These departments 
(n=14) were removed from further analysis as it was clear that for these departments the OSQ was 
not relevant. Additionally, data from these cases (n=128) would not be useful for subsequent factor 
analysis. Even though one aim of factor analysis would be to remove redundant 
items (thus 
reducing the overall % of NA responses), it was felt that departments with a mean NA response rate 
of 25 per cent or more with little within-group variance were unsuitable cases. 
Notablv, 
departments for whom the OSQ was not relevant were generally outpatients departments, 
day units, 
III very non-ward based units (e. g. community midwifery) or highly specialised areas which were 
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distinct from the sample of wards the OSQ was developed with (e, g. department of infectious 
diseases and sexual health). Therefore it is unsurprising that these wards had such high rates of NA 
responding. A total of 128 cases across 20 departments were excluded from further analysis. An 
additional 39 cases were also removed with more than 25 per cent NA response. It was considered 
that even with the removal of items during factor analysis, the OSQ was generally not applicable to 
these individuals who came from a variety of departments and nursing groups. The data set now 
comprised 328 cases which represented 6 types of qualified nurse working in 34 clinical areas. 
Sample details will be presented in section 7.3.3. It should be acknowledged here that although 
preliminary screening of data in this way is not generally reported to this degree, it was an 
important objective of developing the OSQ that the tool was generalisable beyond the clinical 
speciality in which it was developed. Therefore, reporting details on the types of participants and 
multiple clinical areas for which the OSQ is applicable highlights that this objective was generally 
met and is invaluable information for future use of the tool. 
Item variability 
Responses to OSQ items were also examined to eliminate items which were redundant or exhibited 
no variability. 
Redundant items 
After removal of nursing groups and clinical specialties for which the OSQ was generallY not 
applicable, some individual OSQ items still had high levels of NA responding. In order to make the 
OSQ as generalisable as possible to the remaining sample, NA responses for each item were 
calculated. The following items were deemed to have high levels of NA responding (>30 per cent 
of the remaining 'relevant' sample of 328 considered the item NA). Table 7.3.1. c shows items 
removed from further analysis on this basis sorted in descending order of NA response levels. 
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Table 7.3.1. c: Items with >30% NA responding (n=7) 
Latent No of NA 
variable 
Item responses 
(% of sample) 
Bed In the 
last 3 months, this ward has had to rush an existing 
management3 patient's 
discharge to admit a new patient from MAU or 120(371. o) 
A&E to avoid a patient breaching the 4 hour rule in A&E 
Workload' In the 
last 4 weeks, the number of doctors arriving for 119(36%) 
morning ward round has slowed my drug round progress 
Workload' In the 
last 4 weeks, I have sped up during a drug round to 115(35%) 
avoid a backlog of jobs later in the shift 
Workload' In the 
last 4 weeks, I have sped up during a drug round to 108(33%) 
avoid making the next drug round late 
Bed hi the 
last 3 months, this ward has had an 'inappropriate 
Management3 admission' 
because A&E did not want to breach the 4-hour 105(32%) 
waiting rule 
Workload' In the 
last 2 months, I have been unable to coordinate the 102(31%) 
ward/unit/dept because of my patient allocation 
In the last 4 weeks, I have had to break off from a drug round 
Ward climate' because I was interrupted by another health professional (e. g. 101 (31%) 
doctor, nurse, physio) 
It is unclear why these items in particular had such high levels of NA responding although several 
reasons are postulated for each item; 
I. These items relate specifically to conducting a drug round. Although the nurses and 
departments remaining in the sample were considered to be those which routinely engage in 
drug rounds, interviews With nurses during study 1 revealed that not all qualified nurses carry 
out drug rounds on a regular basis. 
2. This item relates to coordination of a ward, an activity which may be restricted to only the 
most senior nurses (e. g. matrons and sisters only) rather than all qualified nurses. 
3. These items related to a specific safety concern which involves rushing existing patient's 
discharges and accepting inappropriate admissions from the Medical Admissions Unit 
due to 
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the A&E 'breach-rule'. It is possible that this is something which largely happens only in 
general medicine (where the item originated from) due to the nature of this clinical specialty. 
NA response data was recalculated for each individual after removal of the above items. A final 17 
cases were removed from further analysis due to having more than 25 per cent NA responses; 
leaving 311 cases and 75 items. 
Poor variability 
Although participants were given a 5-point Likert response scale from I (not at all) to 5 (nearly all 
the time), the overall variability in responding was very low and both histograms and K-S values 
(Kolmogorov-Smimov) revealed every remaining OSQ item (n=75) was significantly positively 
skewed. Comparable evidence of skewed item responses when administering a similar health care 
measure of teamwork and safety climate was found by Hutchinson et al., (2006). This study 
revealed weak discrimination between 'agree slightly' and 'agree strongly' responses. 
To rectify this skew, a number of different transformations were carried out on the dataset including 
reciprocal, logistical and square root transformations in an attempt to attenuate the skewness of data 
and secure more normal distributions before factor analysis was conducted. However, distributions 
were so skewed that transforming the data in this way had little effect, and in some cases made the 
skew worse. It was hoped that collapsing the five response categories into three response groups 
(not at all; occasional ly/quite often; frequently/nearly all the time) would reduce this skew. 
It Unfortunately this was not the case and this method did little to improve response di I 
was also considered that by transfon-ning the data from a scale response to a dichotomous response 
(yes / no) the problem with skewed responding would disappear altogether (collapsing all 2-5 
responses into 'yes' and leaving response I- currently 'not at all' as a 'no'). 
However, it was an 
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important objective of this study to measure the underlying structure of the OSQ which would 
ultimately involve factor analysis. Since factor analysis is not recommended for dichotomous data 
(Kim & Mueller, 1985; Streiner, 1994; Polit, 1996) because this type of data influences the 
correlation between constructs and potentially introduces significant amounts of measurement error, 
response categories were not collapsed in this way. Therefore the decision was made to retain the 
data in its current 5 point response scale and remove items which showed the worst variability 
(hence those which were most positively skewed and had the highest K-S values) in responding. 
The items which had the highest K-S values and lowest mean scores (n=12) were removed from 
further analysis and are reported in Table 7.3. l. d. 
Although the remaining 63 items were significantly positively skewed (as indicated by statistically 
significant K-S values), histograms indicated these distributions were not as problematic as K-S 
values would suggest and so the remaining items were retained for further analysis 39 . Although it is 
acknowledged that it is not ideal to conduct factor analysis on data which is not nonnally 
distributed, it is widely accepted that questionnaire items which are particularly sensitive will 
inevitably yield responses which are skewed to some extent (Tourangeau & Smith, 1996; Giles & 
Field, 2006). 
39 It should also be noted that it is well documented that with large samples, even the slightest skew will result 
in significant high skewness statistics and large K-S values. Under these circumstances researchers are urged 
to use histograms with corresponding normality curves to observe skew (Field, 2005). 
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In summary, preliminary screening of the data led to the removal of 331 cases and 7 items due to 
high levels of 'not applicable' responses. A further 12 items were removed due to reduced 
variability in responses. All analyses reported in subsequent sections are therefore based on a 
dataset of 311 participant's responses (from 34 clinical areas) to 63 OSQ items. 
7.3.2. Underlying structure of the OSQ & internal reliability 
In order to determine whether items were representative of their relative latent variables and 
whether these variables reflected one concept of 'organisational safety', factor analysis was carried 
out. It was anticipated that factor analysis would support a 10 factor solution. Since the test 
construction was still deemed to be at an exploratory stage of development, it was decided that 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) would constitute the most appropriate method of analysing the 
data 40 . Although EFA is constrained by assumptions of normality, Costello and Osboume (2005) 
recommend that in cases where data 'severely violates' assumptions of normality (as was the case 
in this study) principal axis factoring is a more appropriate method of analyzing data than either 
confirmatory factor analysis or the most commonly employed principal components analysis 
(PCA)41 
Initially, the factorability of the 63 OSQ items was examined. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of 
sampling adequacy was . 85, well above the recommended value of .6 
(Hutcheson & SofToniou, 
1999, pp. 224-5), and Bartlett's test of spheiicity was also significant (X 
2 (1953) = 5526.65, p 
001) (Field, 2005, pp. 640). With only 5 exceptions (items M, TC9, LWC1, WPP6 and TRI 
were removed from further analysis; see table 5.5. b for item codings), communalities were all 
40 Had the sample been larger, it would have been useful to randomly divide the sample in two and conduct 
EFA on one half and CFA on the other (Hutchinson et al., 2006). 
4' They suggest that unlike principal components analysis, principal axis factonng discriminates and 
'partitions' the shared variance of each variable from both its unique variance and error variance to reveal an 
underlying factor structure and therefore not as susceptible to the effects of non-normally 
distributed data. 
They claim that PCA should be used where the main purpose is data reduction and not exploring any 
underlying structure of the data caused by latent variables which ývas the aim of this study. 
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above . 3, further confirming that each item shared some common variance with other items (Field, 
2005, pp. 640). Given these overall indicators, principle axis factoring was conducted with the 
remaining 58 items. 
Principle axis factoring revealed a 17-factor solution (eigenvalues >1) which accounted for 48 per 
cent of the overall variance in scores. Factor I explained 20 per cent of this variance and comprised 
40 items. Factors 2-17 accounted for between 3 and less than I per cent of the variance each but 
were generally uninterpretable and predominantly freestanding one item factors. Hutchinson et al., 
(2006) suggest this can occur when trying to measure more than one underlying factor and 
recommends factor analyzing each proposed variable. In their study, teamwork and safety climate 
items were factor analysed respectively to reveal two- and three factor solutions. Unfortunately, in 
this study high levels of not applicable responding had led to the removal of a considerable number 
of items, which meant there were too few items remaining in some of the latent variables (e. g. bed 
management, workload etc. ) to conduct separate factor analyses. 
To avoid over-extraction of factors, Costello and Osbourne (2005) recommend examination of the 
scree plot for the natural bend in the data. This analysis suggested a one-factor solution. Since only 
one factor was extracted, rotation was not applied to subsequent analyses. Using an iterative 
process to remove items loading on factors 2-17, cross-loadings and then any items loading <. 4 on 
factor I (recommended when participant to item ratio is <1 0: 1; Field, 2005), the best solution was 
obtained from 28 items with factor loadings ranging from . 41 to . 70 
(see appendix XVI for 
remaining items and individual item loadings). This factor reflected one construct named 
organisational safety which, due to the large range of items subsumed in this construct with good 
factor loadings, was considered to have good content validity (Clark-Canter, 2004). After redundant 
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items had been removed', the overall one factor solution accounted for 26 per cent of the variance 
in scores. This scale revealed high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha . 90). No substantial 
increases in alpha could have been achi is ieved by eliminating further items. Although factor analys' 
had not extracted the 10 latent variables proposed, reliability analysis was carried out on the items 
which remained of each latent variable to examine internal consistency of subscales and determine 
whether future analyses could be conducted using these subscale. Overall results are reported in 
Table 7.3.2. 
Table 7.3.2: Alpha coefficients for 9 remaining latent variables 
Latent cause No. of items Scale reliability 
Team communication 6 . 73 
Routine procedures 2 . 45 
Workload 2 . 62 
Human resources 4 . 63 
Local working conditions 4 . 54 
Ward climate 4 . 56 
Bed management 2 . 39 
Supervision 2 . 23 
Written policies and procedures 2 . 49 
Overall 28 . 90 
Although the OSQ was successful in measuring organisational safety overall, factor analysis 
revealed that the 10 proposed subscales representing each latent variable did not emerge. Possible 
methodological reasons behind this will be discussed in section 7.4 
42 TC3, TC7, RP1, RP2, RP3, RP4, RP6, RP8, RP9, HR3, HR5, HR7, HR8, HR9. LWC2, LWC5, CLTI, 
CLT3, CLT4, CLTIO, BEDI, BED7, TR4, TR6, TR7, WPP3, WPP4, WL6, SPI, SP2 were all removed (see 
chapter 5, table 5.5. b for complete item listing with corresponding codes). 
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7.3.3. Descriptive statistics 
SaMPle details 
The OSQ was considered relevant for all qualified nurses working in 34 clinical areas (see section 
7.3.1, Tables 7.3.1. a & b). Of the total number of participants for whom the OSQ was considered 
relevant (n=918), 367 nurses responded (before removal of all not applicable cases). representing a 
40 per cent response rate. Comparable response rates were found in a similar study conducted in 
secondary care to measure the validity and reliability of the Teamwork and Safety Climate Survey 
(Hutchinson el al., 2006). After removal of not applicable cases, the sample comprised of 8 
matrons, 60 sisters, 94 senior staff nurses, 126 staff nurses, 4 student nurses and 19 midwives (total 
n=31 1). The majority of nurses stated they worked between 20-39 hours per week (83 per cent), 
with 5 per cent working fewer and 12 per cent working more hours per week than this. In terins of 
the number of years nurses had worked on their current K, ard, 8 per cent had worked there less than 
a year, 39 per cent between 1-5 years, 25 per cent between 6-10 years, 10 per cent between 11-15 
years and 18 per cent said they had worked there for 16 years or more. To retain anonymity, no 
other personal details were asked of participants. 
Patient safety culture and incident reporting 
As mentioned previously, 4 items were added to the OSQ from the Hospital Sunvy on Patient 
Safety Culture (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). One item asked respondents to grade their ward/unit on 
patient safety from failing to excellent. It was anticipated that these grades would be associated 
with scores on the OSQ. Individuals with the poorest levels of safety (as indicated by high scores on 
the OSQ) would be more likely to assess their wards as poorer in terms of patient safety compared 
to individuals working on 'safer' wards. Results revealed 5 per cent of the sample rated it as 
. good' and 
15 per cent as 'failing' or 'poor', 33 per cent as 'acceptable'. 47 per cent as 'ver\ 
'excellent'. The remaining three questions measured the frequency of reporting errors 
dependent on 
the outcome, from I (not at all) to 5 (nearly all the time). 
Mean responses are presented in Table 
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7.3.3. Notably, participants said they were more likely to report mistakes nearly all the time they 
occurred when the mistake could have harmed the patient (question 1) than when it had been caught 
and corrected (question 2) or had no potential to harm the patient (question 3). A one-way within- 
subjects ANOVA revealed this difference was statistically significant (F (1.93,540.8343ý = 31.05, 
p<. 00 1). 
Table 7.3.3: Likelihood of reporting mistakes 
Item Mean 
(Std) 
1. When a mistake is made that could harm the patient, but does not, how often 3.64(1.36) is this reported on your ward? 
2. When a mistake is made, but is caukht and corrected before affecting the 3.03(1.33) 
patien , 
how often is this reported on your ward? 
3. W en a mistake is made, but has no potential to harm the patient how often 3.20(1.39) 
is this reported on your ward? 
Good internal consistency of items (Cronbach's alpha = . 73) allowed a reporting 
likelihood scale 
score to be calculated for further analysis. The mean reporting likelihood score for the sample was 
3.29 (std. 1.10). 
The 9-item Safety Organising Scale (SOS) was also administered within the OSQ questionnaire 
(Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007) in order to examine concurrent validity of the OSQ measure (see section 
7.3.4). This scale involves responding to positively framed items from I (not at all) to 7 (to a very 
great extent). Descriptive statistics revealed an overall sample SOS mean of 4.61 (Std. 1.25) and 
excellent consistency of items (Cronbach's alpha = . 
93). 
43 Since Mauchley's test of sphericity was significant - values reported using greenhouse-Geisser correction. 
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OSQ items 
Since factor analysis did not extract the 10 latent variables proposed and reliability analysis 
revealed poor to moderate alpha coefficients for remaining latent variables, all statistics conducted 
in remaining sections will be based on the overall 28-item organisation safety construct (see 
appendix XVI for final questionnaire). Participants were required to respond to all items from I (not 
at all) to 5 (nearly all the time). It is important to emphasise here that high OSQ scores are 
reflective of poor organisational safety. To deal with missing data the following procedures were 
followed; 
1. NA and missing responses were recoded to zero so they would not affect the overall sum 
2. A worst possible OSQ outcome score was calculated for each participant based on the number 
of non-zero responses multiplied by 5 (the highest response option indicating the indicator 
occurred nearly all the time). This provided a value which was reflective of the highest OSQ 
score each participant could have had based on the number of items they had completed. For 
example, if a participant had responded to 23 out of the 28 possible items, their worst possible 
OSQ score would be 115 (23 x 5). 
3. A sum of all responses was calculated (including zero responses which would not affect this 
sum) and divided by the 'worst possible OSQ outcome' score and multiplying by 100 to 
provide a percentage (Brace et al., 2003, pp. 133). Hypothetically, a participant who had 
responded 5 (nearly all the time) to all 28 items would have an OSQ percentage score of 100, 
indicating the worst levels of safety on that ward. 
The overall mean OSQ percentage score (referred to from this point forward as just OSQ score) for 
the sample (n=311) was 40.24 (Std. 11.19). In order to illustrate whether the OSQ could 
discriminate between different types of clinical areas, a two-way between-groups ANOVA was 
conducted on 5 wardS44 chosen as being of similar size with similar response rates. Results revealed 
44 Five wards were chosen simply to illustrate this point as opposed to testing the difference 
between all 
wards (which was also significant overall), the reporting of which (including post-hoc tests 
for each 
significant difference) would have been beyond the bounds of this section. 
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an overall significant difference in OSQ scores between a neonatal unit, the maternity del]VerV 
suite, an adult female surgical ward, a renal dialysis unit, and a large paediatric medical ward (F 
(4,68) = 17.98, p<. 001). Post hoc tests revealed that the paediaftic medical ward had significantlý, 
higher OSQ scores (indicating the poorest levels of safety) than other 4 wards measured. 
DRBQ items 
Preliminary analysis of Drug Round Behaviour Questionnaire items revealed data was significantly 
positively skewed (as indicated by K-S values and histograms). Data was so skewed in fact that no 
single item had been answered 'nearly all the time' or 'frequently' (2 of the 5 response options). 
Although reduced variability was anticipated to some degree given the sensitive nature of these 
items, the pilot study carried out in study 3 suggested there would be a little more variability in the 
data (see chapter 6, Table 6.5.2.2. a). To enable useful analysis, responses were collapsed 
dichotomously into 'yes' (any response between 'occasionally' and 'nearly all the time') and 'no' 
(retaining 'not at all' response) categories. Because of this, factor analysis to explore the 
underlying structure of this measure was not possible. Nevertheless, reliability analysis revealed a 
Cronbach's alpha coefficient of . 68 which was deemed fair considering the limited range of 
responses. It was not possible to simply calculate a sum of the number of medication 
administration errors (MAEs) to which each participant had responded 'yes' (they had executed in 
the last 4 weeks) since there were still not applicable and missing data within this dataset. Instead, a 
frequency percentage of all MAEs was calculated by counting the total number of 'yes' responses 
per participant and dividing by the number of valid (as opposed to non-valid missing or not 
applicable responses) DRBQ responses multiplied by a hundred. This value therefore represented 
the frequency with which MAEs had been committed as a percentage of the number of DRBQ items 
participants had answered. The mean frequency of MAEs in the 4 weeks preceding administration 
of the tool for the overall sample was 10.70 and ranged from 0 (no errors executed) to 91.67 (12 of 
the 13 MAEs executed). 
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In order to determine whether it was possible to distinguish between wards on DRBQ scores, a one- 
way between-groups ANOVA was conducted. Using the same 5 wards described earlier as an 
example, there was a statistically significant difference between DRBQ scores across the 5 wards (F 
(4,68) = 2.77, p<. 05). Post-hoc tests revealed that the paediatric medical ward had significantly 
higher DRBQ scores (indicating they had committed significantly more errors) than the other 4 
wards measured. This was consistent with this ward having the highest OSQ scores. 
7.3.4. Concurrent validity 
An important objective of study 4 was to measure the concurrent validity of the OSQ - that is the 
extent to which it was associated with a similar measure. The 9-item Safety Organising Scale 
(SOS; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007) was considered a suitably comparable measure with which to 
achieve this since it has been found to be a statistically valid (concurrent with similar measures) and 
reliable self-report measure of nursing behaviour which encapsulates underlying safety culture. 
Pearson's correlation analysis revealed a statistically significant association between individual's 
OSQ and SOS scores (r = -. 40, p<. 001) and therefore good evidence of concurrent validity. This 
relationship was inverse because higher scores on the OSQ indicated poor levels of safety (since 
items were negatively framed) whilst higher levels on the SOS indicated a good safety culture 
(these items were positively framed). 
The OSQ was developed as a ward-based tool (as opposed to a measure of individual perception) 
and it was anticipated that wards with the highest OSQ scores (based on their aggregate OSQ score) 
would also be those with the worst ward safety cultures (as measured by the SOS) compared to 
wards presenting lower safety risks. Pearson's correlation analysis revealed a significant association 
between ivard OSQ and ward SOS scores (r = -. 69, p<. 001). Wards with higher OSQ scores were 
those with the lowest SOS scores supporting the validity of the OSQ as a ward-based measure. 
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7.3.5. Criterion validity 
The main aim of developing the OSQ was to construct a proacth, e measure of organ'satlonal safety 
which could predict future MAEs. Therefore, scores on the OSQ should be able to predict scores 
on a measure of drug administration errors. However, as previously discussed, inherent bi Wi 'ases ith 
current system of NHS reporting cast considerable doubt on whether data from incident reports 
would be a useful or accurate reflection of error occurrence (see chapter 6, section 6-2). To account 
for this, the DRBQ was developed as a measure of specific drug administration errors which nurses 
had previously been willing to report fon-nally (since many of these items were developed from 
incident report data; see chapter 6) but which were framed as potential near mi in an attempt to sses 
encourage 'open' reporting. It is acknowledged that predictive validity measures are ideally 
administered after the measure being validated (Clark-Canter, 2004), however time and sample 
accessibility constraints in this study meant that this was not possible and so all items were 
administered at the same time. Regression and correlational analyses were performed to test five 
research questions. 
1. Does the OSQ predict medication administration errors? 
Linear regression analysis was carried out to determine whether scores on the OSQ would predict 
the number of MAEs committed in the previous 4 weeks as measured by the DRBQ. Analysis 
revealed OSQ scores were significantly predictive of scores on the DRBQ (F (1,309) = 67.82, p<. 00 1) 
and accounted for 18% of the variance in MAE scores (Adjusted R' = . 18; 
p= 
. 43). 
Individuals 
who had high OSQ scores (indicating poor safety levels on their ward) admitted making 
significantly more MAEs in the previous 4 weeks than those with lower OSQ scores. 
Since scores on the OSQ were shown to be significantly associated with scores on the SOS and 
previous research has shown the SOS to be predictive of formally reported medication errors 
(Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007) multiple linear regression analysis using the enter method was conducted 
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to determine which of the two safety measures would be a better predictor of MAE frequency. 
Table 7.3.5. a summarises these findings. 
Table 7.3.5. a: Multiple linear regression analysis: 
Comparison of the predictive validity of OSQ and SOS scores 
Model Beta t 
Adjusted 
R2 
R2 
change 
F Sig. 
1: Only SS scores -. 19 3.30 
1 
. 03 . 03 10.91 . 001 
2: SOS & OSQ scores . 43 7.27 . 18 . 15 32.85 . 000 
Entering SOS scores as the first predictor variable, results revealed that model I was a significantly 
predictive of MAE scores (F (1,298) ý 10-9L P'ý'--005) and accounted for 3 per cent of the variance 
(Adjusted R2= . 03; 
P=-. 19). The inclusion of OSQ scores into the model in step 2 resulted in an 
additional 15 per cent of the variance in DRBQ scores being explained (AR' = . 15; 
P= 
. 43) and as 
such was a significant predictor of DRBQ scores (F (2,297) = 32.85, p<. 001). Although Vogus and 
Sutcliffe (2007) found the SOS to be significantly predictive of medication incidents, these results 
show the OSQ to be a better predictor of MAEs. This finding was to some extent anticipated since 
the OSQ was designed specifically to predict medication administration errors and comprised more 
items of a significantly broader range than the SOS to reflect this. 
2. Does the OSQpredictformally reported incidents? 
It was hypothesised that underreporting biases in forinal NHS incident reporting systems would 
make these incidents an unsuitable outcome measure against which to test the predictive validity of 
the OSQ. Nevertheless, Vogus and Sutcliffe (2007) report that in their study the SOS successfully 
predicted 'fon-nally reported medication errors' and 'patient falls'. To measure whether 
OSQ scores 
would be similarly predictive of formally reported errors, data was gathered 
from the collaborating 
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hospital on the number of Formally Reported Incidents 45 (FRIs) in the 3 months preceding the 
administration of the questionnaire 46 - Data was collected on 5 types of incident-, patient slips and 
falls, near misses, medication incidents; blood transfusion incidents and fluid i fusion incidents. in I 
Because this data was only available at a ward level, mean OSQ, DRBQ and SOS scores were also 
calculated for each ward (n=34). To account for the substantial difference in ward sizes and patient 
intake (and the number of staff working on each ward) the total number of incidents was calculated 
as a function of the number of qualified nurses working on each ward to obtain an average number 
of reported incidents (the total number divided by the number of staff on the ward). In doing this, it 
was hoped that a fairer comparison of incident frequency could be made. For example, the ICU is a 
very large department employing almost 70 qualified nurses and will undoubtedly report a 
significantly larger number of errors than the breast care unit which is comparatively small 
employing only II qualified nurses. Preliminary correlation analysis between OSQ scores and all 
five types of incident are presented in table 7.3.5. b. 
Table 7.3.5. b: Correlations between FRIs and OSQ scores 
Formally Reported Incidents OSQ score (Sig. ) 
Patient slips and falls (p . 
26 
= . 15) 
Near misses (p . 
04 
= . 83) 
Medication incidents (P . 
001 
=. 9 9) 
Blood transfusion incidents (p . 
32* 
= . 08) 
Fluid infusion incidents (p 
-. 10 
= .5 7) 
. 33* Mean number of incidents I L (p = .0 7) 
* Correlations almost signiticant at the . 0-ý level 
45 These events are referred to as 'incidents' rather than errors since it is not known whether the events had 
occurred as a direct result of error. 
46 Although this was almost 3 times longer than the frequency critena on the DRBQ (the pre\-Ious 4 Nýeeks). 
comparatively small numbers of reported events meant that a longer time period was necessary. 
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As this table shows, there were no statistically significant associations between OSQ scores and any 
of the 5 types of FRI or the mean number of FRIs. However, since the relationship between the 
mean number of FRIs and OSQ scores was approaching significance (p=. 07'), linear regression 
analysis was conducted to explore whether OSQ scores were significantly predictive of the mean 
number of FRIs overall. Using the enter method, results revealed that OSQ scores were not 
significantly predictive of the mean number of FRIs (F (1,30) = 3.63, p =. 07) and accounted for only 
8 per cent of the variance (Adjusted R' = . 08; P= . 33). 
As correlation analysis suggested, regression analysis revealed that OSQ scores did not predict any 
of the 5 independent types of FRIs alone, with medication incidents having the worst relationship 
2 
with OSQ scores (F (1,30) ý . 000, p =. 99; Adjusted R=-. 03; 
P= 
. 001). It is important to note 
however that the beta values for the relationship between OSQ scores and blood transfusion 
incidents and mean incidents overall (. 32 & . 33 respectively) were quite 
high considering there 
were so few cases (e. g. 34 wards) entered into the model. It is proposed that by increasing the 
statistical power (i. e. obtaining data from more wards) it is likely that this relationship would have 
reached significance. Table 7.3.5. c summarises these findings. 
Table 7.3.5. c: Summary of linear regression analyses for OSQ scores and 5 types of FRI 
Regression 
LI 
Beta 
I 
t 
I 
Adjusted R' F Sig. 
1: OSQ scores & patient slips/falls . 26 
1.47 . 04 
2.16 . 15 
2. OSQ scores & near misses . 04 . 
21 -. 03 . 05 . 
83 
3. OSQ scores & medication incidents . 
00 . 01 -. 
03 . 00 . 
99 
4. OSQ s ores & blood transfusion incidents . 32 
1.82 . 07 
3.32 . 08 
5. OSQ scores & fluid infusion incidents -. 10 -. 57 -. 
02 . 33 -. 
57-il 
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Vogus and Sutcliffe (2007) found SOS scores to be predictive of formally reported medication 
incidents and patient slips and falls in a US sample. Correlational analysis was conducted to 
examine this relationship in this UK sample. Table 7.3.5. d summarises these findings. 
Table 7.3.5. d: Correlations between FRIs and SOS scores 
Formally Reported Incidents SOS score 
( Sig-) 
Patient slips and falls -. 
35 
(p =. 05) 
Near misses . 
05 
(p = . 77) 
Medication incidents -. 
05 
(p =. 7 7) 
Blood transfusion incidents -. 
20 
- (P =. )8) 
Fluid infusion incidents - (P . 
003 
=. 99) 
-. 28 Mean number of incidents (p = . 12) 
* Correlation almost significant at the . 05 level 
In line to some extent with Vogus and Sutcliffe's findings, the relationship between SOS scores and 
the number of patient slips and falls approached statistical significance (p=. 05). However as 
indicated above, there was no further association between SOS scores and any of the other 4 types 
of FRI or the mean number of reported incidents. 
Results revealed that while OSQ and SOS scores were not statistically significant predictors of 
FRIs, including those categorised as medication-related, these scores did predict drug 
administration errors as measured by the DRBQ. Participants who scored high on the 
OSQ and low 
on the SOS (both indicating poor safety levels) reported they 
had committed more MAEs in the 
previous four weeks compared with individuals with better safety 
levels. However, it is important to 
emphasise that the power achieved in regression analysis using whole sample 
DRBQ data (n=31 1) 
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was significantly greater than that achieved using ward-based FRI data (n=34) which could explain 
why OSQ and SOS scores predicted DRBQ scores but not FRIs. It is likely that OSQ scores would 
have significantly predicted FRIs by increasing the number of wards sampled and increasing 
statistical power. 
Statistical power issues aside, it is also possible that since OSQ and SOS scores significantly 
predicted errors measured by the DRBQ, fon-nally reported incidents either capture more than just 
errors or else are not a measure of error at all. To examine this hypothesis, correlational analysis 
was conducted to examine the relationship between mean ward MAE scores as measured by the 
DRBQ and all five types of FRI and mean FRIs overall. Table 7.3.5. e summarises these findings. 
As this table shows, DRBQ scores were not significantly associated with any of the 5 types of FRI 
or mean FRIs overall. 
Table 7.3.5. e: Correlations between DRBQ scores and FRIs 
Formally Reported Incidents 
DRBQ score 
(Sig. ) 
Patient slips and falls . 
22 
(p =. 23) 
-. 13 Near misses (p =. 4 7) 
-. 03 Medication incidents (p =. 8 9) 
. 21 Blood transfusion incidents (p =. -1 5) 
-. 01 Fluid infusion incidents (p =. 9 6) 
- 26 Mean number of incidents (p =. 15) 
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3. Do 'safer'wards commitfewer errors? 
Individuals with the highest OSQ scores (indicative of poor safety) were more likely to commit 
significantly more MAEs than individuals with lower OSQ scores. However, since the OSQ was 
developed as a ward-based tool it was important to measure the ability of the OSQ to distinguish 
between ward based scores. It was hypothesised that wards with the poorest levels of safety (high 
OSQ scores) would commit significantly more MAEs than wards with higher levels of ward safety. 
Pearson's correlation analysis revealed there was a significant association between OSQ scores and 
MAEs committed at a ward level (r = . 49, p<. 0 1), supporting this hypothesis. 
To examine whether there was a particular OSQ score at which point wards were considerably more 
likely to commit MAEs, wards were split into 'high', 'medium' and 'low' safety-risk categories by 
percentiles. Low risk wards had mean OSQ scores between 0- 38.32, medium risk between 38.33 - 
44.14 and high risk wards scored 44.15 and above. A one-way between-groups ANOVA on the 
ward data (n=34) revealed there was a statistically significant effect of ward safety level on DRBQ 
score (F (2,3 1) ý 9.06, p<. O 1). Bonferroni post-hoc tests indicated this difference was significant 
between low and medium (mean diff. = 7.08, p<. 01), and low and high (mean diff. = 8.16, p<. Ol) 
but not between medium and high safety-risk wards. Therefore, high and medium-safety risk wards 
reported significantly more MAEs than low safety risk wards. For future error management 
purposes, wards with OSQ scores Within the low safety-nsk range (0-38.32) have better 
organisational safety and as such are less likely to make drug administration errors. 
As already discussed, OSQ scores overall were not significantly predictive of fon-nally reported 
incidents (FRls). When wards were split into high, medium and low safety risk categories there 
remained a non-significant effect of ward safety level on the number of FRIs (F (2,29) ý 1.30, p 
29) and there was no significant effect of ward safety level on any of the five types of FRI, 
including medication incidents (F (2,29) ý . 07, p= . 93). 
4. Is the OSQ a goodpredictor ofpatient safety perception? 
One item on the questionnaire asked participants to grade their ward in terins of patient safety as 
being either failing, poor, acceptable, very good or excellent. Linear regression analysis using the 
enter method revealed that OSQ score was a significant predictor of patient safety grade (F (1,309) ý 
57.80, P<. 001), accounting for 16 per cent of the variance (Adjusted R2= . 16; 0=-. 40). Therefore, 
participants who scored highly on the OSQ (indicating poor levels of safety) would be more likely 
to give their ward a poor grade on overall patient safety. This finding lends support to the content 
validity of the OSQ since items were a good indicator of patient safety perception. 
5. Are 'safer' wards more likely to report theirfuture mistakes? 
It was anticipated that wards with the highest OSQ scores (poorest levels of safety) were more 
likely to have relatively 'closed' reporting cultures and thus less likely to report errors formally (see 
chapter 6, section 6.2). Indeed OSQ scores were not as significantly predictive of formally reported 
incidents overall (FRIs) as they were of MAEs (measured by the DRBQ). To examine this issue 
more closely participants were asked to rate the likelihood they would formally report errors 
depending on the patient outcome, from 1 (not at all) to 5 (nearly all the time). Using ward-based 
data, Pearson correlation analysis revealed a significant association between OSQ scores and 
reporting likelihood (r = .51, p<. 
O I). 
Using the same method of dividing wards according to safety level described above, a one-way 
between-groups ANOVA revealed a statistically significant effect of ward safety level on the 
likelihood of reporting errors (F (2,31) = 5.98, p<. 01). Post-hoc analysis revealed this difference was 
significant between low and high safety risk wards only (mean diff . 41, p<. 01). 
Wards categonsed 
as high safety risks were significantly less likely to formally report errors than low safety risk 
wards. 
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7.4. Discussion 
This study was conducted to measure the validity and reliability of the Organisational Safetýr 
Questionnaire (OSQ). The original 107-iteM47 questionnaire was administered in two rounds to both 
qualified and unqualified nurses working in 54 clinical areas across two hospitals and was found to 
be appropriate for all qualified nurses in 34 of these areas. Although it was proposed that items on 
the OSQ represented 10 latent causes of medication administration errors (MAEs), factor analysis 
revealed 28 items representing one construct named organisational safety which had good internal 
reliability. There were several key findings. Firstly, the OSQ had good levels of concurrent validity 
with a valid and reliable 9-itern measure of ward safety culture (Safeo, Organising Scale, (SOS), 
Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007) and a 1-itern measure of patient safety perception (Hospital Sun'eY on 
Patient Safeo, Culture; Sorra & Nieva, 2004). Individuals and also wards which had high OSQ 
scores (indicative of poor organisational safety) had worse perceptions of patient safety and poorer 
ward safety cultures as measured by the SOS. 
To test its predictive validity, the OSQ was compared against six outcome measures; the total 
number of MAEs comi-nitted in the previous four weeks as measured by the DRBQ and five types 
of formally reported incident (FRIs). Scores on the OSQ were significantly more predictive than the 
SOS of DRBQ scores. Furthermore, high safety risk wards committed significantly more MAEs 
than wards which posed a lower safety risk. Neither the OSQ nor the SOS predicted FRIs overall or 
any of the five different types of incident, including those which were medication related. However, 
as mentioned previously the ability of the OSQ to predict FRIs was almost significant and 
insufficient statistical power achieved from data from only 34 wards should not be underestimated. 
It is recommended that future research should increase this statistical power by sampling more 
'relevant' wards to explore other types of reported incident which the OSQ may be able to predict 
(e. g. patient complaints). 
47 Which comprised 82 OSQ items, 13 DRBQ items, 9 SOS items and 3 reporting likelihood items. 
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Scores on the DRBQ were not significantly associated with FRIs. It is therefore possible that FRIs 
constitute adverse events and not errors. Early stages of reviewing incident reports as part of studN, 
I (see chapter 4) revealed that many reported incidents related to abusive patients or visitors during 
drug rounds, theft of medication, absconding patients, slips and falls and other events which did not 
involve errors. These findings could suggest that while FRIs may be an appropriate indicator of 
organisational safety culture, they might not be an appropriate measure of errors and capture only 
adverse events which individuals consider appropriate or are willing to disclose. This finding is 
particular important since FRIs are the most commonly cited measure of errors in patient safety 
research and frequently used in the development of safety related measures. 
In tenns of reporting culture, it was predicted that wards with the poorest levels of organisational 
safety (i. e. those with the highest OSQ scores) would formally report fewer incidents or errors than 
safer wards due to 'closed' reporting cultures. If this were the case, wards categorised as high 
safety risks would have reported significantly lower levels of FRIs than lower risk wards. 
However, this was not found. There was no significant difference in the numbers of FRIs reported 
by high, medium and low safety risk wards. 
The items administered from the Hospital Survey on Patient SafeO, Culture (Sorra & Nieva, 2004) 
to explore reporting likelihood may shed some light on these findings. Wards categorised as high 
safety-risks stated they were significantly less likely toformally report their errors than lower risk 
wards. It is proposed that poorer safety cultures mean that high safety-risk wards feel less inclined 
to report their mistakes and so formally report a comparatively smaller percentage of the errors 
which actually occur compared to lower risk wards. Interestingly, though there was no difference 
between the groups on the number of FRIs reported, high safety risk wards admitted making 
significantly more MAEs on the DRBQ than wards presenting lower safety risks. With this in 
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mind, it is possible that the DRBQ was a more sensitive measure of the actual number of drug 
administration errors occurring on wards. 
One of the limitations of this study was the failure to support the existence of the 10 latent 
preconditions of medication administration errors identified by qualitative methods in study I (see 
chapter 4). This does not mean to say however that the 10 variables identified are not predictors of 
MAEs, only that they were not well represented in this tool. It may have been the case that after the 
removal of cases for which the OSQ was generally not applicable, the sample size was simply too 
small for the number of variables being measured. However, it is widely accepted that beyond 300 
48 participants, parameters tend to be fairly stable . It is possible that by phrasing some items as 
representing the respondent (i. e. "I have worked with an agency nurse who was less qualified.... ") 
and others more generically (e. g. "There has been a deterioration of the skill level on this ward... ") 
may have resulted in different responding patterns for each type of question. Often referred to as 
item characteristic effects (Podsakoff et al., 2003), this form of bias refers to the influence specific 
characteristics of questionnaire items may have over responding tendencies. However, in this study 
early attempts to factor analyse 'I' items (n=58) and 'non-F items (n=24) separately did not 
improve either the factorability of items or the interpretation of a factor solution (i. e. items still 
fractured into multiple uninterpretable factors). Indeed sample mean and median scores for '1* and 
4generic' items were virtually identical49. It is proposed that because OSQ items were neither 
attitudinal nor behavioural (items rarely asked respondents to comment on their own behaviour), the 
difference in wording did not unduly affect responding variance. Nevertheless, it may be useful in 
future versions of the questionnaire to standardise such wording to further reduce the risk of 
introducing bias in responding. 
48 Kass and Tinsley (1979) recommend having between 5 and 10 participants per variable up to a total of 300 
at which point parameters tend to be fairly stable regardless of participant to variable ratio. Similafly 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) agree it is 'comforting to have at least 300 cases for factor analysis. 
49 These descriptive statistics are not reported within this thesis since they not relevant to further statistical 
analysis since items were not analysed in this way. 
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Alternatively, it is possible that findings were confounded to some extent by common method 
variance. For example, research has found that in an attempt to appear consistent and rational in 
their responses, questionnaire respondents will search for similarities within questions and ftame 
their responses accordingly (Johns, 1994; Schmitt, 1994). In this way. findings can represent over- 
inflated relationships between measured constructs. It is possible that In this study, presenting 
OSQ, SOS and DRBQ items within the same questionnaire may have increased the likelihood of 
this consistency effect and thus over-inflated the correlation between OSQ, SOS and DRBQ scores. 
However, in a review of various types of common method variance, Podsakoff et al., (2003) 
acknowledge that this bias effect in particular is largely problematic in questionnaires which 
measure multiple constructs of respondents' attitudes and perceptions. Although SOS items were 
attitudinal (and as such were presented separately on the questionnaire), DRBQ and OSQ items 
were not attitudinal, but were developed as behavioural items and observable indicators of systems 
problems respectively. As such, these items were less likely to result in consistency bias (Podsakoff 
et al., 2003). Furthermore, Kline (2000) recommends that where 'different' constructs are being 
measured within the same questionnaire, *intermixing' items (as was done in this questionnaire) 
should reduce common method variance, and in particular social desirability bias since respondents 
are less likely to 'work out" the constructs and respond desirably. However, there is also evidence 
which suggests that intermixing items in this way can also lead to reduced reliability since 
respondents are also less likely to see similarities in items measuring the same construct. This 
could explain the findings from factor analyses which did not support a 10 factor model. 
Nevertheless, it should be acknowledged that DRBQ items were naturally more likely to be affected 
by social desirability bias given the sensitive nature of these items compared with OSQ items. 
Findings from study I (e. g. observations and Interviews) highlighted a poor reporting culture within 
the nursing population and a fear of blame and reprisal. For this reason, particular attention was 
given to the phrasing of DRBQ items, attenuating any wording which could have been percei\-ed as 
potentially judgemental or 'blameworthy'. These items were also framed as near misses to increase 
227 
honest responding and reduce socially desirable responding. Despite this, response variabilitv was 
extremely low for these items which could either suggest that respondents were responding in a 
socially desirable way or were simply responding honestly to items with poorly referenced time 
frames (e. g. 'In the last 4 weeks... '). 
In addition to problems associated with administering multiple constructs simultaneously Podsakoff 
et al., (2003) emphasise the problem of administering both criterion (DRBQ) and predictor (OSQ) 
measures at the same time. Although administering these measures separately is the preferred 
method, this was not possible. In this study, constraints upon sample availability (due to multiple 
research projects being conducted in this hospital at the same time) and time constraints meant that 
it was not possible to administer the three measures independently which would have reduced the 
potential for this and other aforementioned types of bias. However, in this type of applied research 
setting it is important to find a balance between reducing potential bias effects which may confound 
findings and working within the parameters of such an organisation. 
Factor analysis may not have resulted in the extraction of the ten identified latent preconditions due 
to a pragmatic need for keeping the tool concise and which lead to a relatively small number of 
items representing each variable. It is commonly suggested that within instrument development it is 
essential to have many more items than required for the final tool. Kline (2002) recommends 
developing twice the number needed, particularly when multiple factors are being addressed as was 
the case in this study. However, because of the high complexity of the data and the pragmatic needs 
of keeping the tool concise (i. e. 82 items representing 36 subcategories reflective of 10 latent 
variables) it was not always possible to have multiple items to represent subcategories and in some 
cases even though there were multiple items reflecting the overall variable, some of the component 
subcategories were underrepresented. Furthermore, once items had been removed which 
had high 
levels of not applicable responding some of the predictors had only 3 or 4 items remaining 
(e. g. 
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workload, bed management) each of which measuring a different aspect of that construct. The 
proposed structure of variables may therefore have been over-complex "tbout sufficient Items with 
which to test these sub-structures at this stage of research. In this way, the tool may have been 
trying to measure too many aspects of safety. As discussed previously, this may have been rectified 
by using more items to represent fewer themes in one measure. However, since it was not known 
which of the 10 latent variables were most predictive of medication errors, and as such should be 
included in the tool, this was not possible. An alternative method to explore the underlying structure 
of the longer version of the OSQ may have been to administer different subscales of the OSQ in 
several stages using multiple samples. In each stage 2-3 latent variables, each with 15-20 items 
could be administered to a sample to examine the item cohesion and aid in the removal of redundant 
items until all 10 variables had been administered. Unfortunately as with any type of applied 
research, particularly within health care, constraints on time and sample availability meant that such 
a stratified approach was not possible. 
A second limitation of the study was the relatively low level of response variability which 
ultimately affected subsequent analysis choices. It is possible that this was due to problems with 
the time frames, which may have been too short (e. g. 'In the last 2 weeks/4 weeks/2 months... ' 
etc. ). However, previous pilot studies had not highlighted any such problems with corresponding 
time frames. It is proposed that the nature of the data may have simply been too sensitive in this 
sample of nurses who are unlikely to have been asked for this type of information before. Since 
data responses were not only of limited range, but were extremely positively skewed (i. e. responses 
generally clustered around the lower end of the scale) this is the most likely explanation. It has 
been recommended that to improve reporting of sensitive information attempts should 
be made by 
researchers to familiarise themselves with the sample before administration of questionnaires 
(Edwards et al., 2002). While this was largely achieved during in study 
I and subsequent pilot 
studies and which undoubtedly contributed to the honesty -,, vith which participants 
disclosed 
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information, this was not possible in the large-scale final study which involved a potential sample of 
more than 2000 nurses. 
7.5. Conclusions 
Originally developed as 10 scales representing 10 latent conditions identified during qualitative 
research to be predictive of MAEs, the final 28-item scale comprised one overall construct named 
organisational safety. While the final scale did not consist of individual subscales, the 28 remaining 
items did reflect 8 of the 10 proposed preconditions of MAE and so does to some extent support the 
role of these preconditions in the occurrence of MAE. The final 28-item OSQ had good internal 
consistency, was correlated with an independent measure of organisational safety and was 
predictive of medication administration errors. The OSQ was not significantly predictive of 
formally reported incidents which may in part be due to the nature of the events individuals are 
willing to report and which may not accurately reflect the frequency of errors. Alternatively, this 
may have been an artefact of low statistical power which could have been improved with a larger 
sample. Finally, high safety risk wards said they were less likely toformalli, report their errors than 
lower safety risk wards. However, high, medium and low safety risk wards actually formally 
reported a similar number of incidents. It is possible that high risk wards report a comparatively 
smaller percentage of the errors which actually occur compared to lower risk wards due to poorer 
safety cultures. Interestingly, high safety risk wards admitted making significantly more MAEs on 
the DRBQ than wards presenting lower safety risks suggesting the DRBQ may be a more sensitive 
outcome measure of the actual number of drug administration errors occurring. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS 
1 11 - . 1, ..... . ....... . .... - -I ý .. tl. "A". . .... . .... .I 
-- ....... . ..... ...................... 
Introduction 
The overall objective of this research was to explore latent causes of medication administration 
errors in secondary care and to develop a valid and reliable proactive measure of these error causes 
similar to those already available in other safety-critical industries. This chapter will present a brief 
overview of key findings. Methodological limitations will then be considered before discussing the 
practical implications of these findings and recommendations for future research. 
8.2. Summary of findings 
Chapter 2 of this thesis discussed the 'systems' approach to understanding human error whereby 
latent conditions develop over time within an organisational system from decisions made by top- 
level management, designers and procedure writers. Reason's Swiss cheese model was presented 
as a framework for understanding the interplay between these latent factors at the 'blunt-end' of the 
organisation and unsafe acts at the 'sharp-end' (Reason, 1990). It was noted that although well- 
utilised in other high-risk industries, there has been few attempts to measure the validity or 
reliability of this framework or make use of it to explain errors wbich occur in medicine. This 
finding was supported by the systematic review presented in chapter 3 which identified studies that 
had employed systems interventions to reduce the occurrence of medication error. Almost all of 
these studies gave no indication that any theory had been used as a basis for their Intervention and 
most provided sparse empirical evidence to support their chosen interventions. Overall, studies 
which had carried out multiple interventions provided insufficient methodological details to enable 
replication and had not reported whether independent components of those interventions had been 
successful. More than half of the studies reviewed had implemented computensed systems to 
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reduce medication eiTors driven largely by 'evidence-light' government policy. This atheoretical 
faith in technological interventions (Kremsdorf, 2005) could mean that only a limited number of 
latent failures are currently being addressed in health care. It was concluded in chapter 3 that a too] 
which could measure a wide range of latent failures and monitor them over time would be 
extremely valuable in health care for the development of appropriate interventions to reduce errors. 
With a view to developing such a tool, study 1 was conducted to explore possible latent causes of 
medication administration errors in secondary care. Semi structured interviews, clinical 
observations and a review of a number of incident reports were conducted. While observational 
data was useful to some extent, the lack of clinical training of the observer meant that this data was 
not as detailed as interviews which represented the richest and most useful source of information. 
Fornially reported incidents offered little insight into the causes of error and due to the general 
paucity of detail provided comprised the least useful source of qualitative data. Nevertheless, 
combined analysis of the three data sources identified ten potential latent causes of medication 
administration errors (MAEs). Using research conducted in the oil industry to develop proactive 
measures of latent failure as a basis for test construction, items were developed to represent 
observable indicators of each of the ten latent causes of MAEs. Pilot studies revealed that after the 
removal of items with poor response variability and the replacement of dichotomous response 
options with a Likert frequency scale to improve this variability, the 82-item Organisational Safety 
Questionnaire (OSQ) had good face validity. 
It was a key aim of this research to produce a tool which, unlike similar proactive measures 
developed in other high-risk industries, had good predictive validity. Research has suggested that 
most medical errors are not 'officially' reported and that wards with the poorest 
levels of 
organisational safety would also be those who are less likely to report their errors 
due to *closed' 
reporting cultures (Cullen et al., 1995). Therefore, 
forinally reported incidents may not have 
represented an appropriate outcome measure against which to test 
the predictive validity of the 
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OSQ. To overcome this, an independent measure of MAEs was developed. It was important for 
items on this measure to be objective (not open to interpretation) and not reliant upon adverse 
patient outcomes in order to encapsulate near misses. Items were developed from interview and 
incident report data collecting during study I and represented ten types of MAE as proposed by a 
well-known taxonomy of error. A pilot study revealed that after the removal of items with poor 
variability, the 13-item Drug Round Behaviour Questionnaire (DRBQ) had good face validity and 
measured seven types of M AE. 
Chapter 7 of this thesis described study 4 which measured the concurrent and predictive validity, 
internal reliability and the generaliseability of the OSQ. Findings showed that the OSQ was 
relevant for qualified nurses working across a wide range of clinical specialties. The questionnaire 
had good concurrent validity with another valid and reliable measure of local safety culture (SOS; 
Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007) and was significantly more predictive of MAEs than this independent 
measure. Problems with skewed responses which lead to the removal of large number of items 
meant that factor analysis did not support the OSQ as ten individual scales as had been predicted. 
Nevertheless, the remaining 28 items reflected eight of the ten proposed latent conditions, a finding 
which supports to some extent the role of these conditions in the occurrence of MAEs. 
Further analysis revealed that wards with high levels of latent failure (measured by the OSQ) had 
poor organisational safety cultures (measured by the SOS) and admitted to making significantly 
more MAEs than 'safer' wards. While scores on the OSQ and the SOS were not signiflcantýv 
predictive of formally reported incidents, this may have been an artefact of the low statistical power 
obtained using ward-based data which may have been improved with a larger sample. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that formally reported errors represent more than just errors or are not an 
appropriate measure of error at all, particularly since their frequency was not associated with scores 
on the DRBQ. This was further supported by initial reviews of incident reports during study 1 
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which revealed many 'incidents' did not necessarily constitute errors. This finding is particularly 
significant because formally reported incidents are the most commonly cited measure of errors in 
patient safety research and are often used in the development of safety related measures. 
Finally, findings revealed that wards classified as 'high-safety risks' formally reported a similar 
number of incidents as 'safer' wards, despite responding that they were s1gn1ficantly less likely to 
formally report their mistakes. It was hypothesised that high safety risk wards because of poorer 
safety cultures feel less able to disclose their mistakes and so formally report a comparatively 
smaller percentage of the errors which actualýi, occur compared to lower risk wards. Although 
there was no difference between wards on the number of formally reported incidents, high safety 
risk wards reported more MAEs than safer wards using the DRBQ which might suggest this 
measure is a more sensitive measure of errors than those reported through formal channels. 
Alternatively, this may have been due to the anonymity offered by the DRBQ compared to the non- 
anonymous system of formally reporting incidents. Future research should focus on the difference 
between errors and incidents in terms of reporting likelihood. 
8.3. Limitations 
One particular limitation of the final study was the inclusion of a newly developed and as such 
unvalidated outcome measure (DRBQ) against which to measure the predictive validity of an 
equally unvalidated measure of organisational safety (OSQ). Findings revealed that although scores 
on the OSQ were predictive of scores on the DRBQ, they were not significantly predictive of the 
number of formally reported incidents; the most commonly employed outcome measure in this field 
of research. Ideally, the predictive validity of the OSQ would have been measured using a validated 
and reliable measure of errors. However, it is frequently acknowledged within the patient safety 
literature that there are multiple biases associated within non-anonymous formally reported incident 
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data (e. g. underreporting/selective reporting etc. see chapter 6, section 6.2 for more detailed 
discussion) which make its use as an outcome measure questionable. Indeed, qualitative review of 
a large number of fori-nally reported 'medication incidents' in this study (see study 1, chapter 4) 
highlighted the difficulties of using this data as an appropriate measure of medication 
administration errors. For the majority of reported incidents it was not possible to determine 
whether an error had occurred and it was unclear whether the number of incidents reported 
represented an accurate reflection of the frequency of these events. Unfortunately, patient safety 
researchers also acknowledge that there is a distinct lack of an appropriate and reliable alternative 
measure of error available for this type of applied research (Flin et al., 2000). With this in mind, 
the DRBQ was developed as an independent measure of errors. While significant attempts were 
made to ensure this measure had good face and content validity, the final study revealed especially 
low variability in responding which did not support evidence from previous small-scale pilot 
studies. It is possible that disseminating this measure alone to a larger pilot study (e. g 100+) may 
have refined this measure and improved its reliability and ultimately response variability bqfore the 
final study. However, time and recruitment constraints meant that such a pilot study was not 
possible. Correlational analysis in study 4 revealed little or no relationship between scores on the 
DRBQ and formally reported incidents. Furthermore, there remains to date no available alternative 
measure of medication administration or any other type of medical error against which to test the 
validity of the DRBQ as an error outcome measure. It would be useftil for ftiture research to further 
investigate the validity and reliability of the DRBQ as an independent outcome measure. 
In more general terms, this research was conducted in only one NHS Trust which may to some 
extent compromise the general iseability of findings. Attempts to recruit two other 
liospitals were 
not successful due to ethical and time constraints. It was hoped that by conducting this research in a 
generic field of medicine (general medicine), findings would be common to multiple areas of care 
and also to secondary care environments in general. A plethora of supporting evidence 
for each of 
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the ten latent failures identified in study 1 (see chapter 4 for supporting evidence) and the relevance 
of the final tool to thirty-four clinical areas In study 4 suggest findings are generalisable beyond 
general medicine and indeed beyond this particular NHS Trust, In terms of cultural 
generaliseability, it was not possible to interview any foreign nurses during study I and so all 
interviews were conducted with white British nurses which may represent a biased sample. 
However, the aim of conducting multiple qualitative methods such as interviews, observations and 
reviewing incident reports was to gain a 'holistic' insight into error causation. Observations in 
particular went some way towards gaining an insight into the issues surrounding foreign nursing 
(e. g. language barriers, cultural differences); issues which may not have arisen naturally from white 
British nurses but which could then be further explored during interviews. It was then possible to 
develop OSQ items to reflect these issues. In terms of questionnaire completion, respondent's 
ethnicity was not measured and so it is possible that foreign nurses although sampled, did not 
respond. However, developed items were objectively framed in a clear and concise way and were 
designed specifically so they would not be open to interpretation and as such culturally sensitive. 
Specific problems with poor response variability on the final tool have already been addressed 
elsewhere in this thesis (see chapter 7). However, it Is Important to explore the potential reasons 
why this effect occurred in the final study but was not as evident in previous pilot studies. Firstly, 
during interviews conducted as part of study 1, nurses frequently suggested that they felt a certain 
level of mistrust of the organisation based on a variety of factors such as previous negative 
experiences of reporting mistakes and a general lack of feedback overall. It was therefore essential 
to promote a high level of trust between the interviewer and nurses to achieve a candid and accurate 
perspective of error causation, particularly given the sensitive nature of the issues 
being discussed 
(e. g. making mistakes and organisational failings). This was achieved in part 
by placing a 
conceptual distance between the interviewer and the organisation as is commonly recommended in 
qualitative research of sensitive issues (Elwood & Martin, 
2004). It was frequently emphasised 
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during interviews and observations that while the organisation was supporting the research and 
were keen to improve current error management approaches and systems, the researcher would be 
the only person with access to the information discussed. The information disclosed during 
interviews and observations was largely supported during subsequent pilot studies where similar 
efforts were made to emphasise the independent position of the researcher. Since it would not be 
possible to use face-to-face strategies of gaining participants' trust in the final study due the sample 
size, several recommended strategies for improving the candour of responses for 'sensitive' 
questionnaires were implemented (Edwards et al., 2002; Jones & Linda, 1978). These efforts 
included adopting a 'neutral' stance by emphasising that the research was being conducted by 
researchers at the University of Leeds (Dillman, 2000; Sudman & Bradburn, 1974,1982), assuring 
participants their performance was not being audited by their employer or judged in any way and 
emphasising their responses would be anonymous and confidential. However, as with any type of 
postal questionnaire, there are no guarantees that participants read the information provided before 
completing the instrument. It is also possible that these efforts were undermined to some extent by 
overt organisational endorsements of the research which included placement of hospital logos on all 
documentation and several emails sent by a senior NHS manager encouraging participants to 
complete the questionnaire. With such potentially sensitive items which involved disclosure of 
errors and reporting of latent failures including supervision and other management activities, it is 
possible that these overt organisational endorsements introduced some element of responding bias 
and reduced participant confidence that the questionnaire was not sent as part of a management 
audit. It is also possible that the response bias observed in the final study was not biased but a 
truthful and accurate reflection of the presence of latent failures and prevalence of errors which in 
turn Might suggest that information obtained during interviews was not accurate. 
It is unlikely that the response bias evident in study 4, which to some extent may have been 
reflective of a lack of organisational trust, is limited to the health care organisation in which the 
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research was conducted. Previous research has suggested that health care organisations comprise 
particularly 'closed' reporting cultures and that 'most errors are not reported' compared with other 
high-risk industries (Cullen et al., 1995). Patient safety researchers have identified organisational 
trust as a key determinant of this reporting culture which in turn dictates subsequent organisational 
learning throughout the NHS (Firth-Cozens, 2003; Reason, 2000). Firth-Cozens (2004) suggests 
that when conducting this type of research, sharp-end staff need to feel they can trust that they will 
not be punished by their organisation for their honesty, and reassured that managers will treat 
disclosed information sensitively and fairly to benefit patient safety. She further argues that in most 
health care organisations, this level of trust is currently 'low' and proposes that improving this level 
of organisational trust should be 'high on the agenda of all health care systems' (pp. 56). It is 
proposed that in a reporting and learning 'standoff, lack of organisational trust throughout health 
care may have lead to a culture of reporting which is predominantly 'closed' and which has in turn 
lead to an inaccurate perception of error prevalence. Additionally, errors which are reported are 
less detailed and contain little information useful for determining causation. As supported by study 
1 of this research, workers at the sharp-end of the workforce are not asked for the organisational 
failures which precede their reported mistakes, which may ultimately mean that reported errors are 
not being effectively managed, either respectively or proactively. In a cyclical manner, this could 
result in a further reduction in organisational trust. Indeed, nurses interviewed in study I of this 
research suggested that lack of feedback from previous incident reports played a key role in whether 
they would report their future mistakes. 
It is proposed that this research has provided evidence which is vital 
for breaking this cycle. Health 
care organisations need to know more about latent failures 
for subsequent error management 
strategies to be effective. This research has made a significant contribution 
towards achieving this 
goal. Using evidence such as this, organisations can instigate more appropriately 
targeted 
interventions which can be observed by the workforce as making a 
difference to patient safety. 
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This could go some way towards improving organisational trust which might foster a more 'open' 
culture of reporting and should in turn lead to a signIficant improvement in error leaming. 
Furthermore, the role of organisationally independent research conducted by outside agencies and 
universities should not be underestimated as a means of improving the level of trust between health 
care staff and their managers. 
8.4. Implications & future research 
Using rigorous qualitative methods, this research has made a significant contribution towards 
identifying latent failures in secondary care and examining their role in error causation. Althougli 
there was some empirical support for many of the variables identified, qualitative methods allowed 
for an in-depth examination of variables not currently highlighted within patient safety literature as 
important precursors of error. For instance, the latent factor bed management was commonly 
identified as an organisational factor likely to trigger multiple working conditions such as workload, 
planning and team communication yet is rarely acknowledged as a potential cause of medical errors 
within the literature. The qualitative findings of this research represent a sound platfon-n on which 
to base future work which could examine the ways in which these variables interact with one 
another to lead to accidents and errors. These findings could be used to develop educational 
material with which to improve organisational learning both at the sharp-end and the blunt end of 
health care organisations which may in turn improve the overall culture of disclosing such sensitive 
inforination. Future research could also use the information to develop appropriate interventions for 
each of the latent failures similar to error management 'toolkits' available in other 
industries (HSE. 
1995; Shell, 2004) 
In line with Department of Health objectives for patient safety research 
(DoH. 2001), this research 
has used techniques employed in other high-risk industries to 
develop a theoretical ly-based 
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proactive measure of latent failures. The Organisational Safety Questi II ionnaire differs from other 
currently available safety culture tools in that it was driven by health care professionals at both ends 
of the organisational spectrum. The fact that OSQ items were developed to represent tangible 
indicators of safety as opposed to workers perceptions, attitudes or beliefs also differentiates this 
tool from other available safety measures. Unlike other safety measures, the OSQ had good lex'els 
of concurrent and predictive validity. The 28-item OSQ is a novel and generalisable proactive 
measure of organisational safety not currently available in health care. 
Poor responding variability which lead to the removal of multiple items prevented the construction 
of separate subscales representing each of the ten proposed latent error causes. This would have 
allowed for the development of safety profiles at a ward level (see chapter 2) to identify the ', Aorst' 
variables and which would be useful for the design of appropriate interventions. Nevertheless, OSQ 
items reflect a broad range of latent conditions which would make it a particularly effective 
outcome measure of patient safety intervention success and other organisational changes. The tool 
would also be an appropriate measure of monitoring continuous improvement. 
There are several recommendations for future research. Firstly, conducting focus group studies 
such as those employed to develop the proactive Tripod-DELTA too] (Groeneweg, 1992; see 
chapter 2) would be an effective means of 'fine-tuning' indicators which represent each latent 
failure. This would address problems identified in this study with corresponding indicator time 
frames which may have been inaccurate. By disseminating the revised questionnaire to a larger 
sample than recruited in the final study of this research, it would be possible to examine the 
underlying structure of the OSQ as a measure of ten latent factors. This would then allow 
for a 
more detailed understanding of the relationship between each of the k'anables and the way in which 
this complex interaction might affect error likelihood. It would also 
be interesting to conduct focus 
groups with other health care professionals such as 
doctors or unqualified staff (e. g. nursing 
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assistants, ancillary staff etc. ) to explore whether the latent conditions identified by nurses are also 
proposed by other disciplines. If these variables were generalisable to other health professlons, it 
would then be possible to develop 'job-specific indicators' as currently recommended within other 
high-risk industries (Reason, 1997; Groeneweg, 2002). Finally, future research could also test the 
ability of the OSQ to predict other types of error (e. g. medical, diagnostic etc. ) or other patient 
safety and quality of care measures such patient satisfaction, nosocomial infections rates or length 
of hospital stay and rate of recovery. 
In conclusion, this research has successftilly achieved its main objectives; to gain a clearer 
understanding of the organisational and workplace causes of medication administration errors and 
to develop a theoretically-based valid and reliable tool with which to measure them. This research 
has progressed patient safety research forwards to a more detailed level of understanding the causes 
of error and has developed a novel tool which will be useftil in this field of research. It is 
anticipated that development of this novel tool will enable health care organisations to develop 
educational material to improve organisational learning and the culture of reporting and more 
successfully monitor the effects of organisational change on the workforce. 
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Appendix IV: Senior mana2er's invitation letter 
1. I" 
Bradford Teaching Hospitals 
An NHS Foundation Trust 
Exploring the role of organisational factors in medication error 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
I am a researcher based at the Institute of Psychological Sciences at the University of Leeds 
investigating the role of organisational factors in medication errors in secondary care. The 
research project will be carried out in collaboration with Bradford NHS Trust under the 
supervision of Dr John Wright (Director of Research) and is funded by the Economic and 
Social Research Council. For the initial stage of the project I am keen to recruit NHS 
senior managers and both clinical and non-clinical ward-based staff for a series of short 
interviews. I would be extremely grateful if you could spare a little time to read the 
enclosed project information sheet and consider whether you would like to be involved in 
this valuable and innovative research project. 
Many Thanks 
Samantha Beaumont 
Institute of Psychological Sciences 
University of Leeds 
Leeds 
LS2 9JT 
Email: psc2sjb(a-) e ds. ac. Uk ,Ie 
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Appendix V: Interviews - participant information sheet 
The role of ortlanisational factors in medication error 
My name is Sam Beaumont and I am a researcher based at the Institute of Psychological 
Sciences at the University of Leeds and am working in collaboration with Bradford 
Teaching Hospitals Trust on my PhD research project. I am currently recruiting a variety of 
staff members working for Bradford NHS Trust, who might like to be involved in a new 
and exciting research project and would very much like you to be involved. I am 
interested in interviewing a wide variety of clinical staff working on general medical 
wards and also NHS management staff working in risk, clinical governance, research, 
nursing, patient services and pharmacy. Here are a few important details and questions 
you might like answering before making a decision to participate. 
Who am I& who do I work for? 
The research project is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council and Bradford 
Teaching Hospitals Trust as part of a PhD-CASE collaborative studentship. My academic 
background is in the field of Psychology (BSc Psychology - University of York; MSc 
Health Psychology - University of Leeds) and I also have an employment background in 
psychiatric health care services. I will be based partly in the Institute of Psychological 
Sciences at the University of Leeds and also at Bradford Royal Infirmary for the duration of 
the project (3 years in total). 
What is the research project about? 
The overall aim of the research project is to investigate the organisational or systems 
factors 
which may give rise to medication errors made in secondary care. From initial analyses of 
these organisational factors, the project aims to develop aproacth, e measurement tool in the 
form of a safety checklist, similar to those already developed and employed in 
industry. 
This tool will actively predict the factors most likely to give nse to errors 
before they have 
occurred. The tool will ultimately aim to provide feedback on ways such areas might 
be 
improved and thus reduce the likelihood of future errors occurring. 
Why study this subiect? 
Industrial evidence has emphasised the importance of investigating 
the role of 
organisational or workplace factors which may 
have made individual errors Possible. The 
current research project will apply this 'organisational theory' 
to the field of health care and 
will attempt to uncover which organisational 
factors are most likely to predict the 
occurrence of niedication errors. 
272 
How will you be involved? 
You will be asked to take part in an informal interview, lasting approximately 30-40 
minutes, scheduled at your convenience over the next few months. All Interviews will be 
conducted by me and will be tape-recorded to ensure I can pay full attention to the issues being discussed. The information discussed in these interviews will be strictly confidential 
and any details which would make you identifiable will not be reported on any documentation. 
What will happen durim the interviews? 
During the first part of the interview you will be presented with a printed hypothetical error 
scenario (a short story describing one or more medical errors in the delivery of patient care). 
These scenarios have been developed from the medical literature and are based on actual 
events - although not at Bradford Hospitals. Once you have read this scenario we will go 
on to discuss any ideas you have about the causes behind the errors, in terms of the 
individuals involved, contributing environmental factors and finally the role of the 
organisation. 
We will move on to discuss a 'real-life' example of medication error which you have either 
been involved in (in clinical terms), or an error you simply have knowledge of in enough 
detail to be able to describe it to me. This error does not necessarily need to have ended in 
patient harm - it could simply be a near miss or a common mistake which you think has the 
potential to result in patient harm. You should come prepared to the interview prepared to 
discuss a real error or 'near miss' you have had experience of We will not discuss specific 
details of any individuals involved in the error or near miss you describe and you will not be 
asked to divulge any personal information which could lead to identification of the 
individuals concerned. Similarly you will not be asked to talk about details which might 
cause you any discomfort and you are free to withdraw ftom the interview at any point. 
Since there are no right or wrong answers the interviews will be exploratory and aim to 
uncover a wide range of viewpoints. 
If you would like to take part - what should you do now? 
If you are interested in participating in this research project or would like more information 
before making a decision to participate please get in touch with me on any of the contact 
details listed below and I will be more than happy to discuss the project or arrange a time 
for us to meet. 
Contact details: 
Ms Sam Beaumont 
Institute of Psychological Sciences 
University of Leeds 
Leeds 
LS2 9JT 
Email. psc2sjb@leeds. ac. uk 
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Appendix VI: Letter of invitation to nurses 
Hi) 
My name is Sam Beaumont and I am a2 nd year PhD student in the 
Institute of Psychological Sciences at the University of Leeds. Ia rn 
conducting research into the possible systems causes of medication errors. 
This research has been developed because it is my belief that there are many 
reasons errors occur in medicine - not just because people make mistakes. 
These causes could be things like the way the ward is set up or the design of 
tasks or equipment for example (although I am more interested in what you 
think - rather than what I think! ) 
Part of the project involves interviewing nurses working In Bradford hospitals 
to find out what they believe are important considerations when thinking 
about medical errors. Your name has been suggested by 
............................... as someone who has lots of nursing experience and 
who might have a good insight into the nature of errors. 
If you're still not convinced it's a good idea to be involved - here are just a 
few reasons that might persuade you; 
1. The interviews are really informal and just like a chat between me & you 
really - not like going for a job interview! You are not being tested, as there 
are no right or wrong answers -just your opinion. 
2. The research is important for nurses because finding out what else might 
have caused error might change the way errors are dealt with in the future. 
3. The aim of the project is to get a broad range of views from several nurses 
on more than one medical ward - not to single individuals out. Your name, 
position and ward number will not be reported on any paperwork anywhere. 
\ (<ffr: 5 
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4. As part of being involved I will supply lunch ........ from Marks & Spencers!! 
5. Last (but by no means least! ) ................... 
You will be entered into a prize draw to win 
E50!!!!!!! 
Names will be drawn out of a hat once the last person has been interviewed 
and considering only 20 people will be entered you stand an excellent chance 
of being the lucky winner! There will also be two runners up prizes of wine 
and chocolates. 
What now? 
Our interview has been set up for ....................................... at 
.................. and will last no more than I hour (this time has already been 
agreed by your matron/sister). I will telephone you before the interview 
(usually on the same day) to find out what you would like for lunch (no caviar 
or champagne requests please! ). The interviews should be fun and should 
definitely not be a cause for nerves. If you really do not want to take part in 
the study - don't worry. Just ring me on my mobile (listed below) and let me 
know before the day. If you want to know a bit more before agreeing to take 
part you can either ring me or email me &I will be more than happy to give 
you the details. 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information 
See you soon! 
Sam Beaumont 
Email. Psc2sjb(qi. ), leeds. ac. uk 
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Appendix VII: Hypothetical error scenarios 
1. Mr Smith was transferredfrom Ward A to Ward B at Ipm. Although MrSmith's 
medical notes were with him when he arrived, his drug chart was missing. John, 
the Senior Nurse on Ward B rang Ward A to ask them where the missing drug chart 
was. The qualified nurse who answered the phone said she was almost certain theY 
had sent Mr Smith's drug chart down with his medical notes. John asked her ýf kh- 
Smith had received his 12pm medication before being transferred to Ward B to 
which she replied she "wouldn't have thought so ", since he was due to be 
transferred. The nurse told John what medication Mr Smith should have rcccli, cd 
before being transferred and said the -v would 
hai, e another lookfor the drug chart 
and send someone down to Ward B if it turned up. John gave Mr Smith the 
medication he had supposedly not received at lunchtime. At 5pm wlicti the tea-time 
medication round was started, Mr Smith's drug chart was returned to 11 ard B by 
the Pharmacy department. It was recorded that although the medication John had 
given to the patient was correct, it had already been administered at lunchtime 
(12pm). Aerefore Mr Smith had received his lunchtime dose twice. 
2. An operating surgeon prescribed the intravenous administration of Heparin (to 
prevent blood clots) after a patient's hip surgery and asked the medical technician 
tojetch a bag ofIVHeparin. Ae medical technician mistakenly took a bag from 
the place Heparin is usually kept and does not notice that the bag is actual4l, 
Lidocaine-Hydrochloride not Heparin. Heparin and Lidocaine bags look almost 
identical and are stored side by side. The anaesthesiologist who accompanied the 
patient back to the ward also did not notice the wrong bag hanging on the IV drip. 
Neither the afternoon nor evening nursing staff noticed the error. The following 
day the Staff Nurse arriving on the early shift noticed the IV bag by the patients' 
bedside was Lidocaine not Heparin. "ilst administering Lidocaine to a patient 
who is not prescribed it is not serious, the omission of Heparin is potentially fatal. 
Later incident analysis revealed that the nursing staff, medical technician and 
anaesthesiologist who did not notice the error said the IV bag looked the waY they 
expected it to look had it been Heparin. 
3. A 67-year-old man was admitted to hospital. for surgerv. He had an allergv to 
antibiotic drugs, which was noted on his medical record. 
The surgeon did not notice 
the information about the allergy and ordered an antibiotic to be givell at the end Qf 
the surgety. A hospital nurse gave the patient the antibiotic 
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4. When conducting the 9pm medication round on an elderly care ward, the Staff Nurse noticed that a particular patient was not wearing his identification 
wristband. On this ward, it was correct practice to ensure the I. D. number oil the 
patient's wristband and the number on the drug chart were the same bqfore giving 
them an medication. On this occasion, there were no other staf Y f members around for the nurse to liaise with and she was reluctant to leave the drug trolle 
, 1'. However, the name on the white board above the patients' bed matched the patient 
name on the drug chart at the foot of the patient bed, so believing the patient ill front of her to be the right patient; the Staff Nurse gave him the medication 
prescribed on the drug chart. Thirty minutes later, she discovered that this patient 
was not the patient named on the drug chart. The patient had been confused when 
returningfrom the bathroom and had got in the wrong bed by mistake. 
5. At 9am, Senior Nurse Julie was trving to find the duty doctor to write a discharge 
prescription for patient Mrs Brown who was due to be discharged later that da 
- 1'. An emergency admission meant Julie was unable tofollow this task up. Whcn Julie 
had finished with the new admission she had forgotten about the discharge 
prescription and only remembered later in the da , i, 
during afternoon handov, er. 
Senior Nurse Claire on the afternoon shift arrangedfor a doctor to attend the ward 
to write the prescription which she personally took to the pharmacy department at 
2.30pm. When the ambulance arrived to take Mrs Brown home at 4pm her 
medication was not ready for her to take since Pharmacy had not had sufficient 
time to process the request. Claire rang them and asked if they could dispeilst, thc 
medication as a priority. They said they could have the medication ready by 7pm ýf 
the patient could wait a little longer or else she could have someone collect it for 
her. Mrs Brown would not wait and went home by ambulance. Mrs Brown's 
relative was not able to collect the medication until 8pm the following when they 
hadfinished work. 
6. During the morning medication round at 9am, a patient complained to the nurse on 
duty that he was in pain and would like some pain killers. The patient had been 
transferredftom A &E at Ilpm in the evening the previous day. Aspirin was listed 
on the patients drug chart as a possible PRN (prescription required as needed) 
medication since the patient complained of severe headaches so the nurse gave him 
two 75mg tablets. Three hours later, admission notes from A&E arrived on the 
ward and the nurse discovered this patient had been admitted due to suspected 
severe liver disease. In such cases, aspirin should be avoided due to it increasing 
the risk of gastro-intestinal bleeding and impaired kidney. fiinction. Deterioration of 
kidneyfiinction in these patients can lead to rapid and 1ýfe-threatening deterioration 
of their liver disease. 
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7. Mr. Jameson was a patient in an acute ward. One of his prescription charts ii'as 
rewritten by a doctor who did not usually treat him. The prescription chart it-as jaxed to a pharmacist, Mr. Cryer, who was busy because it was the Fridai, before a bank holiday weekend. Mr. Cryer dispensed hydrala,: ine (for high blood pressure) 
instead of hydroxyzine (for itching). The medicine was sent to the 11'ard in a bottle 
labelled with the patient's name. Mr. Jameson was given the ii, rong drug three 
times a day for five days before the error was recognised b'v another pharniacist, 
who was checking prescription charts in the ii, ard. All the staff treating Mr Jameson 
had given him the drug over the five days but no one had noticed that it was the 
wrong drug. (Foresight training scenarios, NPSA) 
8. Miss Doyle was being given pethidine via a patient-con trolled analgesia (PCA) 
infusion device. She was on pethidine because she was allergic to morphine. Two 
junior nurses, Nurse Khan and Nurse James, were changing Miss Doyle's infusion. 
Neither nurse was competent to carry out this procedure without being supervised 
by another nurse. There was a record about Miss Doyle's allergy in her notes and 
she was also wearing an allergy wristband. However, Nurse Khan and Nurse James 
set up a morphine syringe for Miss Doyle with neither noticing the wristband. In 
addition, the pethidine had originally been set up using a syringe labelled 
morphine. The word morphine had been crossed out andpethidine had been written 
over it. (Foresight training scenanos, NPSA) 
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Appendix VIII: interview schedule 
Short introduction to the structure of the interview (3 main areas of interest; person, 
environment, - organi sation).... give 
RAIL PROMPTS 
A. Person-related questions (active failures) 
1. In terms of the people described in this scenario - what actions do you think 
could have led to this incident? 
Rail example: If a train driver drives through a stop signal and 
subsequently collides with another train he; 
might not have noticed the signal Islip/lapse] 
could have seen the signal but misread it I mistakei 
may have simply ignored it [violation] 
2. Do you think their actions could realistically have been performed any 
differently? If not, what factors do you think could have affected this? 
Rail example: It might not always be possible to simply pay more attention 
or 'know' something other than what you believe to 
be true. Tasks might 
not always be appropriate or achievable according to the 
'rules ý 
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B. Environment-related questions (local working conditions) 
1. Do you think there were any problems relating to the immediate working 
conditions which could have made this error more likely to occur / made this task 
more difficult? 
Rail example: The driver might not have been able to see the stop light 
properly because it was obscured by overhanging trees1sunlight shifting 
made it difficult to see properly. Driver might have ignored stop signal 
because they believed it was giving them incorrect in rmation and they Ifo 
usuallyjust drove through them anyway. 
2. Do you think there were any problems with the specific task which might have 
made this error more likely to occur? 
Rail example: The driver was supposed to be sent on two more 
training courses before driving alone but had had to start 
earlier and not receive the training due to staff shortages. 
C. Organisational-related guestions 
1. In terms of the workplace factor "x- you mentioned earlier - what 
do you think 
the organisational or management factors are which could 
have contributed to this 
problem? 
Rail example: More closely monitored safety training to make sure all 
systems were adequatefor thejob and all staff 
knew what all signals meant. 
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Staff problems with signalling systems were not identified and actioned 
early enough. 
2. Do you think there are any changes which could be made at an organ'sational level which could prevent this type of error occurring? 
3. To what extent do you consider this to be a global problem relating to medical 
errors in general? 
4. Can you think of any other examples whereby problems with this organisational 
factor (name) might result in medical error? 
Follow-up questions 
0 How big a problem do you think this type of error is? 
0 What type of error do you think this is if you had to classify it? 
0 Tell me how common you think this problem is in your experience? 
0 Do you think medication error is a frequent problem? 
0 Can you give me an example of a medication error you have personal experience 
of? It does not have to involve you, it could be an error you have observed and 
simply heard of on the grapevine - you do not have to be involved or disclose 
anyone's name? 
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Appendix IX: Interview consent form 
Researcher: Samantha Beaumont 
Please initial box 
1.1 confirm that I have read and understand the inforination sheet dated 18 
April 05 (version 3) for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask 
F-I 
questions. 
2.1 understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw from the study at any time, without giving any reason for doing so. 
3.1 consent to being tape-recorded whilst taking part in the research. I 
understand that this recording will be confidential, will only be used for the F-I 
purposes of the research being undertaken and will be destroyed when the 
research is completed. 
4.1 agree to take part in the above study. 1-1 
5.1 will not break the confidentiality of any participant concerning -1 information discussed in the interview F 
Name of Participant 
Researcher 
Name of Participant 
Date 
Date 
Date 
Signature 
Signature 
Signature 
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Appendix X: Everyday drivinll error examples 
1. Slips/lapses 
Attempting to drive away from traffic lights in third gear 
Forgetting where you left your car in the multi-storey car park 
Switching on headlights when you meant to turn the wipers on 
Locking yourself out of your car with the keys still inside 
Forgetting to put headlights on when setting off 
2. Mistakes 
Misjudge your gap in a car park and nearly (or actually) hit another parked car 
Overtake a line of slow moving vehicles and discover they were slowing due to the 
lane ending ahead 
Getting into the wrong lane at a roundabout 
Steer the wrong way into a skid 
3. Violations 
Become impatient with a slow driver in outer lane and undertake (overtake them on 
inside lane) them to get past 
Driving too close to the car in front or flashing them to move out of the way 
Speeding 
Speeding up when approaching an amber light when you could have stopped in time 
283 
zc 
(U 
m 
E 
"- 
. 
-fý 
a) 
-0- # 
02 
V3 
1A 
C: 
0 0 
V3 0 
cu 
LJLJ 
t t t 
V3 
0 1 E Cc C) 0 -4- 
CL 
I- 
0 
u 
=1 
. - 
. 
7= L- U D %P C (v Y I- t- --a -0 -2 -0 -0 
-4. - 
LU 0 
I-- 
0 C) " c 0 0 1 
i:: CL u > 0- u 
. rn U J 0 4- 
KA 
n 
- - 52- 93 0 e- r, la) F- ci 0 cn 3 ri -0 cn CL U - zi 
Appendix XII: Final version of the OSO 
Organisational Safety Questionnaire 
Information 
What is this study lookinp_ at? 
This questionnaire aims to assess the way your environment functions. In the same way you 
might monitor changes in a patient's medical condition for example. this tool will assess the 
'health' of your environment so that any future improvements can be most effectively 
targetted. Organisational or other workplace issues such as human resources, training or team 
communication which are not running as smoothly as they could be are often early indicators 
that quality of care or patient safety might be compromised in the future. This questionnaire is 
one way of monitoring your environment to prei, ent future errors and avoid the potentially 
serious consequences for patient care and for the health care professionals involved. The 
questionnaire itself has been developed by researchers at the University of Leeds in 
conjunction with several nursing teams across Bradford NHS Trust who felt that these 
workplace issues played a vital role in the likelihood of medication errors. 
What will you have to do? 
The only thing you need to do is read each statement carefully and circle the appropriate 
frequency with which each event happens in your environment. It should take you no more 
than 15-20 minutes to complete. Some statements might be more relevant to your role or unit 
than others so feel free to circle 'not applicable' if you think you cannot respond. While your 
participation in this study is entirely voluntary, it would be a good opportunity for you to tell 
us about your environment so that resources can be most effectively targeted at the most 
needed improvements in the future. 
What will happen to the information you provide? 
The information you provide is completely anonymous and will be combined and analysed 
with the rest of your ward or unit to obtain a 'Safety Profile'. YOU WILL NOT BE 
PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE FROM THIS QUESTIONNAIRE. We do not ask for 
your name, only very brief details regarding your unit for the purposes of analysis. Combined 
ward/unit data will be fed back to Bradford Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust in order to aid 
future improvements. 
What should you do now? 
Simply turn over this page and begin completing the questionnaire. When you have finished 
simply place it into the freepost envelope provided and post it back to me - Sam Beaumont at 
the University of Leeds before Fridav 30'h November. If you have any questions about the 
study please do not hesitate to contact me either by email (psc2sJb(y), Ieeds. ac. uk) or telephone 
(0113 3436680). 
Organisational Safety Questionnaire 
Please read each statement below carefully and respond by circling the number 
which best represents the frequency with which each event happens on your ward 
or department (if you do not work on a ward). Please bear in mind the time scales 
reported for each question (e. g. in the last 2 weeks, 4 weeks, 2 months etc). If you 
cannot answer the question because you do not know whether this happens in your 
department or it is not relvant to you then circle 'not applicable' (N/A). 
Not at all Occasionally Quite Often Frequently 
Nearly all 
the time 
Not 
Applicable 
1 2 
_3 
4 5 N/A 
In the last 4 weeks, a patient's clinical investigation paper-work (e. g. 
blood test, ecg report etc. ) has been sent to this ward/unit/dept and 12345 N/A 
subsequently lost 
In the last 2 months, I have encountered details on a patient's ID 
wristband which did not correspond with their drug chart * 
12345 N/A 
In the last 2 months, I have been unable to coordinate the ward/unit/dept 
because of my patient allocation 
12345 N/A 
In the last 4 weeks, I have worked a shift when an agency nurse was 12345 N/A 
requested but did not arrive, leaving the ward/unit/dept understaffed 
In the last 3 months, I have worked 3 or more 'long shifts' (7am - 9pm) 
one after another 
12345 N/A 
Senior nurses on this ward/unit/dept prefer all patient queries to come 
through them in the first instance - even if there are other nurses on shift 12345 N/A 
who would know the answer 
When a mistake is made that could han-n the patient, but does not, how 1234 15 N/A 
often is this reported on your ward/unit/dept? 
In the last 4 weeks, I have given or almost given a patient medication 1 12345 N/A 
was not sure had been prescribed correctly 
In the last 3 months, a patient fi, om this ward has been 'slept out' 12345 N/A 
elsewhere but had to return the next day because they were unwell 
All senior nurses on this ward/unit/dept demonstrate a safe example of 12345 N/A 
patient care for staff to follow 
In the last 6 months, I have performed a clinical procedure or used a 12345 N/A 
piece of equipment for which I was not formally trained 
In the last 4 weeks, I have discovered a drug chart belonging to one 12345 N/A 
patient in a different patient's nursing/medical notes/bedside locker/bed 
This ward regularly uses a standardised list (written document) of tasks 12345 N/A 
which should be carried out for each new admission 
In the last 4 weeks, I have sped up during a drug round to avoid a backlog 12345 N/A 
of jobs later in the shift 
Not at all Occasionally Quite Often Frequently Nearly all 
the time 
Not 
Applicable 
1 2 3 4 5 N/A 
In the last 4 weeks, I have given or almost given a patient the wrong dose 
of the correct medication 
In the last 2 months, as a qualified nurse I have had to leave the ward to 
accompany a patient to another department leaving the ward short of 
qualified nurses 
in the last 2 months, I have worked 6 or more hours of my shift without 
anything to eat or drink 
In th e last 2 months, a senior nurse has complained that jobs frorn the 
previous shift were left unfinished 
I have attended a ward/unit/dept meeting in the last 3 months 
This ward uses a standardized list (written document) of information 
which must be passed on to colleagues during patient handover 
In the last 2 months, a doctor has refused to carry out something I 
needed them to do because the patient concerned was not theirs 
In the last 2 months, I have encountered boxed medication which did not 
correspond with the outer package labelling 
In the last 2 months, I have refrained from bleeping a particular doctor 
because I wasn't confident they had the necessary skills to help me 
In the last 4 weeks, I have given or almost given a patient a dose of a 
drug which was 10 times more or less than it should have been (e. g. 
25mgs instead of 2.5mgs) 
In the last 12 months, there has been discussion of a policy or guideline 
that I was not aware existed until after an incident had occurred 
In the last 3 months, I have been pressured into arranging to discharge a 
patient quicker than had been originally planned 
All of the senior nurses on this ward/unit/dept are approachable if a nurse 
needs help or advice with a work issue 
In the last 4 weeks, I have given or almost given a patient medication 
which was intended for a different patient 
In the last 6 months, I have been taught a clinical procedure or how to 
use a piece of equipment by a nurse who had not received the relevant 
'formal' training 
In the last 12 months, I have mentored a newly qualified nurse More I 
have attended mentorship and teaching and assessment programs 
In the last 3 months, this ward has transferred a patient to another ward 
during the night or early hours of the morning because their bed was 
needed for another patient 
In the last 12 months, I have signed to say I have read and understood a 
new policy. procedure or guideline when I haven't either read it or 
understood it 
45 N/A 
45 N/A 
2 3 4 5 N/A 
2 3 4 5 N/A 
2 3 4 5 N/A 
2 3 4 5 N/A 
2 3 4 5 N/A 
2 3 4 5 N/A 
2 3 4 5 N/A 
2 3 4 5 N/A 
2 3 4 5 N/A 
2 3 4 5 N/A 
2 3 4 5 N/A 
2 3 4 5 N/A 
2 3 4 5 N/A 
45 N/A 
N/A 
N/ A 
Not at all Occasionally Quite Often 
- 
Frequently Nearly all 
the time 
Not 
Applicable 
1 2 3 5 N/A 
In the last 2 months, I have been asked by a consultant to carry out a task 
which was really the job of a junior doctor rather than a nurse 
1234 
-1; N/A 
In the last 2 months, I have rushed through outstanding jobs towards the 
end of my shift so the next shift did not have to do them 12345 N/A 
In the last 2 months, I have worked with an agency nurse who did not 
know how to carry out a skill or procedure required of their nursing grade 
12345 N/A 
In the last 2 months, I have encountered a patient on this ward whose 
allergy wristband was on the opposite wrist to their ID wristband 
12345 N/A 
In the last 4 weeks, I have encountered a patient's allergy status written 
on their main drug chart but not on their PRN chart 
12345 N/A 
In the last 4 weeks, I have sped up during a drug round to avoid making 
the next drug round late 
12345 N/A 
In the last 2 months, I have been unable to get hold of IV medication 
equipment because I could not find it in the hospital or it was all in use on 12345 N/A 
other wards 
In the last 4 weeks, I have had to break off from a drug round because 1 
was interrupted by another health professional (e. g. doctor, nurse, physio) 
12345 N/A 
In the last 4 weeks, a patient's drug chart has gone missing from this 12345 N/A 
ward/unit/dept and had to be rewritten 
In the last 12 months, I have received an updated version of a written 
policy, protocol or guideline without knowing which part of the original 12345 N/A 
version had changed 
In the last 4 weeks, I have given or almost given a patient the same 12345 N/A 
medication twice in the same medication round 
In the last 12 months, all newly qualified nurses starting on this 
ward/unit/dept have been given and have worked through a preceptorship 12345 N/A 
pack 
In the last 2 months, a senior nurse has advised me to cut comers in order 12345 N/A 
to complete all jobs planned before the end of the shift 
In the last 12 months, I have been asked to read a written policy, protocol 12345 N/A 
or guideline but only skimmed it to get the gist because it was too long 
In the last 4 weeks, I have given or almost given a patient a drug which 1 12345 N/A 
later discovered should have been withheld or discontinued 
In the last 2 months, I have refrained from bleeping a particular doctor 
again because I knew they would be annoyed I had bleeped them several 12345 
N/A 
tirnes that shift 
In the last 2 months, a patient on this ward has missed 3 or more doses of 
their prescribed medication because it had been ordered but not sent frorn 12345 
N/A 
pharmacy 
Not at all Occasionally Quite Often 
- 
Frequently 
- 
Nearly all the 
time 
Not 
Applicable 
1 2 3 4 5 N/A 
In the last 2 months, an agency nurse has been sent to this ward/unit/dept 
who was less qualified than the grade of nurse we requested 1234 15 N/A 
In the last 3 months, this ward has had an 'Inappropriate admission' 
because A&E did not want to breach the 4-hour waiting rule 
12345 N/A 
In the last 4 weeks, I have given or almost given a patient medication 
which had expired 12345 N/A 
In the last 4 weeks, I have encountered a drug chart where the details of a 
particular drug (e. g. dosage, frequency/route of administration) had been 12345 N/A 
crossed out and altered 2 or more times 
In the last 3 months, I have made or witnessed an error which I did not 
'formally' report because the patient wasn't han-ned by it in any way 
12345 N/A 
In the last 3 months, this ward has had to rush an existing patient*s 
discharge to admit a new patient from MAU or A&E to avoid a patient 12345 N/A 
breaching the 4 hour rule in A&E 
In the last 2 months, a patient from this ward/unit/dept has been 
discharged without taking home their medication because it had been 12345 N/A 
ordered but not been sent by pharmacy 
In the last 4 weeks, the number of doctors arriving for morning ward 12345 N/A 
round has slowed my drug round progress 
In the last 4 weeks, I have sought assistance from a colleague to interpret 12345 N/A 
the handwriting on a patient's drug chart 
In the last 4 weeks, I have infused or almost infused IV fluid over an 12345 N/A 
incorrect time period (e. g. over 8 hours instead of 16) 
In last 6 months, I have formally reported a safety concern on this 12345 N/A 
ward/unit/dept without receiving any feedback 
In the last 2 months, I have found it difficult to prioritize duties for the 12345 N/A 
day because all tasks seemed equally important 
When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the 12345 N/A 
patient, how often is this reported on your ward/unit/dept? 
In the last 2 months, I have been confused as to what jobs were supposed 12345 N/A 
to be my responsibility during the course of a shift 
In the last 2 months, 2 or more new admissions have arrived within 12345 N/A 
minutes of each other on this ward 
In the last 2 months, I have worked an entire shift without a rest break 12345 N/A 
In the last 4 weeks, a doctor or other health professional has written 
instructions in a patients notes for the nursing team to carry out without 12345 
NIA 
verbally advising them they had done so 
In the last 4 weeks, I have given or almost given a patient a drug that they 12345 N/ A 
were allergic to (e. g. Heliclear with penicillin allergy) 
Not at all Occasionally Quite Often Frequently Nearly all the Not 
time Applicable 
2 3- 4 5 N/A 
In the last 3 months, I have encountered medication (e. g. boxed or IV) in 
the drug trolley or clinic room which had expired by more than a month 
12345 N/A 
In the last 3 months, a patient has been discharged from this ward before 
all the necessary agencies needed to care for them at home (e. g. 12345 N/A 
community nurse, social worker) had been arranged 
In the last 2 months, senior nurses have been rushing around the 
ward/unit/dept completing most tasks while other nurses have less to do 
12345 N/A 
in the last 6 months, I have booked a training course or study day which 
was cancelled due to budgetary constraints 
12345 N/A 
In the last 4 weeks, I have withheld or almost withheld a drug which 
should have been administered 
1234 15 N/A 
In the last 4 weeks, I have encountered drugs packaging for two different 
types of medication which was virtually identical 
1234 15 N/A 
In the last 6 months, there has been a deterioration in the level of 
experience within the team on this ward/unit/dept 
1234 15 N/A 
In the last 2 months, I have had to telephone the ward after my shift had 
ended because I remembered information I had previously forgotten to 12345 N/A 
pass on during handover 
In the last 4 weeks, I have bleeped a doctor 2 times or more without 12345 N/A 
receiving a response 
In the last 3 months, I have followed instructions against my better 
judgement because a doctor or more senior nurse told me it was what 1 12345 N/A 
should do 
In the last 12 months, I have encountered a written policy or procedure 12345 N/A 
that I thought would be impossible to follow in the course of my job 
In the last 2 months, there has been an important task outstanding at the 
end of the shift which I didn't do because I thought another nurse had 12345 N/A 
done it 
In the last 4 weeks, I have given or almost given a patient someone else's 12345 N/A 
medication to take home upon discharge 
In the last 2 months, a doctor on this ward has refused to wait until I was 
finished with a particular task before conducting their ward round 12345 N/A 
without me 
In the last 6 months, there has been an increase in senior nursing 12345 N/A 
turnover on this ward/unit/dept 
In the last 2 months, I have experienced difficulty writing all the 
information passed on to me during patient handover because I didn't 12345 
N/A 
hear or understand everything or there wasn't time to write everything 
In the last 2 months, I have encountered a patient who had been on the 
ward for more than 24 hours who did not have this ward's ID wristband 12345 
N/A 
on 
Not at all Occasionally Quite Often Frequently Nearly all 
the time 
Not 
Applicable 
2 -4 5 N/A 
There has been an incident debriefing or team meeting to discuss the last 
-significant' clinical incident to happen on this ward/unit/dept within one 12345 N/A 
month of its occurrence 
In the last 4 weeks, I have infused or almost infused an incorrect iolume 
of IV fluid to a patient (e. g. 75mls instead of 50mls) 12345 N/A 
In the last 4 weeks, I have experienced difficulty getting an on-call 
doctor to come to the ward out of hours 12345 N/A 
In the last 3 months, a patient has been 'slept out' to this ward who 
needed specialised care I thought this ward could not effectively deliver 
12345 N/A 
In the last 4 weeks, I have encountered a patient's drug chart which had 
been changed by a doctor since the previous drug round without my 12345 N/A 
knowledge 
In the last 2 months, I have encountered a patient on this ward wearing 
an allergy wristband whose allergy was not documented on their drug 12345 N/A 
chart or vice versa 
In the last 3 months, I have experienced difficulty challenging a doctor 
about a prescription I thought they had written incorrectly 
12345 N/A 
In the last 6 months, I have booked a training course or study day which 
was cancelled due to a clash with work requirements or staff shortages 
12345 N/A 
In the last 2 months, I have come across details written on the board 
above a patient's bed for the patient who had previouslY occupied that 12345 N/A 
bed 
In the last 4 weeks, I have given or almost given medication to a patient 
too soon after their last dose (e. g. only 4 hours after previous dose instead 12345 N/A 
of 8 hours) 
When a mistake is made, but has no potential to harm the patient, how 12345 N/A 
often is this reported on your ward/unit/dept? 
In the last 12 months, all the reasons have been made clear why a new 12345 N/A 
procedure or policy has been introduced 
In the last 12 months, all newly qualified nurses starting on this 
ward/unit/dept have received the standard induction training programme 12345 N/A 
required 
In the last 4 weeks, an unýý. jeecte new admission on this ward has meant 12345 N/A 
that other important tasks were incomplete by the end of the shift 
To a very To a To a To a 
Not at all limited limited moderate considerabl 
To a great To a, %, er-, - 
extent extent extent e extent extent great extent 
2 3 
_4 
5 6 7 
We have a good "map" of each other's talents and skills 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
We talk about mistakes and ways to learn from them 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
We discuss our unique skills with each other so we know who 
on the unit has relevant specialized skills and knowledge 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
We discuss alterriatives as to how to go about our non-nal work 
activities 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
When giving report to an oncoming nurse, we usually discuss 
what to look out for 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
When attempting to resolve a problem, we take advantage of 
the unique skills of our colleagues 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
We spend time identifying activities we do not want to go 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
wrong 
When errors happen, we discuss how we could have prevented 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
them 
When a patient crisis occurs, we rapidly pool our collective 1234567 
expertise to attempt to resolve it 
rm 
Bacýkgrolund information 
Please give your work area/unit in this hospital an overall grade on patient safety. 
Mark ONE answer only. 
LJ Failing LJ Poor LJ Acceptable LJ Very good LJ Excellerit 
0 In the last 12 months, how many incident reports have you personally 
filled out and 
submitted? 
LJ None JI to 2 LJ 3 to 5 LJ 6 to 10 LJ II to 20 J 21 or niore 
0 How long have you worked in your current hOSDital ýiork area/unit? 
J Less than I LI I to 5 years 
LJ 6 to 10 JII to 15 J 16 to 20 J 21 %cars or 
year years years years more 
0 Typically, how many hours per week do you work in this hospital? 
LJ Less thari 10 hours per week J 10 to 19 hours per week LJ 20 to 39 liours per week 
LJ 40 to 59 hours per week LJ 60 to 79 hours per week LJ 80 liours or more 
0 What is your staff position in this hospital? 
LJ Matron LJ Sister 
LJ Senior Staff LJ Staff Nurse LJ Student Nurse 
Nurse 
LJ HCA / NA LJ Midwife 
LJ Other, please 
specify: ................................................................... 
Do you administer medication to patients as part of your nursing role? YFS 
NO 
Please feel free to write any comments about patient safety, error, or incident reporting in 
your hospital (attach extra sheet if space allowed is insufficient). 
Appendix X111 - DRBQ Participant information shect 
Drug Round Behaviour Questionnaire 
Information 
What is this study looking, at? 
While it is important to evaluate significant clinical incidents which directly affect patient 
safety, it is also irnportant to keep track of smaller 'events' \vlilch might occur more freqLiently 
but generally go unnoticed. Such events may often seem insignificant at the time, rarely 
resulting in a bad outcome for the patient. However they are often symptomatic of future large 
scale incidents. This short questionnaire has been developed as a way of monitoring these 
smaller events which might occur whilst you undertake your routine drug round. These events 
could be in the form of a memory lapse, concentration or attention difficulties. They might also 
represent a situation where you acted in a way you thought was right at the time but which you 
later discovered was incorrect. Finally, an event could be a situation where you performed an 
action in a way you knew was not exactly how it should be done believing the *rules' to be 
unsuitable or irrelevant to the circumstances. While these events may not have resulted in a bad 
outcome for the patient (or any outcome at all in some cases) it is important that such events are 
monitored in order to prevent more potentially serious (for the patient and for the nurses 
involved) incidents in the future. 
What will you have to do? 
The only thing you need to do is read each question carefully and circle the frequency with 
which you think it happens to you. It should take you approx 5-10 minutes to complete. 
What will happen to the information you provide? 
You do not need to give us your name as the information you give us is completely anollynious. 
We only ask that you provide us with a few simple demographic details at the end of tile 
questionnaire to help us to analyze the data accurately. Individual responses will be viewed 
only by researchers at the University of Leeds' Institute of Psychological Sciences. These 
responses will then be combined to produce an average 'Medication Round Behaviour Profile* 
for your ward. You will not be personally identifiable from this questionnaire. Combined ward 
data will be fed back to Bradford Teaching hospitals NHS Trust. 
What should you do now? 
Simply turn over this page and begin completing the questionnaire. If you have any questions 
about the study please do not hesitate to contact Sam Beaumont at the 
University of Leeds either 
by ernail (psc2sjb(yjccds. ac. uk). 
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Appendix XIN'- 27-item DRBQ face validity task- 
Drug Round Behaviour Questionnaire 
TASK 1- ANSWER SHEET 
For each of the 27 questions on the Drug Round Behaviour Questionnaire please consider 
the following 3 issues; 
1. Comprehension - is the question clear and easy to understand" If no, please provide 
details. 
2. Frequency - would you be able to rate the number of times this behaviour happens to 
you? (answer yes or no) 
3. Examples - can you think of examples of when this might have occurred either to you 
or to soineone else? (you do not need to provide examples here, simply answer yes or no) 
Ql Y/N 
Q2 Y/N 
Q3 Y/N 
Q4 Y/N 
Q5 Y/N 
Q6 Y/N 
Q7 Y/N 
Q8 Y/N 
Q9 Y/N 
Q10 Y/N 
I. Comprehension 
(if no, provide details) 
2. 3. 
Frequency Examples 
Y/N Y/N 
Y/N Y/N 
Y/N Y/N 
Y/N Y/N 
Y/N Y/N 
Y/N Y/N 
Y/N Y/N 
Y/N Y/N 
Y/N Y/N 
Y/N Y/N 
'195 
Qll Y/N 
Q12 Y/N 
Q13 Y/N 
Q 14 Y/N 
Q15 Y/N 
Q16 Y/N 
Q17 Y/N 
Q 18 Y/N 
Q19 Y/N 
Q20 Y/N 
Q21 Y/N 
Q22 Y/N 
Q23 Y/N 
Q24 Y/N 
Q25 Y/N 
Q26 Y/N 
Q27 Y/N 
I. Comprehension 
(if no, provide details) 
2. 3. 
Frequency Examples 
Y/N N' N 
N' /N N' N 
Y/N Y/N 
N' /N Y/N 
Y/N Y/N 
Y/N Y/N 
Y/N Y/N 
Y/N Y/N 
Y/N Y/N 
Y/N Y/N 
Y/N Y/N 
Y/N Y/N 
Y/N Y/N 
Y/N Y/ N 
Y/N Y/N 
Y/N Y/N 
Y/N Y/N 
296 
Please write here any comments you would like to make about the Drug Round Behaviour 
Questionnaire in general, i. e. structure, clarity, wording, formatting or more general 
aspects of its use. All your comments will be completely anonymous so feel free to be as 
honest as you like! 
We would like to thank you for being involved with this research. 
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Appendix XV: Personalised OSO cover letter for Study 4 
Sam Beaumont MSc 
Institute of Psychological Sciences 
University of Leeds 
LS2 9JT 
Email: psý: 2ý, jb(a leeds. ac. Lik 
Tel no: 0113 3436680 
Dear Anne, 
Please find enclosed the Organisational Safety Questionnaire and FREEPOST return 
envelope. This questionnaire aims to measure particular aspects of your working 
environment (e. g. workload, human resources, policies etc. ) which are most likely to make 
everyday tasks more prone to error. You will not be personally identifiable from the 
information you provide on this questionnaire. 
You will have already received this questionnaire a few weeks ago. Unfortunately, several 
staff members felt that since they did not strictly work on a ward it was not applicable to 
them. At this stage I need to find out exactýv which questions are relelantfior eacli ward / 
unit or department. If you do not work on a ward, there will be other less specific 
questions on the questionnaire which may be relevant to your area of work, such as training 
issues or your relationship with other departments and health professionals for example. 
Although involvement in this research is voluntary, please be aware that the information 
you provide on this questionnaire is completely anonymous. This means I do not know 
who has or hasn't already returned their completed questionnaires. If you have already 
done so, I would like to thank you for your time and effort. I realise how difficult it can be 
fitting extra activities into your schedule. If you have yet to fill in a questionnaire and you 
wish to be involved please return completed questionnaires to me, Sam Beaumont at the 
University of Leeds in the freepost envelope provided by Friday 30th November. 
Kind regards 
Sam Beaumont 
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